


Dr. Mustafa Cerić važi za jednog od najuticajnijih muslimanskih ličnosti današnjice. Završio je Gazi Husrev-begovu medresu u Sarajevu, a diplomirao na Univerzitetu Al-Azhar u Kairu, Egipat. Doktorirao je na Čikaškom univerzitetu pred uglednim muslimanskim učenjakom Fazlur Rahmanom. Predavao je na Međunarodnom institutu islamske misli i civilizacije u Kuala Lumpuru u Maleziji pod vođstvom prof. Naquib Al-Attasa, te kao gostujući profesor na Svjetskom univerzitetu za islamske nauke i obrazovanje, Amman, Jordan. Vodio je Islamsku zajednicu u Bosni i Hercegovini kao reisu-l-ulema i vrhovni muftija(1993 – 2012) u ratu i miru; njegovo vodstvo je imalo veliki utjecaj na domaća i međunarodna pitanja koja se tiču istine, pravde, mira i pomirenja. Dr. Cerić je zagovornik međukulturalnog angažmana, kao i mirovni aktivist; dobitnik je *UNESCO-ove nagrade za mir*, nagrade *Theodor-Heuss-Stiftug*, *Sternbergove nagrade*, *nagrade zaklade Eugen Biser*, *nagrade za životno djelo asocijacije UK Muslim Social Scientist*, *nagrade Fondacije Ducci*... Napisao je *Deklaraciju evropskih muslimana*; predvodio muslimansku delegaciju inicijative *Zajednička riječ u Vatikanu*; član je *Odbora savjesti* koji se bori protiv poricanja holokausta; član je Upravnog odbora *Muslimanskog mirovnog foruma*, Abu Dabi; specijalni savjetnik šejha Abdallaha bin Bejje; počasni predsjednik *Svjetske konferencije 'Religija za mir'*; uvršten je među 50 najuticajnijih muslimana u svijetu... Redovni je član Kraljevske akademije Al al-Bajt (Jordan), a jedan je od osnivača i redovni član BANU-a (Bosna). E-Mail: **cericmustafa@gmail.com**

Dr. Mustafa Cerić is considered one of the most inȧuential Muslim figures of today. He completed the Gazi Husrevbeg Madrasa in Sarajevo and earned a scholarship to Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. He received his doctorate from the University of Chicago by the mentorship of the eminent Muslim scholar Fazlur Rahman. He lectured at the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, under the leadership of Prof. Naquib Al-Attas; was a Visiting Professor at the World University of Islamic Sciences and Education, Amman, Jordan. He led the Islamic Community as the Grand Mufti (Raisu-l-ulama) of Bosnia (1993-2012) in war and peace; his leadership had a major impact on domestic and international issues concerning truth, justice, peace and reconciliation. Dr. Cerić is an advocate of intercultural engagement as well as a peace activist; he won the ***UNESCO Peace Prize, the Theodor-Heuss-Stiftung Prize, the Sternberg Prize, the Eugen Biser Foundation Prize, the UK Muslim Social Scientist Association Life Achievement Prize, Ducci Foundation Prize***... He wrote ***Declaration of European Muslims***; led the Muslim delegation of the ***Common Word initiative*** to the Vatican; he is a member of the ***Committee of Conscience*** against Holocaust denial; he is a member of the Board of ***Trustees of Muslim Peace Forum***, Abu Dhabi; he is a special adviser to Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah; he is Honorary President of ***World Conference Religions for Peace***; he is listed among the 50 most influential Muslims in the world ... He is a ful member of the Royal Academy Al al-Bayt (Jordan), and is one of the founders and ful member of BANU (Bosnia). E-Mail: **cericmustafa@gmail.com**



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Mustafa CERIĆ

O PRIRODNOJ VJERI (AL-ĪMĀN) I FORMALNOJ RELIGIJI (AL-DĪN)

ON NATURAL FAITH (AL-ĪMĀN) AND FORMAL RELIGION (AL-DĪN)

Sažetak

Ovaj članak je fokusiran na međudjelovanje prirodne vjere (*al-īmān*), formalne ili umjetne religije (*al-dīn*) i umijeća politike (*fann al-siyāsah*) u islamu. Vjera (*trust*) u Boga je iskonska vjera (*al-īmān*) koju dijele svi ljudi svjesni da su Božija stvorenja kojima je Svevišnji Bog udahnuo Svog duha (*al-rūḥ*). To je potencijalna vrijednost vjere. Dakle, vjera u Boga je prirodna materija (*hyle*). Kao takva nema formu/oblik (*al-ṣūrah* ili *al-šakl*). Oblik materije vjere postaje religija (*al-dīn*) nakon što je instruktivna teologija oblikuje u dogmu, koja nije nužno u potpunoj saglasnosti s iskonskom materijom (*hyle*) vjere, ali ne može se reći ni da je oblik (*al-ṣūrah* ili *al-šakl*) religije (*al-dīn*), kao formalna teologija, potpuno lišen materije ili supstance prirodne vjere (*al-īmān*). Umijeće politike (*fann al-syāsah*), politika koja upotrebljava ili zloupotrebljava prirodno urođenu vjeru (*al-īmān*) i formalnu religiju (*al-dīn*) održava kontinuitet i potiče promjene u povijesti. U ovom procesu kontinuiteta i promjene mnoge su sile u islamskoj povijesti bile u igri i mnoge krize su se zbog toga javljale. Ovaj članak je pokušaj identificiranja ovih "sila", fokusirajući se na fenomen povijesnih i suvremenih devijacija "ekstremizma" u svijetu islama.

Ključne riječi: *islam, čista vjera (al-īmān), formalna religija (al-dīn), diktat vjere, zavjet vjere, talibani, šerijat.*

Abstract

This article is focused on the interplay of natural faith (*al-īmān*), formal or artificial religion (*al-dīn*), and the art of politics (*fannu-l-siyāsah*) in Islam. Trust in God is primordial faith (*al-īmān*), which is shared by all human beings in the conception of their creation by God who breathes His soul (*al-rūḥ*) into each and every human being as a potential trust in Him. Thus, trust in God is the matter (*hyle*) of faith. The faith is not yet the form (*al-ṣūrah* or *al-shakl*). The form of the matter of faith becomes religion (*al-dīn*), after it has been shaped by the art of theologians as an artificial theology, which is not necessarily wholly compatible with the primordial matter (*hyle*) of faith, but it cannot be said that the form (*al-ṣūrah* or *al-shakl*) of religion (*al-dīn*), as formal or artificial theology, is totally void of the matter or substance of the natural faith (*al-īmān*). The art of politics (*fann al-siyāsah*), a politics that uses or abuses naturally born faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-dīn*) is to preserve continuity and encourage change in history. In this process of continuity and change, many forces in Islamic history were at play and many crises arose as a result. This article is an attempt to identify these "forces", focusing on the phenomenon of historical and contemporary deviations of "extremism" in the world of Islam.

Key words: Islam, pure faith (*al-īmān*), formal religion (*al-dīn*), dictate of faith, covenant of faith, Taliban, *Sharīʿah*.

O PRIRODNOJ VJERI (*AL-ĪMĀN*) I FORMALNOJ RELIGIJI (*AL-DĪN*)

Uvod

Moja istinska želja, otkad sam zakoračio u Gazi Husrev-begovu medresu u Sarajevu, zatim kao studenta na Univerzitetu Al-Azhar u Kairu te, naravno, kasnije na postdiplomskom studiju na Čikaškom univerzitetu, bila je da ustanovim da li postoji prirodno urođena vjera koju u bîti jednako dijele svi ljudi. Preciznije, htio sam znati razliku između prirodne vjere i formalne ili instruktivne religijske teologije. Ali, prvo, postoji li razlika između tog dvoga? Osjećao sam nekako u dubini moje svijesti da postoje razlike između „prirodne" vjere i „vještačke" religije, jer je primjetno da postoje drastično divergentna i devijantna tumačenja vjere (religije) na temelju kolektivne religijske svijesti i osobnog religijskog iskustva.

Nadalje, osjećao sam da, ako bi svaki čovjek pošao od izvornog osjećaja prirodne vjere, koja je zajednička svim ljudima, čovječanstvu bi bilo lakše prihvatiti činjenicu da su svi ljudi jedno čovječanstvo (One Humanity), jer je Bog jedan te isti Stvoritelj univerza, odnosno multiverza, i unutar njega čovječanstva. Sâma ideja da dijelimo istu bît i istu supstancu vjere u Boga kao urođenu tvar (*hyle*) u našoj duši, približava nas jedne drugima i inspirira nas da jedni s drugima sarađujemo. Na kraju krajeva, Svevišnji Bog je svjetlo nebesa i Zemlje. Božije svjetlo dodiruje sve i svakoga na zemlji. Bog je također ljubav. Njegova ljubav dopire do svakog čovjeka bez obzira na to bio on/ona svjestan toga ili ne. Za razliku od životinja i biljaka, ljudi su dodatno opremljeni Božijim svjetlom, a to je svjetlo uma, odnosno to je ljudski razum koji ne može a da se ne uhvati u koštac sa svojom okolinom bez obzira na to da li je to što radi dobro ili loše za čovječanstvo. Naravno, najizazovnije od svega je ljudska misao o Bogu jer je Bog skriven od čovjekovog pogleda, ali čovjek osjeća Božiju prisutnost u svojoj duši kao urođeni osjećaj svoje prirodne vjere u Tvorca nebesa i Zemlje.

ON NATURAL FAITH *(AL-ĪMĀN)* AND FORMAL RELIGION *(AL-DĪN)*

Introduction

It has been my deep concern since I had entered into the field of religious studies as a young pupil at the Islamic Madrasa in Sarajevo, then as a student at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and, of course, later on as a postgraduate student at the University of Chicago to figure out if there is an innate nature of faith that is shared by all humanity. To be precise, I wanted to know the difference between a natural faith and a formal or artificial religious theology. But, first, is there a difference between the two? I felt somehow in my deep consciousness that there was a difference between the two because of the drastically divergent and deviant streams in religious and theological interpretations of faith as a matter of collective background and personal experience.

Furthermore, I felt that if humanity comes to the original terms with a natural faith that is common to all human beings, it would be easier for humanity to accept the fact that we humans are a single humanity because God is the One and the Same Creator of all the universe, nay the multiverse, and within it the whole humanity. The very idea that we share the same core and the same substance of trust in God as an innate item in our soul, moves us closer to each other and inspires us to cooperate with each other for good. After all, God is the light of heavens and earth and His light touches everything and everyone on earth. God is love as well. His love reaches every human being whether he/she is aware of it or not. Unlike the animals and plants, the humans are additionally equipped with God's light in their mind, i.e., in their human reason that cannot but tackle with everything around regardless whether this would be good or bad for humanity. Of course, the most challenging of all is human thought about God as God is hidden from man's sight but man feels God's presence in his soul as an innate sense of his trust in God.

Ako prihvatimo premisu da svi ljudi dijele isti potencijal vjere (*trust*) u Boga, što je prirodna vjera kao takva, onda se postavlja pitanje (*petitio principia*): pretpostavlja li ta premisa istinitost zaključka? Pretpostavlja li se zaključak da su svi ljudi jednaki u svojoj izvornoj ili urođenoj sposobnosti da vjeruju u Boga čak i prije nego što budu izloženi Božanskom pozivu u vjeru? Ustvari, uloga Božanske riječi ili objave je da oblikuje prirodnu materiju (*hyle*)[1] vjere (*al-īmān*) u oblik religije (*al-dīn*), tj. Božanski zakon (*al-šarīʾah*). Ova ideja je eksplicitna u Časnom Kur'ānu u ajetima: 44, 46, 47 i 48, 5. poglavlja *Al-Māʾidah*:

> 44. *Mi smo objavili Tevrat, u kome je uputstvo i svjetlo. Po njemu su jevrejima sudili vjerovjesnici, koji su bili Allahu poslušni i čestiti ljudi, i učeni, od kojih je traženo da čuvaju Allahovu knjigu, i oni su nad njom bdjeli. Zato se, kada budete sudili, ne bojte ljudi, već se bojte Mene, i ne zamjenjujte riječi Moje za nešto što malo vrijedi! A oni koji ne sude prema onome što je Allah objavio, oni su pravi nevjernici.*
>
> 46. *Poslije njih poslali smo Isaa, sina Merjemina, koji je priznavao Tevrat prije njega objavljen, a njemu smo dali Indžil, u kome je bilo uputstvo i svjetlo, i da potvrdi Tevrat, prije njega objavljen, u kome je također bilo uputstvo i pouka onima koji su se Allaha bojali,*
>
> 47. *i sljedbenicima Indžila smo bili naredili da sude prema onome što je Allah objavio u njemu. Oni koji nisu sudili prema onome što je Allah objavio – pravi su grješnici.*
>
> 48. *A tebi objavljujemo Knjigu, samu istinu, da potvrdi knjige prije nje objavljene i da nad njima bdi. I ti im sudi prema onome što Allah objavljuje i ne povodi se za prohtjevima njihovim, i ne odstupaj od Istine koja ti dolazi; svima vama smo zakon i pravac (način života) propisali. A da je Allah htio, On bi vas sljedbenicima jedne vjere učinio, ali, On hoće da vas iskuša u onome što vam propisuje, zato se natječite ko će više dobra učiniti; Allahu ćete se svi vratiti, pa će vas On o onome u čemu ste se razilazili obavijestiti.*

Ovaj eksplicitni kur'anski pluralitet ne samo formalnih religija već i „Božanskih zakona" (*šarīʾah*) i „načina života" (*minhādž*) najuvjerljiviji je dokaz za zajedničku prirodnu vjeru (*al-imān*) u konkurenciji sa formalnom ili umjetnom religijom (*al-dīn* ili *al-islām*), koja bi mogla postati ekstremna i isključiva ideologija opterećena nerazumnom politikom. Upravo u ovoj tački pronašao sam zanimljivu analizu mog profesora Freda Donnera sa Univerziteta u Čikagu o putu razvoja rane muslimanske zajednice od „vjernika" do „muslimana". Naime, Donner tvrdi da su Muhammed, a.s., i njegovi sljedbenici sebe u početku doživljavali kao zajednicu vjernika (ar. *al-muʾminūn*), zajednicu kojoj su svi, koji su imali jaku vjeru u Jednog Boga i Sudnji dan, pripadali. Nadalje, Donner tvrdi da korijen islama leži u onome što bismo mogli nazvati „pokretom vjernika", koji je započeo Muhammed, a.s., kao religijsku reformu. Ovaj pokret naglašava strogi *tawḥīd*, monoteizam, i ponašanje po pravdi u skladu s Božijim objavljenim zavjetom/zakonom. Tako je „pokret vjernika" u ranim godinama islama uključivao pravedne kršćane i židove, jer su, poput vjernika Kur'ana, i kršćani i jevreji, bili monoteisti i pristajali su živjeti po pravdi

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[1] Ovdje se aludira na Aristotelovu doktrinu materije (*hulê*) i forme (*eidos* ili *morphê*). Izuzetno utjecajan na razvoj srednjovjekovne filozofije, Aristotelov hilomorfizam je također doživio nešto poput renesanse u savremenoj metafizici.

If we accept the premise that all human beings share the same potential of trust in God, which is a natural faith as such, then begging the question (*petitio principia*) is whether the premise assumes the truth of conclusion. If fact, it does assume the conclusion that all men are equal in their original or innate ability to trust in God even before they are exposed to a divine word. In fact, the role of the divine word or revelation is to shape the natural matter (*hulê*) of faith (*al-īmān*) into the form of religion (*al-dīn*), i.e., the divine law (*al-sharī'ah*).[1] This idea is explicit in the Holy Qur'ān in the verses: 44, 46, 47 and 48 of the 5th Chapter *Al-Mā'idah*:

> *44. Surely, God revealed the Torah, wherein there is guidance and light. Thereby did Prophets – who had submitted themselves (to God) – judge for the Judaized folk; and so did the scholars and jurists. They judged by the Book of God for they had been entrusted to keep it, and bear witness to it. So (O Jews!) do not fear men but fear Me, and do not barter away My signs for a trivial gain. Those who do not judge by what God has revealed are indeed the unbelievers.*
>
> *46. And We sent Jesus, the son of Mary, after those Prophets, confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah. We gave him the Gospel, wherein is guidance and light, and which confirms the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah, and a guidance and admonition for the God-fearing.*
>
> *47. Let the followers of the Gospel judge by what Allah has revealed therein, and those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are the transgressors.*
>
> *48. Then God revealed the Book to you (O Muhammad!) with Truth, confirming whatever of the Book was revealed before, and protecting and guarding over it. Judge, then, in the affairs of men in accordance with the Law that Allah has revealed, and do not follow their desires in disregard of the Truth which has come to you. For each of you God has appointed a Law and a Way of life. Had Allah so willed, He would surely have made you one single community; instead, (He gave each of you a Law and a Way of life) in order to test you by what He gave you. Vie, then, one with another in good deeds. Unto Allah is the return of all of you. He will then make you understand the truth concerning the matters on which you disagreed.*

This explicit Qur'ānic plurality not only of formal religions but also of "divine laws" (*sharī'ah*) and "a way of life" (*minhāj*) is the most convicting proof for a shared natural faith (*al-imān*) in competition with a formal or artificial religion (*al-dīn* or *al-islām*), which might become an extreme and exclusive ideology influenced by unreasonable politics. On this very point I have found an interesting analysis by my professor Fred Donner from the University of Chicago on the development road of the early Muslim community from "Believers" to "Muslims". Namely, Donner argues that Muhammad, a.s., and his followers initially saw themselves as a community of Believers (ar. *al-mu'minūn*), a community to which all who had a strong faith in the One God and the Day of Judgment belonged. Furthermore, Donner argues that the root of Islam lies in what we might call the "Movement of Believers," started by Muhammad, a. s., as a religious reform. This movement emphasizes strict *tawḥīd*, monotheism, and righteous conduct in accordance with God's revealed covenant/law. Thus the "movement of believers" in the early years of Islam included righteous

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[1] I am echoing here the Aristotle's doctrine of matter (*hulê*) and form (*eidos* or *morphê).* Highly influential in the development of Medieval philosophy, Aristotle's hylomorphism has also enjoyed something of a renaissance in contemporary metaphysics.

u skladu sa svojim zavjetima, *Tevratom* i *Indžilom*.[2] Vjerovanje da muslimani čine zasebnu vjersku zajednicu, različitu od kršćana i jevreja, pojavilo se stoljeće kasnije, kada su nasljednici pokreta vjernika odlučili da su pravi vjernici-muslimani samo oni koji drže Kur'an kao konačnu objavu Jednog Boga i Muhammeda kao posljednjeg Božijeg vjerovjesnika. To ih je odvojilo od monoteista koji su se identificirali s Torom ili Jevanđeljem.[3]

Ovdje mi je zagonetka bila intrigantna. Intrigiralo me je zašto i kako se pomak od prirodne vjere ili vjerovanja, koje je zajedničko svim ljudima, mijenja kao takvo da postane toliko neprirodno da više ne liči na sebe? Stvarno, pitanje je kako se ova prirodna vjera pretvara u formalnu ili umjetnu religiju/teologiju sa dijametralno različitim zaključcima ne samo formalno različitih religijskih tradicija nego i sljedbenika iste formalne religije? Zaista, naše bi pitanje trebalo biti kako religija (*al-dīn*) istog Božanskog (prirodnog) korijena postaje isključiva i opasna ideologija u sprezi sa opasnom politikom?



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Kaligrafsko rješenje zajedničke prirodne vjere, *al-islām*.
ILLUSTRATION ~ Calligraphic solution of the common natural religion, *al-islām*.

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[2] Zanimljiv primjer može se primijetiti u mom iskustvu iz 2006. godine na Institutu Madison Lubar na Univerzitetu Wisconsin, gdje sam održao predavanje o Deset zapovijedi kao osnovi za smislen judeo-kršćansko-muslimanski dijalog. Naime, svoje predavanje sam bazirao na testu za slušatelje, čitajući im deset Božanskih citata, tražeći od njih da ocijene koji su od tih citata iz Tore, koji iz Evanđelja, a koji iz Kur'āna. Odgovori su bili različiti. Ali kada sam im rekao da su svih deset citata samo ajeti iz Kur'āna, bili su iznenađeni. Namjera je bila pokazati koliko je slična, ako ne i identična, *tawḥīd*, monoteistička, ideja prirodno naslijeđena u sve tri ibrahimovske/abrahamovske tradicije.
Vidjeti link dostupan: 26.09.2022.:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiyqYeOkbL6AhX0_7sI-HXSODAcQFnoECBoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Flubar.wisc.edu%2Farchive%2F2005-06%2F10Commandments.html&usg=AOvVaw0Tx9zZI29AbZSHBzquSjvA

[3] Vidjeti: Donner, Fred: ***From Believers to Muslimas : Confessional Self-identity in the Early Islamic Community***, *Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences*, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Journal 50-51, 2002-2003, p. 9-53.

Christians and Jews, because like believers in the Qur'ān, both Christians and Jews were monotheists and agreed to live righteously according to their revealed law, the *Tawrāt (Tora)* and the *Injīl (Gospels)*.[2] The belief that Muslims form a separate religious community, different from Christians and Jews, emerged a century later, when the leaders of the belief movement decided that only those who held the Qur'an as the final revelation of the One God and Muhammad, a.s., as the last messenger of God, were legitimate Believers-Muslims. This decisively separated them from the monotheists, who identified themselves with the Torah or the Gospel.[3]

Here I found the puzzle intriguing. I am intrigued to know why and how the shift from a natural faith or belief that is common to all humans is being altered as such to become so unnatural that it sometimes does not resemble to itself anymore? Really, the question is how this natural faith is being transformed into a formal or artificial religion/theology with diametrically different conclusions not only by formal different religious traditions but also by the followers of the same formal religion? Indeed, our question should be as to how the religion (*al-dīn*) of the same divine (natural) root becomes an exclusive dangerous ideology supported by hazardous politics?



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Qur'ān* (Arabic calligraphy) as the final revelation of the One God and Muhammad as the last prophet of God.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Kur'ān* (arapska kaligrafija) kao konačna objava Jednog Boga i Muhammeda kao posljednjeg Božijeg poslanika.

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[2] An interesting example may be noted in my experience (2006) at the Madison Lubar Institute at the University of Wisconsin, where I gave a lecture on the *Ten Commandments as a Basis for Meaningful Judeo-Christian-Muslim Dialogue*. Namely, I based my lecture on a test for listeners by reading them ten sacred quotations, asking them to rate which of these quotations are from the Torah, which are from the Gospels, and which are from the Qur'ān. The answers varied. But when I told them that all ten quotations were verses from the Qur'ān only, they were surprised. The intention was to show how similar, if not identical, is the *tawhīd*, monotheistic idea naturally inherited in all three Ibrahim/Abrahamic traditions.
See link available by 26.09. 2022:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiyqYeOkbL6AhX0_7sIHXSODAcQFnoECBoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Flubar.wisc.edu%2Farchive%2F2005-06%2F10Commandments.html&usg=AOvVaw0Tx9zZI29AbZSHBzquSjvA

[3] See: Donner, Fred: ***From Believers to Muslimas: Confessional Self-identity in the Early Islamic Community***, *Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences*, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Journal 50-51, 2002-2003, p. 9-53.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ ***Veliki Abu Sa'ud podučava zakon*** – stranica iz ***Divana*** Mahmuda `Abd-al Baqija (detalj). Irak, Bagdad, sredina 16. stoljeća. Metropolitan muzej, ev. br. 25.83.9.



ILLUSTRATION ~ *The Great Abu Sa'ud Teaching Law* – Folio from a ***Divan*** of Mahmud `Abd-al Baqi (detail). Iraq, Baghdad, mid-16th century. Metropolitan Museum, acc. num. 25.83.9.

1. U potrazi za prirodnom vjerom

Siguran sam da jevreji i hrišćani imaju svoje unutrašnje teološke razlike i ekstremne grupe koje bi trebale biti njihova unutrašnja briga. Rečeno nam je u jednom *hadisu*, koji je prenio Awf bin Malik: „Jevreji su bili podijeljeni u 71 sektu. Jedna od njih je u raju, njih sedamdeset je u paklu. Kršćani su podijeljeni u 72 sekte. Sedamdeset i jedna od njih je u paklu, jedna je u raju. Kunem se Allahom čija svemoć drži Muhammedovu volju, van svake sumnje, moj *ummet*, nacija, bit će podijeljena na 73 sekte. Jedna će biti na nebu, sedamdeset dvije će biti u plamenu. 'O, Allahov Poslaniče! Ko su ti?' 'Ti su *al-džamāʾah* (zajednica koja se drži zajedno).'"[4]

Naravno, neću se zadržavati na jevrejskim i kršćanskim teološkim razlikama i ekstremnim grupama. Ovdje se bavim prirodnom vjerom islama i njegovim formalnim ili vještačkim religiozno/teološkim tumačenjima koja su ponekad neprepoznatljiva po svojoj izvornoj prirodi. Zaista, želim pronaći svoj urođeni osjećaj vjere u Boga kako bih se mogao nositi s formalnom ili umjetnom pripadnosti teologiji, kakva god ona bila. Zato što pripadnost određenoj vjerskoj grupi (*al-džamāʾah*) nije nužno istinska vjera, već može biti varljiva lojalnost lažnim vođama lažne ideologije. Zapravo, želim dokazati sebi, prije nego bilo kome drugom, da je 'vjera' urođena vjera u Boga, koja je zajednička cijelom čovječanstvu. Želim da shvatim ideju da je 'vjera' samodokazivi entitet kao što je 'bitak' (Heideggerov 'Sein') „koncept koji je sam po sebi dokaziv". Parafrazirajući dalje Heideggerov pojam nedefiniranosti 'bitka', možemo reći da „kad god se neko odnosi prema entitetima, čak i prema sebi, koristi se 'vjera', tj. 'vjera' u Boga"; „ovaj izraz se smatra razumljivim 'bez daljeg *ado*, odlaganja', baš kao što svi razumiju 'nebo je plavo'..."[5] Tako, poput pojma biće (*al-wujūd*), i vjera (*al-īmān*) je najviše samodokazivi duhovni entitet, a ipak je i suštinski i konceptualno najskriveniji. Kao što

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[4] Mevlüt Özler dijeli različite narativne verzije 73 sekte ovog ḥadīsa u četiri grupe: 1. Narativi koji deklariraju samo broj sekti na koje će se muslimanska zajednica podijeliti (al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Mādža, al- Nīsābūrī, al-Bayāb, Ibn Ḥibbān), 2. Narativi koji govore da će samo jedna sekta biti spašena dok će druga biti u paklu (al-Dārimī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal), 3. Narativi koji objašnjavaju tačan identitet spašene sekte (Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Mādža, al-Tirmidhī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Nīsābūrī), 4. Narativi u kojima se navodi da će sve sekte biti na nebu osim samo jedne (al-'Adžlūnī, al-Suyūṭī, 'Alī al-Qār'ī, Ibn 'Arrāq).

Za ove narative vidjeti Özler, Mevlüt: ***İslâm Düşüncesinde 73 Fırka Kavramı*** (Istanbul: Nûn, 1996), str. 21-28. Drugi istraživač, Ahmet Keleş, procjenjuje narative 73 sekte *ḥadītha* u pet grupa: 1. Narativi u kojima se navodi da će se islamska zajednica podijeliti na različite sekte, 2. Narativi koji određuju identitet sekti koje će ići u raj i pakao, 3. Narativi opisivanja spašene sekte koja će otići u raj, 4. Narativi koji opisuju sekte koje će otići u pakao, 5. Narativi koji sugeriraju da se slijedi zajednica (*al-džamāʾah*).

Za detalje, vidi: Ahmet Keleş, ***73 Fırka Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme***, *Marife* 5/3 (2005), str. 25-45. Nijedan od narativa *ḥadītha* o 73 sekte ne spominje se u al-Bukhārīju, Muslimu i al-Nasā'īju. Za više detalja o različitim narativnim verzijama *ḥadītha* o 73 sekte i istraživanje naratora vidjeti Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad al-'Adžlūnī, ***Kašf al-khafā'*** (Bejrut: Dar iḥyā al-turāth al-'arabī, 1932), str. 149-151; Abdullah Eren, ***İftirak Hadislerinin Tahric***, Tahkik ve Yorumu (magistarska teza, Univerzitet Uludağ, 1998); Sayın Dalkıran, ***Yetmişüç Fırka Hadisi ve Düşündürdükleri***, EKEV Akademi Dergisi 1/1 (1997), str. 97-116.

Vidi: Gömbeyaz, Kadir: ***Utjecaj 73 sekte Ḥadītha na klasifikaciju teoloških sekti u islamskoj hereziografskoj književnosti***, *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 14/2 (2005–16.01.2005.), str. 147-160, fusnota 1.

[5] Heidegger, Martin: ***Being and Time*** (prevod: John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson). Harper & Row, 1962, str. 23.

1. In Search for Natural Faith

I am sure, the Jews and Christians have their own internal theological differences and extreme groups that should be their own internal concern. We are told in a *ḥadīth*, narration by the Prophet Muhammad, a.s., which was reported by 'Awf bin Malik that the Prophet said: "Jews were divided into 71 sects. One of them is in Heaven, seventy of them are in Hell. Christians are split into 72 sects. Seventy-one of them are in Hell, the one is in Heaven. I swear to Allah whose mighty hands hold the Muhammad's will, beyond any doubt, my *ummah*, nation, will be divided into 73 sects. One will be in Heaven, seventy-two will be in flames. 'Oh, the Messenger of Allah! Who are they?' 'They are *al-jamā'ah* (the group or community that holds themselves together)'.[4]

Obviously, I will not dwell on the Jewish and Christian theological differences and extreme groups. I am concerned with natural faith of Islam and its formal or artificial religious/theological interpretations that are sometimes unrecognizable to its original nature. Indeed, I want to find my innate sense of trust in God in order to be able to deal with a formal or artificial belonging to a theology, whatever it might be. Because the belonging to a particular religious group (*al-jamā'ah*) is not necessarily genuine faith but may be a delusive loyalty to deceitful leaders of a fake ideology. In fact, I want to prove to myself, before anyone else, that 'faith' is an innate trust in God, which is common to and shared by all mankind. I want to grasp the idea that 'faith' is a self-evident entity just as 'Being' (Heidegger's 'Sein') "is all concepts the one that is self-evident". Paraphrasing further Heidegger's notion of indefinability of 'Being', we may say that "whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made" of 'Faith', i.e., 'Trust' in God; "and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands 'The sky *is* blue'..."[5] Thus, like 'Being' (*al-wujūd*), 'Faith' (*al-īmān*) is the most obvious spiritual entity, and yet it is the most hidden both essentially and conceptually. Just as there is no

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[4] Mevlüt Özler divides the different narrative versions of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* into four groups: 1. Narratives declaring only the number of sects into which the Muslim community will divide (al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, al- Nīsābūrī, al-Bayḥakī, Ibn Ḥibbān), 2. Narratives saying that only one sect will be saved while the other will be in Hell (al-Dārimī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal), 3. Narratives explaining the exact identity of the saved sect (Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja, al-Tirmidhī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, al-Nīsābūrī), 4. Narratives stating that all sects will be in Heaven except for one only (al-'Ajlūnī, al-Suyūṭī, 'Alī al-Qārī, Ibn 'Arrāq).

For these narratives, see Özler, Mevlüt: ***İslâm Düşüncesinde 73 Fırka Kavramı*** (Istanbul: Nûn, 1996), pp. 21-28. Another researcher, Ahmet Keleş, evaluates the narratives of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* under five groups: 1. Narratives stating that the Islamic community will divide into various sects, 2. Narratives determining identities of sects that will go to Heaven and Hell, 3. Narratives describing the saved sect that will go to Heaven, 4. Narratives describing the sects that will go to Hell, 5. Narratives suggesting to follow the community (*al-jamā'ah*).

For details, see Ahmet Keleş, ***73 Fırka Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme***, *Marife* 5/3 (2005), pp. 25-45. None of the narratives of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* is mentioned in al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and al-Nasā'ī. For further details of the different narrative versions of the 73 sects *ḥadīth* and the investigation of narrators, see Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad al-'Ajlūnī, ***Kashf al-khafā'*** (Beirut: Dar iḥyā al-turāth al-'arabī, 1932), pp. 149-151; Abdullah Eren, ***İftirak Hadislerinin Tahric****, Tahkik ve Yorumu* (M.A. Thesis, Uludağ University, 1998); Sayın Dalkıran, ***Yetmişüç Fırka Hadisi ve Düşündürdükleri***, EKEV Akademi Dergisi 1/1 (1997), pp. 97-116.

See, Kadir Gömbeyaz, ***The Influence of the 73 Sects Ḥadīth on the Classification of Theological Sects in Islamic Heresiographical Literature***, *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 14/2 (2005): pp. 147-160, footnote 1.

[5] Heidegger, Martin: ***Being and Time*** (translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson), Harper & Row, 1962, p. 23.

nema potrebe da se definira „čisto biće" zbog njegove samodokazivosti, nema potrebe ni da se definira „čista vjera" zbog njenog samodokazivog manifesta. Dakle, vjera je prirodno stanje ljudske duše. Jer, ono što je čisto i samo po sebi razumljivo jeste i samo po sebi odredivo; a ono što je samo po sebi odredivo nema ni rod ni vrstu koja bi ga definirala u odnosu na drugi entitet drugačije osobenosti. Čista vjera je Božiji dar o kojem ljudski um nema ništa za reći osim da je prihvati takvu kakva jest ili zanemari ili odbaci.[6]

Budući da se urođeno stanje humanog duha vjere (trust) u Boga u širem smislu ne stječe iskustvom, već se dobije rođenjem, stoga: *Ti okreni lice svoje izvornoj vjeri, tj. prirodnoj vjeri (fiṭratallah), kojom je On obdario ljude. Nema promjene u Allahovom stvaranju. To je prava vjera, ali većina ljudi to ne znaju.*[7] *Dakako, svako dijete je rođeno na prirodan način kroz Božije stvaranje (ʾalā fiṭrah)...*[8]



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn al-Nafīs i Ibn Sinâ – *... vjera je prirodno stanje čiste ljudske duše i čovjekovog čistog uma. U njegovoj čistoj prirodi leži urođena vjera (trust) u Boga, odnosno leži prirodna vjera.*

ILLUSTRATION ~ Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn al-Nafīs and Ibn Sinâ – *... faith is the natural state of a pure human soul and human pure mind. In his pure nature lies innate faith (trust) in God, that is, natural faith.*

Iako su drevni filozofi, poput Aristotela i stoika, imali ideju o *tabula rasi*, ta ideja nije bila široko razrađena sve do jedanaestog stoljeća kada je perzijski muslimanski filozof Ibn Sinâ (980–1037) ustanovio frazu *al-ṣafḥah al-bayḍā'* (prazna ploča ili *tabula rasa*). Andaluzijski filozof i romanopisac Ibn Ṭufayl (1105–1185) razvio je Ibn Sinaovu ideju *tabula rasa* u teoriju refleksivnog eksperimenta pokazujući razvoj uma kod divljeg dječaka na pustom ostrvu.[9] U trinaestom stoljeću Toma Akvinski (1225–1274) uveo je ovu ideju ili teoriju *tabula rasa* u kršćansku teološku i filozofsku misao preuzevši je od Aristotela i Ibn Sinâa. U modernom dobu daljnja razrada ideje o *tabula rasi* pripisuje se Johnu Lockeu

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[6] Vidjeti: Barret, Justin L.: ***Born Believers, the Science of Children's Religious Beliefs***. Atria Books, 2012.

[7] ***Kur'ān***, 30:30.

[8] ***Ḥadīth***, Abu Hurayrah.

[9] Ibn Ṭufayl: ***Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*** („*The Living Son of the Awake*"). Vidi i: Goodman, Lenn Evan: ***Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzān***. The University of Chicago Press, 2003.

need to define 'Pure Being' because of its self-evidence, there is no need to define 'Pure Faith' because of its self-evident manifesto. Thus, faith is natural state of human soul. For, what is pure and self-evident is definable in itself; and what is definable in itself has neither genus nor species that would define it in relation to other entity of a different trait. 'Pure Faith' is a gift of God about which the human mind has nothing to say but to accept it as it is or neglect or reject it.[6]

Being an innate state of huma spirit, the trust in God or faith in a broad meaning is not acquired in experience, but it is given by birth. Therefore, *turn your face to the natural way of creation (fiṭratallah), the way that all people were created by God because there is no alteration of God's creation..."*[7]; Indeed, *every child is born in a natural way of God's creation (ʿalā fiṭrah)..."*.[8]



ILLUSTRATION ~ Aristotle: *... the idea of faith as a soul by birth tabula rasa;* John Locke: *... man is born with an innate mental structure, of which selfishness is the most obvious;* Thomas Hobbes: *... the natural state of man is 'war of all against all'.*

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Aristotel: *... ideja vjere kao duša po rođenju tabula rasa;* John Locke: *... čovjek se rađa s urođenom mentalnom strukturom, od koje je sebičnost najočitija;* Thomas Hobbes: *... prirodno stanje čoveka je 'rat svih protiv svih'.*

Although ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle and the Stoics, had the idea of *tabula rasa*, it was not widely elaborated though until the eleventh century when the Persian Muslim philosopher Ibn Sīnā (980-1037) forged his phrase *al-ṣafḥah al-bayḍā'* ("white paper" or "tabula rasa"). The Andalusian philosopher and novelist Ibn Ṭufayl (1105-1185) developed Ibn Sīnā's idea of *tabula rasa* into a theory of reflective experiment by showing the development of the mind in a wild boy on a desert island.[9] In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) introduced this idea or theory of *tabula rasa* into Christian theological and philosophical thought from Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā. In the modern age, further elaboration of the idea of the theory of *tabula rasa* is attributed to John

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[6] See: Barret, Justin L.: ***Born Believers, the Science of Children's Religious Beliefs***. Atria Books, 2012.

[7] ***Qur'ān***, 30:30

[8] ***Ḥadīth***, Abu Hurayrah.

[9] Ibn Ṭufayl: ***Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*** (*The Living Son of the Awake).* See: Goodman, Lenn Evan: ***Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzān***. The University of Chicago Press, 2003.

(1632–1704), koji je vjerovao da sve znanje dolazi iz iskustva, jer je naša duša po rođenju *tabula rasa*, bez prethodnih pravila. Stoga je svaka duša ili svaki um slobodan da se oblikuje svojom voljom na osnovu vlastitog iskustva. Za razliku od Johna Lockea, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) je vjerovao da se čovjek rađa s urođenom mentalnom strukturom, od koje je sebičnost najočitija. Otuda je Hobbes smatrao da je prirodno stanje čoveka „rat svih protiv svih" (*bellum omnium contra omnes*), kao i svoju zloglasnu opasku da je „čovjek čovjeku vuk" (*lupus est homo homini*).[10]

Suprotno ovom pesimističkom pogledu na prirodu čovjeka, islamska perspektiva čovjeka je da u njegovoj čistoj prirodi leži urođena vjera (*trust*) u Boga, leži prirodna vjera. Ovu prirodnu vjeru Svevišnji Bog je iz Svoje milosti udahnuo čovjeku od Svoga duha (*nafkhah rūḥiyyah*) u čovjekovu čistu dušu i čovjekov čisti um. O tome svjedoče dva epska zapisa. Jedan se zove *Živi sin budnog* (*Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*), a drugi se *Plemeniti sin govornika* (*Fāḍil bin Naṭiq*). Priču o prvom prenio je Ibn Ṭufayl,[11] a o drugom Ibn al-Nafīs.[12] Obojica su posudili ideju prirodne teologije [13] od Ibn Sinâa,[14] koji je prije njih zamišljao *Živog sina budnog*.[15] Ibn Sinaov *Živi sin budnog* ne liči na Robinzona Krusoa, niti Daniel Defoe[16] liči na Ibn Ṭufayla ili Ibn al-Nafīsa. Robinzon Kruso je avanturista na pustom morskom ostrvu, dok je Ibn Ṭufaylov *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* radoznalo ljudsko biće na pustom ostrvu u potrazi za istinom o svojoj ljudskoj prirodi i prirodi oko sebe. Defoeov junak je avanturista koji ima samo jednu želju, a to je da preživi na pustom ostrvu, očekujući spas od nekoga. Ibn al-Nafīsov *Fāḍil bin Naṭiq* nije avanturista. On je dječak koji se spontano rodio bez majke i oca na pustom ostrvu. Ibn al-Nafīs je svjestan da postoje ljudi koji ne prihvataju da se čovjek može roditi bez oca i majke.

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[10] Pogledajte link, pristupljeno 12. augusta 2021.: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwipjJv0pKvyAhXZ_rsIHe6xCkIQFnoECB8QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.cr%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DO_QyCDsmdZsC&usg=AOvVaw2-hjZxXzi54CAo2_PrGgWV.

[11] Ibn Ṭufayl (1105–1185) je arapski andaluzijski muslimanski polimatičar, pisac, filozof, teolog, liječnik i vezir. Najpoznatiji je kao autor knjige ***Živi sin budnog***, koju mnogi smatraju prvim filozofskim romanom u istoriji književnosti.

[12] Ibn al-Nafīs (1213–1288) jedan je od najpriznatijih ljekara u historiji medicine. Otkrio je plućnu cirkulaciju ili mali protok krvi. Vjeruje se da je napisao svoj prvi teološki roman: ***Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah***, što se na Zapadu prevodi kao: *Theologus Autodidactus*.

Vidjeti i: al-Qurashī, Ibn al-Nafīs, ʾAlāʾu al-Dīn ʾAlī bin al-Haram: ***Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah fī al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah*** (*Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Nafis*), Oxford, Max Meyerhof & Joseph Schacht, At the Clarendon Press, 1968.

[13] Prirodna teologija, nekada nazivana i fiziko-teologija, vrsta je teologije koja daje argumente za postojanje Boga zasnovane na razumu i uobičajenom iskustvu prirode.

[14] Ibn Sina (980–1037), vodeći muslimanski filozof i neoplatonista perzijskog porijekla. Osim što je bio vodeći filozof, Ibn Sina je bio i astronom, hemičar, geolog, hafiz Kur'ana, islamski psiholog, teolog, logičar, paleontolog, matematičar, mektebski učitelj, fizičar, pjesnik i naučnik. Ibn Sina je također autor knjige: ***Ḥayy ibn Jaqzān***, koja je bila inspiracija Ibn Tufaylu da napiše svoju knjigu Živi sin budnog. Treba napomenuti da je Šahabuddin Suhrawardi al-Maqtūl između 1191. i 1208. napisao knjigu ***Qiṣṣat al-ghurbat al-gharbiyyah*** (*Priča o zapadnom egzilu*), koja liči na priču *Ḥayy ibn Jaqzān*.

[15] Vidjeti: Amin, Ahmad: ***Ḥayy ibn Yaqzan – Ibn Sina, Ibn Tufayl, al-Sahruwardi***, Al-Āfāq, 2018.

[16] Daniel Defoe (1659–1731) bio je engleski pisac, novinar i pamfletičar. Rođen je kao Daniel Foe, sin londonskog mesara Jamesa Foya, ali je kasnije svom prezimenu dodao „de", kako bi zvučao elegantnije. Njegov najpoznatiji roman je ***Robinson Crusoe*** iz 1719.

Locke (1632-1704), who believed that all knowledge comes from experience, because our soul is by birth a "tabula rasa" without prior rules. Therefore, every soul or every mind is free to shape itself of its own free will on the basis of its own experience. Unlike John Locke, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), believed that man is born with an innate mental structure, of which selfishness is most obvious. Hence, Hobbes considered the natural state of man to be "a war of all against all" ("bellum omnium contra omnes"), as well as his infamous remark that "man is wolf to man" ("lupus est homo homini").[10]

Contrary to this pessimistic view of the nature of man, the Islamic perspective of man is that in his pure nature lies an innate trust in God, his natural faith. This natural faith of man is the grace of God's spiritual breathe (*nafkhah rūḥiyyah*) into man's pure soul as well as a dictate of his pure mind. Two epic witnesses testify to this fact. One is called the 'Living Son of the Awake' ('Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān') and the other is called the 'Noble Son of the Speaker' ('Fāḍil bin Nāṭiq'). The story of the former was narrated by Ibn Ṭufayl,[11] and the story of the latter was reported by Ibn al-Nafīs.[12] They both borrowed the idea of natural theology[13] of Ibn Sīnā,[14] who had imagined the 'Living Son of the Awake' before them.[15] Ibn Sīnā's 'Living Son of the Awake' does not resemble Robinson Crusoe, nor does Daniel Defoe[16] resemble either Ibn Ṭufayl or Ibn al-Nafīs. Robinson Crusoe is an adventurer at sea on a desert island, while Ibn Ṭufayl's 'Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān' is a curious human being on a desert island in search for the truth of his human nature and the nature around him. Defoe's hero is an adventurer who had one wish only and that is to survive on a desert island while expecting a salvation from someone else. Ibn al-Nafīs' 'Fāḍil bin Nāṭiq' is not an adventurer. He is a boy who is born spontaneously without his mother and father on a desert island. Ibn al-Nafīs is aware that there are people who do not accept that man can be born without father and mother. Nevertheless, he is detriment to tell the story of a human being who came out without a mother and father.

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[10] See link available on August 12, 2021: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwipjJv0p-KvyAhXZ_rsIHe6xCkIQFnoECB8QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.co.cr%2Fbooks%3Fid%3DO_QyCDsmdZsC&usg=AOvVaw2-hjZxXzi-54CAo2_PrGgWV

[11] Ibn Ṭufayl (1105-1185) is an Arab Andalusian Muslim polymath, writer, philosopher, theologian, physician and vizier. He is best known as the author of the book: *The Living Son of the Awake*, which is considered by many to be the first philosophical novel in the history of literature.

[12] Ibn al-Nafīs (1213-1288) is one of the most recognized physicians in the history of medicine. He discovered pulmonary blood circulation or small blood flow. He is believed to have written his first theological novel: ***Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah***, which is in the West translated as: *Theologus Autodidactus*.

See: al-Qurashī, Ibn al-Nafīs, ʿAlā'u al-Dīn ʿAlī bin al-Haram: ***Al-Risālah al-Kāmiliyyah fī al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah***, (*Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Nafis*), Oxford, Max Meyerhof & Joseph Schacht, At the Clarendon Press, 1968.

[13] Natural theology, once also termed physico-theology, is a type of theology that provides arguments for the existence of God based on reason and ordinary experience of nature

[14] Ibn Sīnā (980-1037) was a leading Muslim philosopher and Neoplatonist of Persian descent. In addition to being a leading philosopher, Ibn Sīnā was also an astronomer, chemist, geologist, hafiz of the Qur'an, Islamic psychologist, Islamic theologian, logician, paleontologist, mathematician, *maktab* teacher, physicist, poet and scientist. Ibn Sīnā is also the author of the book: ***Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān***, which was the inspiration for Ibn Tufayl to write his book ***The Living Son of the Awake***. It should be mentioned that Shahabuddin Suhrawardi al-Maqtūl between 1191 and 1208 wrote a book entitled ***Qiṣṣat al-ghurbat al-gharbiyyah***, which resembles ***Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān***.

[15] See: Amin, Ahmad: ***Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān – Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Tufayl, al-Sahruwardī***. Al-Āfāq, 2018.

[16] Daniel Defoe (1659-1731) was an English writer, journalist and pamphleteer. He was born as Daniel Foe, the son of London butcher James Foy, but later added *de* – to his surname, to sound more elegant. His most famous novel is ***Robinson Crusoe*** (1719).



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Uloga božanske riječi ili objave je da oblikuje prirodnu materiju (*hulê*) vjere (*al-īmān*) u oblik vjere (*al-dīn*), tj. božanski zakon (*al-sharī'ah*).



ILLUSTRATION ~ The role of the divine word or revelation is to shape the natural matter (*hulê*) of faith (*al-īmān*) into the form of religion (*al-dīn*), i.e., the divine law (*al-sharī'ah*).

Za razliku od Ibn Ṭufaylovog *Ḥayya ibn Yaqẓāna*, koji kao beba odrasta uz pomoć gazele, Ibn al-Nafīsov Kāmil izlazi iz pećine kao dječak sâm i započinje život bez ičije pomoći. Ibn Ṭufaylov heroj sâm upoznaje vatru i sâm uči koja obuća i odjeća mu trebaju, dok Ibn al-Nafīsov junak sve to uči od svojih posjetitelja. Možda nenamjerno, ali Ibn al-Nafīs je na ovaj način naglasio ideju, za razliku od Ibn Ṭufayla, da život postaje civiliziran samo u ljudskom društvu. Nakon svega što je vidio i doživio, Živi sin budnog dolazi do zaključka da čovjek može razumjeti prirodu svoje duše i doći do suštine Boga kroz svoj čisti nepomućeni um.

Iako Ibn Nafīsov *Savršeni čovjek* ne poriče moć čistog uma, ali čovjeku je ipak potrebna pomoć Božijih vjerovjesnika, posebno u pogledu organizacije ljudske zajednice. Dakle, Ibn Nafīsov junak otkriva ne samo neophodnost čovjekove pobožnosti i društvene solidarnosti, već i neophodnost periodičnog vjerovjesničkog pojavljivanja. Također, životna historija Posljednjeg Vjerovjesnika i Smak svijeta sa određenim znacima, koji tome prethode, važni su pomagači pravoj istini. Ibn Ṭufaylov heroj susreće zajednicu vjernika ili Božijih povjerenika koji slijede prethodne Božije vjerovjesnike. Ibn Nafīs ne spominje nijednu vjeru imenom, ali se podrazumijeva da je to islam, koji nije samo posljednji autentični diktat vjere za sva vremena i mjesta, već je i najsigurniji odgovor na pitanje kako vjerovati, kako djelovati i kako se spasiti.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Portret Al-Fārābīja. Stranica iz latinskog prijevoda Gerarda od Kremone iz Al-Farabijeve knjige ***Kitab ihsa' al-'ulum***.
ILLUSTRATION ~ Portrait of Al-Fārābī. A page from Gerard of Cremona's Latin translation of Al-Farabi's book ***Kitab ihsa' al-'ulum***.

Thus, Ibn al-Nafīs' Fāḍil bin Nāṭiq ('*Noble Son of the Speaker*') tells the story of a hero, called the Perfect (Kāmil), who is spontaneously born without a father and mother after a flood on a lonely island with a temperate climate and an abundance of plants, fruits and vegetables. The flood brings to the island new ingredients of clay, which is deposited in the cave, whereby a fermentation takes place, from which the organs of the human body are formed, from which man is created. In the cave one feels the air, which gives the heart breath or spirit (*rūḥ*), which when mixed with purified blood gives a vital soul, which keeps Kāmil alive in the cave until he strengthens so that, like a chicken from an egg, he can go out in a white world.

Unlike Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*, who, as a baby grows up with the help of a gazelle, Ibn al-Nafīs' Kāmil emerges from the cave as a boy alone and begins life without anyone's help. Ibn Ṭufayl's hero himself comes to know about fire and learns for himself what shoes and clothes he needs, while Ibn al-Nafis' hero learns all this from his visitors. Perhaps unintentionally, but Ibn al-Nafīs in this way emphasized the idea, unlike Ibn Ṭufayl, that life becomes civilized only in human society. After all what the Living Son of the Awake had seen and experienced, he comes to the conclusion that man can understand the nature of his soul and reach the essence of God through his pure unaided mind.




ILLUSTRATION ~ Part of the issue on **Islamic philosophy** in the Western market.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dio izdanja o **islamskoj filozofiji** na zapadnom tržištu.

Očigledno, Ibn Tufayl je kroz ovaj jedinstveni filozofsko-romaneskni žanr želio da ukaže na razliku između formalnog ili tradicionalnog vjerovanja, koje se zasniva na simbolima, alegorijama ili metaforama, i filozofsko-mističkog ili umjetničko-elitističkog vjerovanja, koje se oslanja na čisti um ili čistu neposrednu spoznaju, koja se postiže upornim vježbama čiste duše. Ali Ibn Ṭufayl nije prvi koji je napravio tu razliku. Za tako nešto u islamskoj filozofiji najzaslužniji je Al-Fārābī (870–950), koji smatra da se objava (*waḥy*) može shvatiti kao kombinacija najvišeg filozofskog znanja s najvišim oblikom vjerovjesništva. Al-Fārābī ne osporava funkcionalnost objave za mase, ali preferira razum, koji služi inteligentnoj eliti. Ibn Nafīs je, s druge strane, imao drugu namjeru, a to je da pobije mišljenja muslimanske filozofske elite, prije svega Ibn Sinaa, elite koja se previše zaljubila u svoj um. Konkretno, kaže Ibn Nafīs, život (*sīrah*) posljednjeg Božijeg Poslanika je paradigma zasnovana na principu „najboljeg ili uvijek najboljeg rješenja za sve životne situacije".

2. Prirodna vjera *vis-à-vis* Božanskog diktata

Naveli smo ovdje dvije priče Ibn Tufayla i Ibn Nafīsa da bismo pokazali potencijalnu moć urođene prirode vjere (*al-īmān*) u usporedbi s mogućnošću formalne ili naučene religije (*al-dīn*) kao Božanskog diktata. Koliko god je prirodna, vjera je i Božanski diktat ili imperativ. Dakle, pravi izazov za čovjeka je shvatiti i prihvatiti ovaj Božji apsolutni diktat: *Budi – i to bude*. Od prvog „Čistog Bića" kao „svjetlost svih svjetlosti" (*nūrun ʿala nūr*) do posljednje „Čiste vjere" kao „spasenja svih spasenja", čovjek ima moć vjerovati da je Bog Prvi i Posljednji (*al-awwal wa al-ākhir*), da je On imanentan i transcendentan (*al-zāhir wa al-bāṭin*) u isto vrijeme. Čovjek ima tu moć, ali možda nema volje da slijedi svoje vjerovanje u apsolutnu istinu kao temelj za sve druge istine. Prema tome, tvrdnja da je „vjera diktat" ima smisla za one koji dobrovoljno prihvate prvu tvrdnju: „Bog je apsolutni Gospodar svih svjetova", tj. ne jedan univerzum, već mnogo multiverzuma. Ima ljudi koji to razumiju, ali ne prihvataju, kao što postoje i oni koji to prihvataju, ali ne razumiju. Ovdje nas zanimaju oni ljudi koji formalno prihvataju da je Bog prvi i najvažniji *al-Āmir*, Onaj koji poziva čovjeka na određenu radnju i *al-Nāhī*, Onaj koji čovjeka odgovara od određene radnje. Ali, oni, ekstremisti, ne shvataju u potpunosti krajnju svrhu Božanskih zapovijedi, koje imaju za cilj stvaranje bratstva među ljudima. Oni su ti koje ovdje želimo podvrgnuti kritičkom posmatranju u svjetlu kritike čiste vjere na koju se odnose. Svjestan sam oni da odbacuju naše zapažanje i našu kritiku jer su uvjereni da su samo oni na pravom putu kojeg mi ne razumijemo. Ali čak i kada bismo nekako shvatili njihov „pravi put", mi ne bismo bili njihovi jer oni nisu naši. Dakle, ne radi se ovdje o njihovoj i našoj vjeri, već o njihovoj i našoj pripadnosti. Ljudi nisu razdvojeni vjerom jer je vjera zajednička vrijednost svih. Ljude razdvaja pripadnost budući da je pripadnost privatna vrijednost određene grupe. Vjera je svjetlost uma; pripadnost je sljepilo

Ibn Nafis' "Perfect Man" does not deny the power of the pure mind, but man still needs the help of God's messengers, especially with regard to the organization of the human community. Thus, Ibn Nefis's hero reveals not only the necessity of man's piety and social solidarity, but also the necessity of a periodic prophetic appearance. Ibn Tufayl's hero meets a community of believers or God's trustees who follow God's previous messengers and prophets. Ibn Nafis does not mention any religion by name, but it is understood that it is Islam, which is not only the last authentic dictate of religion for all times and places, but it is also the surest answer to the question of how to believe, how to act and how one might be saved.

Obviously, through this unique philosophical-romantic genre, Ibn Tufayl intended to point out the difference between formal or traditional belief, which is based on symbols, allegories or metaphors, and philosophical-mystical or artistic-elitist belief, which relies on pure mind or pure immediate cognition, which is achieved by persistent exercises of the pure soul. However, Ibn Tufayl was not the first one to make that distinction. Al-Fārābī (870–950) was most responsible for something like this in Islamic philosophy, who thought that revelation (*waḥy*) can be understood as a combination of the highest philosophical knowledge with the highest form of prophecy. Al-Fārābī does not dispute the functionality of revelation to the masses, but prefers reason, which serves the intelligent elite. Ibn Nafīs, on the other hand, had another intention, and that was to refute the opinions of the Muslim philosophical elite, above all Ibn Sīnā, an elite who had fallen too much in love with their minds. In particular, says Ibn Nafīs, the life (*sīrah*) of the last Messenger of God is a paradigm, based on the principle of "the best or always the best solution for all life situations".

2. Natural Faith *vis-à-vis* Divine Dictate

I have brought these two stories of Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Nafīs to show the potential power of the innate nature of faith (*al-īmān*) as compared to the power of formal or instructive religion (*al-dīn*) as a divine dictate or imperative. For as much as is it is natural, faith is a divine dictate as well. So, the real challenge for man is to grasp and accept this God's absolute dictate: 'Be – and it is'. From the first 'Pure Being' as the 'light of all lights' (*nūrunʿala nūr*) to the last 'Pure Faith' as the 'salvation of all salvations', man is impowered to believe that God is the First and the Last (*al-awwal wa al-ākhir*), that He is the Immanent and the Transcendent (*al-zāhir wa al-bāṭin*) at the same time. Man has that power, but he may not have the will to follow his belief in the absolute truth as a foundation for all other truths. Therefore, the proposition: "faith is a dictate" makes sense for those who willingly accept the first proposition: "God is the absolute Lord of all worlds", i.e., not one uni-verse but many – multi-verse. There are people who understand it but do not accept it, just as there are those who accept it but do not understand it. We are interested here in those people who formally accept that God is the First and foremost *al-āmir*, the One who calls man to certain actions and *al-Nāhī*, the One who distracts man from certain actions. But they, extremists, do not comprehend fully the ultimate purpose of divine commandments which aim at making the brotherhood of

razuma; mrak nastaje kada se svjetlo ugasi. Pripadnost otuđenoj grupi počinje kada se izgubi čista prirodna vjera.

Koliko god je važno da čovjek razumije i prihvati da je vjera Božiji diktat za njegovo djelovanje ili nedjelovanje, toliko je važno da zna razliku između Božijeg i ljudskog govora ili Božijih i ljudskih zapovijesti. Na ovom detalju prikazano je cijelo pitanje čiste vjere, čistog uma i čiste ruke. Kada kaže: „Bog je rekao ili naredio", čovjek je u poziciji da se uzdigne do „svjetlosti svog svjetla" ili da padne u „bezdan svih bezdana". To je onaj most koji je tanji od dlake i oštriji od sablje, preko kojeg čovjek treba hodati ne samo onog vječnog dana, već i ovog prolaznog iskušenja. Ovaj zemaljski most nije ni privilegija ni prokletstvo neke posebne vjere, već je uobičajeno iskušenje svake vjere. Ali u kasnom dvadesetom i ranom dvadeset prvom stoljeću *Milada*, rođenje Isa/Isusa, a.s., što odgovara kasnom četrnaestom i ranom petnaestom stoljeću *Hidžre*, selidbi poslanika Muhammeda, a.s., iz Mekke u Medina, islam i muslimani se suočavaju s ovim iskušenjem više nego bilo koja druga formalna religija na svijetu. Muslimani su danas suočeni s iskušenjem značenja čiste vjere za razliku od nečiste religije neodgovornih grupa koje tvrde da brane islam. Božija čista vjera islama bila je zamagljena nečistim ljudskim umovima do te mjere da čak ni najčistiji umovi nisu ostali netaknuti. Možda je utjeha u tome što su mnogi u svijetu odustali ili su na putu da se odreknu vjere kao takve i stoga ih ne zanima ni čista ni nečista vjera, osim muslimana, koji se ne odriču svoje urođene vjere u Boga. Čini se da su oni najglasniji od svih u odbrani svojih vjerskih uvjerenja. Ali, pitanje je da li muslimani to rade na način da ih drugi razumiju ili, možda, ne postoji način da ih drugi razumiju ma koliko se religiozno predstavili. U svijetu u kojem vjera nije prvorazredna vrijednost nije lahko biti vjernik. No, to ne smije biti razlog da nečisti um skrnavi čistu vjeru jer drugi ne cijene miris vaše vjere, niti razumiju ukus vašeg uma, niti uživaju u pravdi vaše ruke. Da biste vratili volju i ljubav prema vjeri onima koji su odustali od vjere, morate im srcem svoje ljubavi, umom svojih bistrih misli i rukom svoje pravde pokazati da vas je vjera podigla da biste bili istinoljubiv čovjek, koji ima srce ljubavi, koji ima razum razumijevanja i koji ima ruku pravde svih ljudi dobre volje. Svi ljudi su Božija stvorenja. Bog zna zašto ih je stvorio.

Drugi vjernici imali su isti izazov kao i muslimani danas, ali izazov s kojim se muslimani danas suočavaju je najteži od svih. Ovaj izazov nije u teoriji, već u praksi. Ako iko na ovom svijetu ima Svetu Knjigu u kojoj je sve zapisano od početka do kraja ljudskog života na Zemlji, onda muslimani imaju tu Knjigu. Oni nasljeđuju Božiju Knjigu u kojoj im je sve objašnjeno; u kojoj su upozoreni na opasnost od nečistog ljudskog uma koji onečišćuje čistu vjeru; u kojem im se sugerira kako uvesti čisto srce koje vjeruje, zdrav um koji misli i ruku pravednu koja djeluje u jednu cjelinu. Šta se dogodilo u međuvremenu? Gdje i kada je prekinuta veza između čistog srca, zdravog uma i pravedne ruke kod muslimana? Ta veza je svakako postojala. O ovoj povezanosti muslimanskog srca, uma i ruke brinuli su ljudi koji su također bili svjesni da je Bog *al-Āmir*, Onaj koji poziva na časno djelo i *al-Nāhi*, Onaj koji odvraća od sramotnog djela. Razlika nije u kur'anskoj poruci, niti u učenju i praksi Sunneta.

humanity. They are the ones we want to subject here to critical observation in the light of the critique of the pure faith to which they refer. I am aware that they reject our observation and our criticism because they are confident that only they are on the right path, which we do not comprehend. But even if we understand somehow their "right path," we would not be theirs because they are not ours. Therefore, this is not about their and our faith, but about their and our affiliation. People are not separated by faith because faith is the common value of all. People are separated by belonging because belonging is a private value of a certain group. Faith is the light of the mind; affiliation is the blindness of reason; darkness arises when the light is turned off. Belonging to an alienated group begins when pure natural faith is lost.

As important as it is for man to understand and accept that faith is God's dictate for his action or inaction, it is so important that he knows the difference between God's and man's speech or God's and man's commandments. On this detail the whole question of pure faith, pure mind, and pure hand is featured. When he says, "God has spoken or commanded," man is in a position to rise to the "light of all lights" or to fall into the "abyss of all abysses." It is that bridge, which is thinner than a hair and sharper than a saber, over which man should walk not only on that eternal due day, but also on this passing test time. This earthly bridge is neither a privilege nor a curse of any particular faith, but it is a common temptation for every faith. But in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries of the *Mīlād*, the birth of Isa/Jesus, a.s., which corresponds to the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries of *al-Hijrah*, migration of the Prophet Muhammad, a.s., from Mecca to Medina, Islam and Muslims face this temptation more than any other formal religion in the world. Muslims today are faced with the temptation of the meaning of pure faith as opposed to an impure religion of irresponsible groups who claim to defend Islam. God's pure faith of Islam was clouded by impure human minds to such an extent that even the purest minds were not left unaffected. Perhaps there is consolation here in that that many in the world have given up or are on their way to give up the faith as such and therefore they are not concerned with either pure faith or impure religion, except Muslims, who do not give up their innate trust in God. It appears that they are the loudest of all in a defense of their religious beliefs. But the question is whether Muslims do it in a way that others understand them or, perhaps, there is no way for others to understand them no matter how religiously they present themselves. In a world where faith is not a first-rate value, it is not easy to be a believer. But this must not be a reason for the unclean mind to defile pure faith because others do not appreciate the smell of your faith, nor understand the taste of your mind, nor enjoy the justice of your hand. In order to return the will and love for the faith to those who have given up the faith, you must show them with the heart of your love, with the mind of your clear thoughts and with the hand of your justice that faith raised you to be a truthful man, who has the heart of love, who has the mind of understanding and who has the hand of justice of all people of good will. All people are God's creatures. God knows why He created them.

Other people of faith have had the same challenge as Muslims have today, but the challenge that the Muslims face today is the most difficult of all. This challenge is not in theory, but in practice. If anyone in this world has a Holly Book in which everything is written from the beginning to the end of human life on earth, then Muslims have that Book.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Dvolist prijepisa Kur'āna* – nasljeđe muslimana gdje im je sve objašnjeno; knjiga u kojoj su upozoreni na opasnost od nečistog ljudskog uma koji onečišćuje čistu vjeru.



ILLUSTRATION ~ *A two-page copy of the Qur'ān* – the heritage of Muslims where everything was explained to them; a book in which they were warned about the danger of an impure human mind that pollutes pure faith.

Razlika je u pozadini onih koji poruku čitaju naopačke, onih koji pogrešno razumiju Božije zapovijedi i onih koji pogrešno primjenjuju zapovijedi na način koji ne povezuje čisto osjećanje srca sa zdravom mišlju uma s moralnom radnjom ruke.

Uzaludno je pozivati se na čisto osjećanje srca, zdravu misao uma i moralno djelovanje ruke protiv onih koji se pozivaju na Knjigu Božiju i na praksu Poslanika bez osjećaja čiste vjere. Iako u manjini, oni šire utisak da su dominantni u vjeri, vjeri koja nije ni bez čistog srca, ni bez zdravog razuma, niti bez prave ruke, ali je bez jasne ideje, koja bi mogla zaustaviti bezosjećajnost, ludilo i bespomoćnost. Nije nam namjera da se bavimo francuskim pjesnikom Andréom Bretonom, koji je početkom prošlog stoljeća okupio umjetnike oko svog ***Manifesta nadrealizma*** pozivajući ih na „diktat misli, bez kontrole razuma, mimo svake estetske ili moralne preokupacije", nego da istaknemo da je ova ideja vrlo slična ideji takozvane Islamske države Iraka i Levanta (ISIL), koja poziva na „diktat vjere, bez kontrole značenja, izvan svake etike ili morala". Nekadašnji Bretonov poziv na „diktat misli bez razuma i morala" ostao je na nivou umjetničke imaginacije ili naivne gluposti, ali poziv na „diktat vjere bez razuma i morala" danas nikoga ne ostavlja ravnodušnim i spokojnim, a posebno ne – muslimane. Igra oko „bezumnih diktata vjere" nije ni umjetnička mašta ni naivna umjetnost, već egzistencijalni izazov na koji muslimani moraju odgovoriti egzistencijalnim uvjerenjem i slobodom.


Naravno, aktueliziranjem pitanja „diktata vjere" ili „vjere diktata" svjesno otvaramo jednu od najtežih teoloških dilema otkako čovjek postoji na zemlji. Čovjekova je potreba da čuje glas izvan sebe. Ta potreba nije slučajnost, već urođeni osjećaj njegove svijesti, kao ovisnost o nekome ko je negdje i njemu apsolutno nadređen. Ovakvo stanje čovjekove situacije je paradoks jer je on u isto vrijeme slobodan i ovisan o nečemu izvan sebe. Zaista, ovaj paradoks čovjeka najviše zbunjuje i sprečava ga da shvati svoj pravi položaj u svijetu. Kad misli da je apsolutno slobodan, javlja se apsolutna sila koja ga vraća u stanje relativne slobode, ali i kada pomisli da mu sudbina od nekoga kobno zavisi, u njemu se javlja pobuna protiv zavisnosti od bilo koga. Čovjek zna da nije sam na zemlji. Svjestan je da pripada nekome ko ga je stvorio. Ali on ne zna ko. U potrazi za otkrivanjem kome pripada izvan i iznad sebe, čovjek sluša neki glas odozgo koji je kompatibilan s njegovim glasom iznutra o tome kako može vjerovati, kako može misliti, kako može djelovati i kako može biti spašen. Tajna je, dakle, u tom glasu koji čovjek čuje izvan sebe, ali i u sebi; tajna je u tom diktatu, koji čovjek prima s vjerom da je to diktat od onoga koji će ga dovesti do uspjeha na ovom svijetu i spasa na ahiretu. Ne samo da su različite generacije naroda kroz historiju drugačije slušale glas i drugačije primale diktat, već su različiti pojedinci čuli i različite glasove s neba. Tako je to nekada bilo. Ali danas se na zemlju ne spušta samo uobičajeni nebeski glas, niti se s neba šalje samo autentični nebeski diktat. Danas se glasovi dižu sa zemlje na nebo kao diktati, koji se onda vraćaju na zemlju, pa su mnogi zbunjeni, jer nisu u stanju razlučiti pravi od pogrešnog glasa koji čuju s neba, niti mogu razlikovati pravi od pogrešnih diktata. Oni nisu u stanju oduprijeti se lažnim glasovima i lažnim diktatima koji se danas

They inherit God's Book in which everything is explained to them; in which they are warned of the danger of an impure human mind, which defiles pure faith; in which they are suggested how to import a pure heart that believes, a healthy mind that thinks, and a righteous hand that acts into one whole. What happened in the meantime? Where and when the connection between a pure heart, a healthy mind and a just hand was broken in Muslims? That connection certainly existed. This connection of the Muslim heart, mind and hand was cared for by people who were also aware that God is *al-Āmir*, the One who calls for honorable deed and *al-Nāhi*, the One who deters shameful act. The difference is not in the Qur'anic message, nor in the Sunnah teaching and practice. The difference is in the background of those who read the message upside down, those who misunderstand God's commandments, and those who misapply the commandments in a way that does not connect the pure feeling of the heart with the healthy thought of the mind with the moral action of the hand.

It is in vain to invoke the pure feeling of the heart, the sound thought of the mind, and the moral action of the hand against those who invoke the Book of God and the practice of the Prophet without a sense of pure faith. Although a minority, they spread the impression that they are dominant in the faith, a faith that is neither without a pure heart, nor without a common sense nor without a righteous hand, but it is without a clear idea, which could stop the insensitivity, insanity and helplessness. It is not our intention to deal with the French poet André Breton, who gathered artists around his "**Manifesto of Surrealism**" at the beginning of the last century, calling them to "the dictates of thought, without control of reason, beyond any aesthetic or moral preoccupation," but to point out that this idea is very similar to the idea of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), who call for "the dictates of faith, without control of meaning, beyond any ethics or morals." Breton's former call for the "dictate of thought without reason and morality" has remained at the level of artistic imagination or naive folly, but the call for "the dictate of faith without reason and morality" today leaves no one indifferent and serene, especially non-Muslims. The play around the "mindless dictates of faith" is neither artistic imagination nor naive folly, but an existential challenge to which Muslims must respond with existential conviction and freedom.

Of course, by actualizing the question of the "dictates of faith" or the "faith of dictates," we consciously open one of the most difficult theological dilemmas since man has existed on earth. It is man's need to hear a voice outside of himself. This need is not an accident but an innate sense of his consciousness, as his addiction to someone who is somewhere and absolutely superior to him. This state of man's situation is a paradox because he is at the same time free and dependent on something beyond him. Indeed, this paradox confuses man the most and prevents him from realizing his true position in the world. Just as he thinks that he is absolutely free, an absolute force appears, which returns him to a state of relative freedom, but also when he thinks that his destiny is fatally dependent on someone, a rebellion against dependence on anyone appears in him. Man knows that he is not alone on earth. He is aware that he belongs to someone who created him. But he doesn't know who. In the quest to find out to whom he belongs outside and above himself, man listens to some voice from above, which is compatible with his voice from within about how he can believe, how he can think, how he can act and how he can be saved. The secret, then, is in that voice, which man hears outside himself, but also within himself; the secret is in that dictation, which man

šire nebom i zemljom. Sve im se pomiješalo u srcu i umu, pa ruka postaje nepravedna. Zato je potrebno vratiti se čistoj prirodnoj vjeri, koja čisti ljudsko srce, čisti ljudski um i čisti ljudsku ruku od nepravde.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Muhammed, a.s., je po diktatu čiste vjere ostavio sve svoje u Mekki da bi spasio sve u Medini.
ILLUSTRATION ~ Prophet Muhammad, a.s., according to the dictates of pure faith, left everything he owned in Mecca to save everything in Medina.

Nema jačeg diktata niti jačeg motiva od diktata i motiva čiste vjere. Nuh, a.s., je sagradio brod spasa po diktatu čiste vjere; Ibrahimu, a.s., je čista vjera naložila da žrtvuje svog sina; Musa, a.s., se suočio s faraonom po diktatu čiste vjere; Isa, a.s., je patio po diktatu čiste vjere; Muhammed, a.s., je po diktatu čiste vjere ostavio sve svoje u Mekki da bi spasio sve u Medini. Onima koji su zaduženi za afirmaciju čiste vjere kao diktata nije teško braniti ovu tvrdnju. Oni koji su već u vjeri, ili su s vjerom u svojoj duši kao neupitnom istinom, prihvataju diktate čiste vjere kao konačnu stvar u kojoj nema sumnje i rasprave. Ustvari, ovo je značenje religioznog diktata: bez sumnje, to je konačno Božansko dobro. Bog je dobar i stoga je sve što Bog zapovijeda dobro samo po sebi. Ne mora postojati neposredna jasna korist ili dobit od Božanske zapovijesti, ali duša mora biti pokorna da primi i izvrši zapovijed – odmah.

receives with faith that it is a dictation from the one who is to lead him to success in this world and salvation in the Hereafter. Not only have different generations of peoples throughout history listened to the voice differently and received the dictation differently, but different individuals have also heard different voices from heaven. That is how it used to be. But today not only the usual heavenly voice descends to earth, nor is only authentic heavenly dictation sent from heaven. Today, voices rise from the earth to the sky as dictations, which then return to the earth, so many are confused, because they are not able to distinguish the right from wrong voices they hear from the sky, nor are they able to distinguish right from wrong dictates. They are incapable of resisting to the false voices and false dictates that are spreading across heaven and earth today. Everything is mixed in their heart and mind, so the hand becomes unjust. That is why it is necessary to return to pure natural faith, which purifies the human heart, clears the human mind and cleans the human hand of injustice.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Prophet Noah, a.s., built the ark of salvation according to the dictates of pure faith.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Nuh, a.s., je sagradio brod spasa po diktatu čiste vjere.

There is neither a stronger dictation nor a stronger motive than the dictation and the motive of pure faith. Noah, a.s., built a ship by the dictates of pure faith; Ibrahim, a.s., was dictated by pure faith to sacrifice his son; Musa, a.s., confronted Pharaoh by the dictates of pure faith; Isa, a.s., suffered all by the dictates of pure faith; Muhammad, a.s., by the dictates of pure faith left everything in Mecca to save everyone in Medina. It is not difficult for those in charge of affirming pure faith as a dictation to defend this claim. Those who are already in faith, or are with faith in their souls as unquestionable truth, accept the dictates of pure faith as a final thing in which there is no doubt

Koliko je neka zapovijed korist ili dobitak, čovjek će kasnije spoznati ili nikada neće spoznati, ali će uvijek vjerovati da je svaka Božija zapovijed za njega i dobra i korisna. Bog je stvorio čovjeka i zato bolje od čovjeka zna šta je za njega najbolje. Čovjek je neznalica. Na to ga treba stalno podsjećati kako bi shvatio da mora čitati i učiti da zna i razumije gdje mu je mjesto u svijetu. Ako se pokuša takmičiti s Bogom, čovjek je na gubitku. Ne zato što mu Bog ne dozvoljava da sazna istinu, već zato što u trenutku zaboravljanja svog položaja u odnosu na Boga, svog Stvoritelja, čovjek misli da je sâm sebi dovoljan, kao i da ga Stvoritelj sputava na putu do „sveznajućeg" čovjeka iako nije u stanju spoznati ni samoga sebe. Jasno je da samo onda kada spozna samoga sebe, čovjek može spoznati svog Stvoritelja, a time i svoje mjesto u svijetu. Sufije, muslimanski mistici, bi rekli: *man ʾarafa nafsahū fa qad ʾarafa rabbehū* („Onaj koji pozna samoga sebe, spoznao je svog Gospodara"). Ali po svojoj prirodi, čovjek voli da zna ono što ne treba da zna i čime ne treba da se bavi, a ne ono što bi trebao znati i čime se mora baviti. Najviše od svega čovjek mora znati „ko je i šta je" i mora se baviti sa pitanjima „zašto je ovdje i sada".

3. Prirodna vjera *vis-à-vis* zavjeta

Dosad smo uspoređivali prirodnu vjeru sa diktatom vjere kako bismo pokazali mogući pomak od čiste materije vjere (*al-īman*) do oblikovane religije (*al-dīn*), odnosno teologije ili ideologije. Koliko god da je plemenit u svojoj svrsi, diktat vjere, ako nije pravilno shvaćen, mogao bi biti katastrofalan. Od stanja ljudske duše, srca, uma i ruke zavisi kako će se diktat vjere razvijati u povijesti.

Sada bismo željeli uporediti prirodnu vjeru s idejom Božanskog zavjeta s čovjekom ili čovjekovog zavjeta s Bogom. Prvo, recimo da je zavjet čista teorija vjere, kao što je zakon čista teorija prava. Pod pojmom „čista teorija vjere" želim naglasiti da je potrebno definirati vjeru tako što će se ukloniti svi elementi koji ne pripadaju čistoj vjeri, tj. koji vjeru čine nečistom. To je metodološka osnova kojom se čista vjera oslobađa od stranih elemenata, koji zamagljuju njenu čistotu i kvare njenu ljepotu. Na prvi pogled to izgleda i normalno i razumljivo, ali u historiji nije bilo ni normalno ni razumljivo. Bilo je normalno pripisivati vjeri mnogo toga što joj ne pripada. Naime, normalno je bilo pripisivati vjeri sve što čovjeku padne na pamet da istakne sebe i svoju misao; i bilo je razumljivo da vjera sve opravdava da bi čovjek mogao zavladati svijetom. Otuda postoji stalna potreba da se čista vjera zaštiti ili očisti od stranih elemenata, koji joj po svojoj prirodi ne pripadaju. To treba činiti teorijski, metodološki i praktično kako bi se očuvala čistoća vjere, njena ljepota i njena uzvišenost, slično kao što je austrijski teoretičar prava Hans Kelsen upozoravao da se pravo, kao osnova za uređenje međuljudskih odnosa u društvu, mora očistiti od elemenata koji mu ne pripadaju. Kelsen je primijetio da je tokom devetnaestog i dvadesetog stoljeća pravo izgubilo svoju čistoću, rekao bih svoju nevinost, jer se metodološki spojilo sa disciplinama kao što su psihologija, sociologija,

and no discussion. In fact, this is the meaning of religious dictate: without question it is the ultimate Divine good. God is good and therefore everything God commands is good in itself. There does not have to be an immediate clear benefit or gain from the Divine commandment, but the soul must be submissive to receive and carry out the commandment – immediately. About how much a commandment is a benefit or a gain, man will know later or will never know, but he will always believe that every commandment of God is both useful and gainful for him. God created man and that is why He knows better than man what is best for him. Man is ignorant. He needs to be constantly reminded of this in order to understand that he must read and learn to know and understand where his place is in the world. If he tries to compete with God, man is loser. Not because God does not allow him to know the truth, but because in the moment of forgetting his position in relation to God, his Creator, man thinks that he is self-sufficient, as well as that the Creator hinders him on the path of knowing everything although he is not able to know even himself. It is clear that only when Man knows himself, can he know his Creator, and thus his place in the world. The Sufi, Muslim mystic, would say: *man ʿarafa nafsahū fa qad ʿarafa rabbahū* ("He who knows himself, has known his Lord"). But by his nature, man likes to know what he needs not know and what he needs not be concerned with rather than what he should know and what he must be concerned with. Most of all man must know "who and what he is" and he must be concerned with "why he is here and now".

3. Natural Faith *Vis-à-vis* Covenant

So far, I have compared the natural faith with the dictate of faith in order to show a possible shift from the pure matter of faith (*al-īman*) to the form of religion (*al-dīn*) of theology nay ideology. As much as it is noble in its purpose, the dictate of faith, if not properly comprehended, might be a disaster. It depends on the state of human soul, heart, mind and hand how the dictate of faith will be worked out in history.

Now, we would like to compare the natural faith with the idea of divine covenant with man or the man's covenant with God. First, let's say that a covenant is a pure theory of faith, just as a law is a pure theory of law. Under the term "pure theory of faith" I want to emphasize that it is necessary to define faith by removing all the elements that do not belong to pure faith, which makes faith impure. It is a methodological basis by which pure faith frees itself from foreign elements, which obscure its purity and spoil its beauty. At first glance, this seems both normal and understandable, but in history it has been neither normal nor understandable. It was normal to attribute to faith much that did not belong to it. Namely, it was normal to ascribe to faith all that came to man's mind to emphasize himself and his thought; and it was understandable that faith justifies all so that man may rule over the world. Hence, there is a constant need to protect or cleanse the pure faith from foreign elements, which by its nature do not belong to it. This should be done theoretically, methodologically and practically in order to preserve its purity, its beauty and its sublimity, similarly as the Austrian theorist of law Hans Kelsen warned that law, as a basis for regulating interpersonal relations in society, must be cleansed of elements that do not belong to it.

etika i politička teorija. Ako je to slučaj sa pravom, šta je onda sa vjerom, koja je mnogo podložnija manipulaciji ljudske samovolje i zloupotrebe.[17]

Zaista je mnogo teže sačuvati čistotu ili nezavisnost vjere koja je poput pravog dragulja, koja se krije u najdubljem dijelu ljudske duše, ali se ponekad i otkriva kao lažni dragulj u najplićoj ljudskoj „volji da vlada", nego da se očuva čistoća ili nevinost prava, koje se rađa kao najdublja ljudska želja za društvenim poretkom, ali se i narušava iz najpliće ljudske pokvarenosti i sebičnosti. Koliko je vjera „čisto pravo" (nomokratija), toliko je i pravo „čista vjera" (demokratija). Ove dvije vrijednosti su toliko međusobno ovisne da nije moguće zamisliti vjeru bez prava, niti pravo bez vjere. Zato je interesantna Kelsenova teza o „čistoj teoriji prava", kao što je i njegova potreba da pročisti pravnu nauku od svih elemenata koji striktno ne pripadaju pravu, vrijedna naše pažnje. Ustvari, ovo nam još više nameće zadatak da religioznu nauku pročistimo od svih elemenata koji striktno ne pripadaju prirodnoj vjeri, jer ona postaje mnogo važnija i mnogo značajnija. Zaista, vjerujemo da je Posljednji Božanski zavjet – Kur'ān – krajnji pokušaj da se vjera pročisti od svih elemenata koji joj striktno, teorijski, metodološki i praktično ne pripadaju.

Ali, treba naglasiti da zavjet prethodi pravu, kao što propis prethodi konačnom zakonu. Zavjet je apodiktičan[18] dok je zakon kazuistički propis.[19] Apodiktički vjerski propis, kao zavjet, je zapovijest (*al-amr*) ili zabrana (*al-nahy*) u obliku imperativa: „reci", „poštuj", „čuvaj", „učini" to i to... i „nemoj da radiš" ili „ne radi" to i to... Reci: „Bog je jedan!", „Poštuj svoje roditelje!", „Drži se Božijeg užeta!", „Čini dobro drugima!" Ali isto tako: „Ne ubij!" „Ne kradi!", „Ne razbijaj zajednicu!", „Nemoj biti pokvaren!" Ovi negativni imperativi mnogo su jači u apodiktičkom pravu od pozitivnih, jer implikacije ukazuju na prirodnu sklonost čovjeka da čini ono što ne smije činiti, tj. da ne smije „ubiti", „krasti", „lagati", da „ne smije biti korumpiran" itd. Dakle, čovjek se upozorava da to ne čini iako je to u njegovoj prirodi, jer je to protuzakonito. Prema tome, „apodiktički zakon ili zapovijest je vječni Božiji zavjet o kojem nema rasprave. Nema rok trajanja. Apodiktički zakon je vječna Božija zapovijest. Apodiktički zakon nije primijenjeni zakon, već bezuvjetni i nepromijenjeni zavjet Boga čovjeku, kao i čovjekov zavjet Bogu da je primio poruku koja uvijek treba da mu je na umu i svijesti. S druge strane, kazuistički zakon je primijenjeni Božiji zakon, izveden iz Božijeg apodiktičkog zakona, koji je obično u obliku kondicionala: 'ako...' se dogodi ova *protasis*, 'onda...' će biti ta *apotasis*." Kazuističko pravo je najbliže

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[17] Vidjeti, Kelsen, Hans: ***Pure Theory of Law***, University of California Press, 1967.

[18] *Apodiktičan* (gr. *apodeiktikos evidentiary*), u običnom govoru: odlučan, odlučan, siguran; u logici *apodiktički sud*, kod Aristotela dokazni sud za razliku od problematičnog. Kod Immanuela Kanta matematički aksiomi su apodiktični jer su zasnovani na apriornoj svijesti o njihovoj nužnosti.

[19] *Kazuistički* (lat. *casus*: slučaj pada). Kazuističko pravo nastaje kao pravo za određene potrebe pojedinca ili društva u svjetlu Božijeg apodiktičkog zakona. To je induktivni zakon od slučaja do slučaja na osnovu kojeg se donosi pravna norma, a ne deduktivni zakon, gdje su pravne norme već poznate i služe za usvajanje potrebnih pravnih podnormi na osnovu njih.

Kelsen observed that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries law lost its purity, I would say its innocence, because it methodologically blended with disciplines such as psychology, sociology, ethics, and political theory. If this is the case with the law, then what about faith, which is much more susceptible to the manipulation of human arbitrariness and abuse.[17]

Indeed, it is much harder to preserve the purity or independence of faith which is like a true gem and which hides itself in the deepest part of the human soul, but also sometimes reveals itself, as a false gem in the shallowest human "will to power", than to preserve the purity or innocence of law which is born as a deepest human desire for social order, but is also violated from the shallowest human corruption and complacency. As much as faith is "pure law" ("nomocracy"), so much is the law "pure faith" ("democracy"). These two values are so interdependent that it is not possible to imagine faith without a law, nor a law without faith. That is why Kelsen's thesis on the "pure theory of law" is interesting, just as it is his need to purify legal science from all elements, which strictly do not belong to law, is worthy of our attention. In fact, this imposes on us even more the task of purifying religious science from all elements, which strictly do not belong to the natural faith, because it becomes much more important and much more meaningful. Indeed, we believe that the Last Divine Covenant – the Qur'ān is the ultimate attempt to purify the faith from all these elements, which do not belong to it strictly, theoretically, methodologically and practically.

But it should be emphasized that a covenant precedes a law, just as a regulation precedes the final bill. A covenant is apodictic[18] while a law is a casuistic regulation.[19] Apodictic religious precept, as a covenant, is a commandment (*al-amr*) or prohibition (*al-nahy)* in the form of imperatives: "say", "respect", "keep", "do" this and that ... and "you shall not do" or "don't do" this and that ... Say: "God is One"! "Respect your parents"! "Stick to the rope of God"! "Do good to others"! But also: "You shall not kill"! "You shall not steal"! "You shall not fall apart"! "You shall not spoil"! These negative imperatives are much stronger in apodictic law than positive ones, because the implications indicate man's natural tendency to do what he must not do, i.e., "kill," "steal," "lie," "be corrupt," and so on. This is why man is warned not to do it even though it is in his nature because it is illegal. Thus, apodictic law is an eternal covenant of God about which there is no debate. It has no expiration date. Apodictic law is the eternal commandment of God. Apodictic law is not an applied law, but an unconditional and unaltered covenant from God to man, as well as man's vow to God that he has received a message, which should always be present in his mind and consciousness. On the other hand, casuistic law is an applied law of God, derived from God's apodictic law, which is usually in the form of a conditional: "if ..." this *protasis* occurs, "then ..." it will be

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[17] Kelsen, Hans: ***Pure Theory of Law***. University of California Press, 1967.

[18] *Apodictic* (Gre. *apodeiktikos evidentiary*), in ordinary speech: resolute, determined, sure; in logic *apodictic judgment*: in Aristotle the evidentiary judgment as opposed to a problematic one. In Immanuel Kant mathematical axioms are apodictic because they are based on a priori awareness of their necessity.

[19] *Casuistic* (lat. *casus:* fall case). Casuist law arises as a right for certain needs of an individual or society in the light of God's apodictic law. It is an inductive law on a case-by-case basis on the basis of which a legal norm is adopted, and not a deductive law, where legal norms are already known and serve to adopt the necessary legal sub-norms on the basis of them.

induktivnom ili anglosaksonskom pravu, koje je izvedeno iz konkretnih životnih slučajeva za razliku od deduktivnog ili rimskog prava, koje se uglavnom zasniva na utvrđenim pravnim aksiomima, iz kojih se po potrebi mogu izvesti i druge pravne podnorme. Ova deduktivna ili induktivna metodologija u pravu prisutna je u šerijatskom pravu na takav način da Kur'ān sadrži i apodiktički i kazuistički zavjet ili pravnu odrednicu.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Čovjek ima od Boga datu inteligenciju koja ima moć da razumije Božiju knjigu. *Odlomak iz Kur'āna*; Arapski poluotok (moguće) 675.-800.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Man has a God-given intelligence that has the power to understand God's book. *Fragment from the Qur'an*; Arabian Peninsula (possibly) 675-800.

that *apotasis*. Casuistic law is closest to inductive or Anglo-Saxon law, which is derived from specific life cases as opposed to deductive or Roman law, which is mainly based on established legal axioms, from which other legal sub-norms can be derived as needed. This deductive or inductive methodology in law is present in *Sharīʿah* law in such a way that the Qur'ān contains both an apodictic and a casuistic covenant or legal narrative.



ILLUSTRATION ~ The seal of God in the soul of man is indelible, just as the seal of God in the book of God is indisputable. Excerpt from the Qur'an, Persia, 10-11. century, Dallas Museum of Art.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Pečat Božiji u duši čovjeka je neizbrisiv, kao što je neosporan i pečat Božiji u knjizi Božijoj. Odlomak iz Kur'ana, Perzija, 10.-11. stoljeće, Dallas Museum of Art.

Zapravo, egzegetska disciplina *asbāb al-nuzūl* (uzročno-posljedični razlog za Božiju objavu određenih ajeta) predstavlja jedan od najboljih načina da se razumije kur'ansko-zavjetna ili kur'ānsko-pravna poruka u smislu apodiktičko-deduktivne i kazuističko-induktivne metode, što ljudskom umu olakšava da shvati razliku između vječnog i prolaznog, između nepromjenjivog i promjenjivog, između živog i neživog, između razumne i nerazumne ideje i prakse u životu čovjeka koji se zavjetovao Bogu da će biti svjestan Božije prisutnosti kao što je svjestan samoga sebe, jer bez samosvijesti čovjek ne može biti svjestan Boga. Zapravo, sve što „jeste" u ovom prolaznom svijetu ima smisla za čovjeka onoliko koliko je čovjek toga svjestan. Bog živi i djeluje bez obzira na to da li čovjek ima svijest o Bogu, ali čovjekov život i ljudska djela nemaju smisla ako nema čovjekove svijesti o Bogu. Čovjek to zna, ali ponekad to ne priznaje dok je ovdje u ovom prolaznom svijetu. Ali na kraju ga ovo priznanje čeka na ahiretu.

U Časnom Kur'ānu riječ *mīthāq* (zavjet) spominje se 25 puta. Evo primjera *mithāqa*, zavjeta koji je Svemogući Bog sklopio sa sinovima Israilovim, zavjeta koji Kur'an prenosi iz *Tewrāta* (Tore, Stari zavjet). Ovaj zavjet važi za sva vremena kao i za čitavo čovječanstvo: – *I kada smo od sinova Israilovih uzeli zavjet: da se nećete klanjati nikome osim Bogu, Jedinom Bogu;* (2) *da ćete biti dobročinitelji svojim roditeljima,* (3) *da ćete biti dobrotvori svojim rođacima;* (4) *da ćete biti dobročinitelji siročadi;* (5) *da ćete biti dobročinitelji siromašnima;* (6) *da ćete ljudima govoriti ljubazne riječi;* (7) *da ćete održavati vezu sa Bogom kroz molitvu (ṣalāh);* (8) *i da ćete od svoje imovine izdvojiti za opće dobro (zakāt). Ali vi ste se odrekli tog zavjeta, osim jedne manjine.*[20]

Naravno, svaka od ovih osam zavjetnih normi, koje je Svemogući Bog propisao sinovima Israilovim u Starom zavjetu (*Tewrāt*), koje Svemogući Bog ponavlja u Posljednjem zavjetu (*Kur'ān*), predstavlja vrhunac apodiktičko-deduktivnog prava i morala. Ovaj vječni zavjet sadrži cjelovit svjetonazor, kao opći pogled na svijet. Ovaj pogled na svijet obuhvata najviše principe života. Onaj ko svjesno prihvati ove zavjetne principe može imati određenu sliku svijeta, što može biti u skladu s mišljenjem M. Heideggera da je „pogled na svijet preontološko oblikovanje slike svijeta" ili urođena moć da čovjek ima sliku svijeta, sliku koja mu omogućava da na osnovu nje odlučuje o suštinskim pitanjima smisla i značenja svijeta. Jer razumijevanje vjere i morala proizlazi iz svjetonazora, ideala, životnih principa iz kojih proizlaze politička, etička, estetska, ekološka i druga uvjerenja. Misao i vjerovanje da je Bog jedan, kao zavjetna norma, obavezuje čovjeka na slobodu od ropstva lažnim bogovima, koji su svuda oko njega u jednom lažnom svijetu. Dakle, sloboda nije izbor, već zavjetni nalog da čovjek bude ono što jeste u odnosu na Boga Svevišnjeg, a to je da mora prihvatiti Božiji dar slobode kao najvišu zavjetnu vrijednost. Zato je ova prva zavjetna norma uvjet svih ostalih zavjetnih normi. Jer, onaj ko je svjestan Jednog i Jedinog Boga, svjestan je svoje obaveze prema roditeljima, rodbini, siročadi i siromašnima, svjestan je vrijednosti lijepe riječi, svjestan je da je održavanje odnosa sa Stvoriteljem najsigurniji

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[20] ***Kur'ān***, 2:83.

In fact, the exegetical discipline of *asbāb al-nuzūl* (the cause-and-effect reason for God's revelation of certain verses) represents one of the best ways to understand the Qur'ānic-votive or Qur'ānic-legal message both in terms of apodictic-deductive and in terms of the casuistic-inductive method, which makes it easier for the human mind to comprehend the difference between the eternal and the transient, between the unchangeable and the changeable, between the living and the non-living, between the reasonable and the unreasonable ideas and practices in the life of man who took a vow to God that he will be aware of God's presence as he is aware of himself, for without self-awareness, man cannot be aware of God. In fact, everything that "is" in this transient world makes sense to man as much as man is aware of it. God lives and acts regardless of whether man has an awareness of God, but man's life and man's actions have no meaning if there is no man's awareness of God. Man knows this, but sometimes he does not admit it while here in this transient world. But ultimately this recognition awaits him in the Hereafter.

In the Holy Qur'ān the word *mīthāq* ("covenant") is mentioned 25 times. Here is an example of *mīthāq*, a covenant made by God Almighty with the sons of Isrāil, a covenant transmitted by the Qur'ān from the Torah (the "Old Testament"). This covenant is valid for all times as well as for the entire humanity: – *And when we took from the sons of Isrāil vow: (1) that you will worship no one but God, the One and Only God; (2) that you will be benefactors to your parents, (3) that you will be benefactors to your relatives; (4) that you will be benefactors to orphans; (5) that you will be benefactors to the poor; (6) that you will speak kind words to people; (7) that you will maintain a connection with God through prayer (ṣalāh); (8) and that you will set aside from your property for the common good (zakāh). But you have renounced that vow, except for one minority.* [20]

Of course, each of these eight covenant norms, which God Almighty prescribed to the sons of Isrāil in the Old Testament ("Tawrāt") and which God Almighty repeats in the Last Testament ("Qur'ān"), represents the culmination of apodictic-deductive law and morality. This eternal covenant contains a complete worldview, as a general view of the world. This worldview encompasses the highest principles of life. One who consciously accepts these votive principles may have a certain image of the world, which may be in line with M. Heidegger's thought that "the worldview is a pre-ontological shaping of the image of the world" or the innate power to have a picture of the world, a picture that allows him to decide on the basis of it the essential questions of the meaning and significance of the world. Because the understanding of faith and morals is derived from the worldview, ideals, life principles from which political, ethical, aesthetic, ecological and other beliefs are derived. The thought and belief that God is One as a votive norm obliges man to freedom from slavery to false gods, who are all around him in one false world. Therefore, freedom is not a choice, but a votive mandate for man to be what he is in relation to God the Highest, and that is that he must accept God's gift of freedom as the highest votive value. That is why this first votive norm is a condition of all other votive norms. For, he who is aware of the One and Only God, is aware of his obligation to parents, relatives, orphans and the poor ... is aware of the value of the beautiful word ...

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[20] ***Qur'ān***, 2:83.

način da bude psihički zdravi i duhovno bogat, svjestan je da je rad za opće dobro vrijednost, koja čovjeka čini sretnim.

Naš argument ovdje je očigledan, naime, da postoje dva pečata zavjeta vjere između Boga i čovjeka, čovjeka i Boga. Jedan je utisnut u duši čovjeka, a drugi je zapisan u Božijoj knjizi za čovjeka. Svemogući Bog je utisnuo oba pečata svojom „rukom".[21] Čovjek je vezan za ova dva zavjetna pečata čiste vjere, bez obzira na to da li ih je svjestan ili ne, i da li ih savjesno i odgovorno ispunjava. Čovjek ima Bogom dani dâr uma, koji ima moć da čita zavjet vjere u njegovoj duši; čovjek ima od Boga datu inteligenciju koja ima moć da razumije Božiju knjigu. Da čovjek nema dâr uma, onda zavjet vjere u njegovoj duši sa Božijim pečatom ne bi imao smisla. Isto tako, ako čovjek ne bi imao dâr inteligencije, onda zavjet vjere u Božiju knjigu ne bi imao svrhe. Pečat Božiji u duši čovjeka je neizbrisiv, kao što je neosporan i pečat Božiji u knjizi Božijoj. Tajna čiste prirodne vjere (*al-īmān*) je u Božanskom dodiru ljudske duše da prepozna u sebi Božanski zavjetni dâr formalne i normativne religije (*al-dīn*); tajna čiste vjere je u božanskom nadahnuću uma da u Knjizi Božijoj prepozna Božansku zavjetnu milost Božanskog zakona kao formalnu i normativnu moć ljudskog individualnog i društvenog života.

4. Odstupanje od čiste prirodne vjere

Teško je precizno odrediti kada i kako dolazi do odstupanja od čiste prirodne vjere. Međutim, moglo bi se pretpostaviti da počinje onda kada se zloupotrebljava diktat vjere i krši njen zavjet. Ali, ko je sudija da odluči da je neko zloupotrijebio diktat vjere i prekršio zavjet vjere? Rečeno nam je da je Svevišnji Bog jedini sudija u ovim stvarima na ahiretu, tako da mi ne trebamo raspravljati jedni s drugima ovdje i sada, jer bi nas to moglo dovesti do neprijateljstva jednih prema drugima. Trebali bismo biti tolerantni jedni prema drugima dok razgovaramo jedni s drugima. Trebali bismo izbjegavati donošenje oštrih osuda o drugima u pitanjima vjere, vjerovanja i religije. Jer nikome nije drago da bude proklet ili izopćen iz svoje religijske zajednice, bez obzira na to kakav je grijeh. Svjestan ove fiziologije čovjeka, šejhul-islam Muṣṭafa Ṣabrī je izdao ovu zanimljivu fetvu:[22]

> Onaj ko zaista pije vino i čini *al-zinā* (preljub) ne smatra se *kafirom* (nevjernikom) sve dok vjeruje da je to *ḥarām* (zabranjeno). Počinilac ovog djela je samo grešnik (*fāsiq*) ali ne i *kāfir*, dok onaj koji

[21] Ovaj izraz „**Božija ruka**" ne smije se shvatiti doslovno, već se mora shvatiti metaforički, kako ga tumače muslimanski racionalisti, kao što je Fakhruddin al-Razī, u smislu da je to pojam „Božija moć", a nikako „Božija ruka" kao „tjelesni organ".

[22] Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869–1954) bio je jedan od posljednjih šejhul-islama u Osmanskom Carstvu. Bio je više puta imenovan na položaj šejhul-islama na nekoliko mjeseci i smijenjen tokom 1919. i 1920. godine. Na kraju je prognan u Egipat, gdje je proveo ostatak svog života. Umro je u Egiptu, gdje je i sahranjen. Posljednji, 131. po redu, šejhul-islam u Osmanskom Carstvu bio je časni Mehmet Nuri-efendija od 1920. do 1922. godine, kada je zvanična institucija šejhul-islama definitivno ukinuta. U Bosni je ova institucija zamijenjena institucijom Reisl-uleme i Velikog muftije bosanskog 1882.

is aware that maintaining a relationship with the Creator is the surest way to be mentally healthy and spiritually rich ... is aware that working for the common good is a value, which makes a person happy...

Our argument here is obvious, namely, that there are two seals of the covenant of faith between God and man, man and God. One is imprinted in the soul of man, and the other is written in God's book for man. God Almighty imprinted both seals with his "hand".[21] Man is bound by these two votive seals of pure faith, whether he is aware of them or not, and whether he fulfills them conscientiously and responsibly. Man has the God-given gift of the mind, which has the power to read the vow of faith in his soul; man has a God-given intelligence, which has the power to understand the book of God. If man did not have the gift of the mind, then the vow of faith in his soul with the seal of God would make no sense. Likewise, if man did not have the gift of intelligence, then the vow of faith in God's book would have no purpose. The seal of God in the soul of man is indelible, just as the seal of God in the book of God is undeniable. The secret of pure natural faith (*al-īmān*) is in the Divine touch of the human soul to recognize in itself the Divine votive gift of formal and normative religion (*al-dīn*); the secret of pure faith is in the Divine inspiration of the mind to recognize in the Book of God the Divine votive grace of divine law as a formal and normative may of human individual and societal life.

4. Deviation from Pure Natural Faith

It is hard to determine precisely when and how the deviation from the pure natural faith occurs. However, it might be assumed that it starts when the dictate of faith is being abused and the covenant of faith is being broken. But who is the judge to decide that someone has abused the dictate of faith and has broken the covenant of faith? We are told that God Almighty is the only judge in these matters in the Hereafter so that we humans should not dispute with each other here and now because it could lead us to hostility against each other. We should be tolerant with each other while dialoging with each other. We should avoid passing harsh judgements on each other in matters of faith, belief and religion. Because no one is pleased to be cursed or excommunicated from his/her faith community no matter what he/she sin might be. Being aware of this physiology of man, Sheikh al-Islam Muṣṭafa Ṣabrī issued this interesting fatwa of his time:[22]

> One who actually drinks wine and commits *al-zinā* (adultery) is not considered as to be a *kāfir* (infidel) as long as he believes that it is *ḥarām* (forbidden). The perpetrator of this act is only a sinner (*fāsiq*) but not *kāfir*, while

[21] This phrase "**God's hand**" must not be taken literally, but must be understood metaphorically, as interpreted by Muslim rationalist, such as Fakhruddin al-Rāzī, in the sense that it is the notion of "God's power" and by no means "God's hand" as the "bodily organ".

[22] Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869-1954) was one of the last Sheikh al-Islam in the Ottoman Empire. He was repeatedly appointed to the position of Sheikhu-l-Islam for several months and removed during 1919 and 1920. He was eventually exiled to Egypt, where he spent the rest of his life. He died in Egypt, where he was buried. The last, 131st in a row, Sheikh al-Islam in the Ottoman Empire was the Honorable Mehmet Nuri Efendi from 1920 to 1922, when the official institution of Sheikh al-Islam was definitively abolished. In Bosnia, this institution was replaced by the institution of Rais-l-ulama or the Grand Mufti of Bosnia in 1882.

zapravo ne pije vino niti čini preljubu, ali smatra da su ta djela *ḥalāl* (dozvoljena), tj. vjeruje da pijenje alkohola i preljuba nije grijeh, smatra se nevjernikom *(kāfir*).[23]

Bez obzira na konkretan razlog, ova fetva Ṣabrī-efendije je najdrastičniji izraz teoloških dilema s kojima se muslimanska zajednica suočavala od samog početka, odnosno zajednica muslimanske '*ulemā*'/učenjaka ili teologa. Zapravo, sve je počelo ubistvom trećeg zakonitog halife, ʾUthman bin ʾAffāna (644–656). Nakon toga, rasprava o tome ko je zapravo „pravi ili čisti musliman" nikada nije prestala. Isto pitanje je i danas: „Šta je čista vjera?"; „Gdje je skrivena čista vjera?"; „Kako se čista vjera dokazuje i pokazuje?"; „Ko je kompetentan ili ovlašten da ocjenjuje kvalitetu čiste vjere?"; „Da li je čista vjera isto što i čisto djelo, ili je čista vjera odvojena od čistog djela – morala?"; „Da li se čista vjera povećava ili smanjuje?"

Prvi koji su dali odgovor na ova teška pitanja bili su haridžiti. Haridžīti (ar. *Khawāridž* sing. *Kharīdžī*) bili su prva prepoznatljiva pobunjenička sekta u islamu. Njihov identitet je nametnut u vrijeme kada je muslimanska '*ulemā*' pokušala definirati stanje u kojem musliman ponekad može odstupiti od idealnih normi islama, ali i dalje zadržava pravo da se naziva „muslimanom". Haridžīti su po ovom pitanju imali izuzetno ekskluzivan stav u smislu da je onaj ko počini teški ili smrtni grijeh odstupio od čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne vjere (*al-dīn*). On je otpadnik (*al-murtadd*) od čiste vjere. Dakle, on zaslužuje smrtnu kaznu. Ovaj isključivi i neodrživ stav haridžija bio je razlog da mudra i odgovorna muslimanska '*ulemā*'/učenjaci ustanu u odbranu „racionalne vjere" u smislu očuvanja „racionalne muslimanske zajednice" od ekstremnih haridžija, čiji su stavovi počeli dovoditi u pitanje cjelokupnu muslimansku zajednicu i društvo. Zbog toga su dobili ime *khawāridž,* što znači oni koji su izašli iz glavne zajednice (*al-sawād al-aʾazam*).

Zahvaljujući ranoj savjesnoj muslimanskoj '*ulemi*'/učenjacima, haridžiti su brzo teoretski ili apologetski poraženi, ali ostaci njihovih latentnih militantnih stavova nisu nestali. Prijetili su miru i sigurnosti glavne muslimanske zajednice sve do kraja osmog stoljeća nove ere. Historijski gledano, haridžiti su ostali samo kao loš primjer ortodoksne muslimanske '*ulema*'/učenjaka u njihovim argumentima za „racionalnu vjeru", koja ne pribjegava *tekfīru*, osporavanju vjere drugima. '*Ulemā*' je koristila argument protiv *tekfīra*, *hadīthom*: „Ako neko uskrati vjeru svom bratu, onda je jedan od njih nevjernik." (*Idhā kaffara al-radžulu akhāhu fa qad bāʾa bihā ahaduhumā*).[24]

Najizazovniji odgovor na ovaj drastičan haridžitski ekstremizam došao je od murdž'īta (ar. *murdž'iah*). Murdž'īti su također jedna od ranih sekti u islamu koja se pobunila protiv haridžīta, proklamirajući svoje teološko učenje o grijehu koje je dijametralno suprotno haridžijskom, u smislu da odgađaju

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[23] Vidjeti: Ṣabrī, Muṣṭafa: ***Mawqif al-ʾaqli wa al-ʾilmi wa al-ʾālimi min rabb al-ʾālamīn wa ʾibādihī al-mursalīn***, al-Maktaba al-aṣriyyah, Beirut, 2018, str. 16.

[24] ***Ḥadīth*** zabilježen u Muslimovoj zbirci.

the one who does not actually drink wine nor does he commit adultery, but believes that these acts are *ḥalāl* (permissible), i.e. he believes that drinking alcohol and adultery are not sins is considered to be an infidel (*kāfir*).[23]

Regardless of the specific reason, this Ṣabrī-effendi fatwa is the most drastic expression of the theological dilemmas faced by the Muslim community from the very beginning, i.e., the community of Muslim *'ulamā'*/ scholars or theologians. In fact, it all began with the assassination of the third rightful caliph, ʿUthmān bin ʿAffān (644–656). After that, the debate over who was, in fact, a "true or pure Muslim" never ended. The same question is now as it was then: "what is pure faith?"; "where is pure faith hidden?"; "how is pure faith proven and shown?"; "who is competent or authorized to assess the quality of pure faith?"; "is pure faith the same as pure deed, or is pure faith separate from pure deed – morality?"; "Does pure faith increase or decrease?"

The first to come out with an answer to these difficult questions were the Kharijites. The Kharijites (ar. *Khawārij*, sing. *Kharījī*) were the first recognizable rebellious sect in Islam. Their identity is imposed at a time when the Muslim *'ulamā'* have tried to define a state in which a Muslim can sometimes deviate from the ideal norms of Islam, but still retain the right to be called a "Muslim". It is on this issue that the Kharijites had an extremely exclusive view in the sense that one who commits a grave or mortal sin has departed from pure faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-dīn*). He is an apostate (*al-murtadd*) from pure faith. Therefore, he deserves the death penalty. This exclusive and unsustainable attitude of the Kharijites was the reason for the wise and responsible Muslim *'ulamā'*/scholars to stand up in defense of the "realistic faith" in terms of preserving the "realistic Muslim community" from extreme Kharijites, whose views began to call into question the entire Muslim community and society. That is why they were given the name "khawārij", which means those who have defected from the mainstream community (*al-sawād al-aʿazam*).

Thanks to the early conscientious Muslim *'ulamā'*/scholars, the Kharijites were theoretically or apologetically defeated quickly, but the remains of their latent militant attitudes had not disappeared. They had been threatening the peace and security of the mainstream Muslim community until the end of the eighth century AD. Historically, the Kharijites have remained only as a bad example to the orthodox Muslim *'ulamā'*/scholars in their argument for "realistic faith," which does not resort to *takfīr*, an atter denial of the faith of others. The *'ulamā'* used an argument against *takfir* the *ḥadīth*, narrative, of the Prophet Muhammad, a.s, who said: "If one denies the faith to his brother, then one of them is an infidel". (*Idhā kaffara al-rajulu akhāhu fa qad bā'a bihā ahaduhumā*).[24]

The most challenging response to this drastic Kharijite extremism came from the Murj'ites (ar. *Murdj'iah*). The Murj'ites are also one of the early sects in Islam, who rebelled against the Kharijites by proclaiming their theological teaching on sin, which is diametrically opposed to the Kharijite, in the sense that they delay the

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[23] See: Ṣabrī, Muṣṭafa: ***Mawqif al-ʿaqli wa al-ʿilmi wa al-ʿālimi min rabb al-ʿālamīn wa ʿibādhī al-mursalīn***. al-Maktaba al-aṣriyyah, Beirut, 2018, p. 16.

[24] ***Ḥadīth*** by Muslim.

osudu grijeha, prepuštajući to Božijoj presudi na Sudnjem danu, jer je Bog samo nadležan da sudi ljudima o njihovoj unutrašnjoj vjeri i njihovom vanjskom ponašanju. Ova murdžitska teološka doktrina bila je posebno u upotrebi između atentata na halifu ʾUthmana bin ʾAffāna i atentata na četvrtog zakonitog halife ʾAlija bin Abu Ṭāliba (656–661). Shodno tome, doktrina murdž'īta odigrala je ključnu ulogu u održavanju dinastije Umejada, koju je u Damasku uspostavio Muʾāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (661–680). Muʾāwiya je, dakle, uveo dinastiju u instituciju *khalifata*, koji se više nikada nije vratio svojoj prvobitnoj svrsi i funkciji, ovlašćujući svog sina Yazida bin Muʾāwiyu (680–683) da ga naslijedi po osnovu porodične pripadnosti, a ne na zasluge vjerske i moralne dosljednosti. Ovo nije moglo proći nezapaženo od strane muslimanske *'uleme'*/učenjaka, koji su to vidjeli kao izazov da objasne odnos između čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne religije (*al-islām* ili *al-dīn*) u teoriji vjere i praksi morala.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Rasprava muslimanske *uleme*/učenjaka oko odnosa između čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne religije (*al-islām* ili *al-dīn*).
ILLUSTRATION ~ A debate among Muslim ulema/scholars over the relationship between pure faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-islām* or *al-dīn*).

Haridžīti su, kao što smo vidjeli, bili poraženi, dok murdž'īti nisu bili ni potpuno prihvaćeni ni potpuno odbačeni. Nadalje, dok je haridžitska doktrina prijetila fizičkom postojanju muslimanskog društva, doktrina murdž'īta je relativizirala suštinu muslimanskog sistema moralnog mišljenja i prakse. Može se reći da su murdž'īti imali amoralni odnos prema javnom moralu, u smislu da su izbjegavali da donose moralne sudove o ljudskom ponašanju. Murdž'īti su iz ove premise izveli svoj zaključak da „čista vjera" nema veze sa „dobrim djelom". Naime, „čista vjera"(*al-īmān*) nije isto što i „formalna vjera" (*al-islām*), što znači da *al-īmān* ima svoju nezavisnu suštinu u odnosu na *al-islām*, tj. vjera i praksa su dva različita pojma i stoga su vjera i moral odvojeni entiteti. Otuda, murdž'ītski stav je da se „čista vjera" ne

judgment of sin while leaving it to God's judgment on the Day of Judgment because God is only competent to judge people about their inner faith and their outer behavior. This Murj'ite theological doctrine was specially in use between the assassination of Caliph ʿUthmān bin ʿAffān and the assassination of the fourth rightful Caliph ʿAli bin Abū Ṭālib (656-661). Consequently, the Murj'ite doctrine played a crucial role in the maintenance of the Umayyad dynasty, established in Damascus by Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (661-680). Muʿāwiya, therefore, introduced the dynasty into the institution of the *caliphate*, which has never again returned to its original purpose and function, by authorizing his son Yazīd bin Muʿāwiya (680-683) to succeed him on the merits of family affiliation, not on the merits of religious and moral consistency. This could not go unnoticed by Muslim *'ulamā'*/scholars, who saw this as a challenge to explain the relationship between pure faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-islām* or *al-dīn*) in the theory of faith and the practice of morality.



ILLUSTRATION ~ A debate among Muslim ulema/scholars over the relationship between pure faith (*al-īmān*) and formal religion (*al-islām* or *al-dīn*).
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Rasprava muslimanske *uleme*/učenjaka oko odnosa između čiste vjere (*al-īmān*) i formalne religije (*al-islām* ili *al-dīn*).

The Kharijites, as we have seen, had been defeated, while the Murj'ites were neither fully accepted nor completely rejected. Furthermore, while the Kharijite doctrine threatened the physical existence of Muslim society, the Murj'ite doctrine relativized the essence of the Muslim system of moral thought and practice. It can be said that Murj'ites had an amoral attitude towards public morality, in the sense that they avoided making moral judgments about human behavior.[25] It is this premise that the Murj'ites have derived their conclusion: "pure faith" has nothing to do

[25] In ethics, as the science of morality, we have terms: "moral", "immoral", and "amoral". "Moral" term indicates to a acceptable standpoint of what is good, just, and beautiful act; contrary to that is the term "immorality" as an unacceptable bad, unjust and ugly act. "Amoral" term, on the other hand, is an act about which there is no moral judgment. Thus, the Murj'ites can be said to have

povećava niti smanjuje pod utjecajem „dobrog" ili „loših" djela, već je čista vjera iskonska vrijednost s kojom se čovjek rađa, živi i umire pod uvjetom da je svjestan toga u svom srcu. Čovjek to ne mora nužno potvrditi svojim djelom.

Tako je *fetva* jednog od posljednjih osmanskih šejhul-islama Mustafe Ṣabrī-efendije usvojena u duhu murdž'ītske doktrine da „čista vjera" nije suštinski dio „dobrog djela" ili „lošeg djela". Međutim, čovjek mora biti svjestan lošeg djela da je to *ḥarām* (zabranjeno). Ono što se danas dešava u muslimanskom svijetu može se vidjeti u kontekstu ova dva suprotstavljena moralna stava, haridžītskog i murdž'ītskog, koji današnja muslimanska*'ulemā'*/učenjaci nastoje nadmašiti nudeći ideju *al-waṣatiyye*, srednjeg inkluzivnog ili integralnog puta. Ovo je prvenstveno važno za muslimane koji žive u mješovitim zajednicama i društvima i na zapadu i na istoku.

Trenutna moralna kriza u svijetu u velikoj je mjeri rezultat trijumfalnog povratka formalne religije ili teologije na svjetsku scenu nakon što je, prije više od jednog stoljeća, bila bačena na marginu povijesnih zbivanja, ali nije sposobna da adekvatno odgovori zahtjevima vremena. Zvuči paradoksalno, zar ne? Nije li povratak religije iz ateističko-komunističkog „zatvora" bio istovremeno i povratak religije moralnoj „slobodi" izbora dobra? Nažalost, ne. Savremena religijska ili teološka misao ne samo da je moralno zakržljala, već je postala moralno neodrživa jer, u moralnom smislu, gubi svrhu svog postojanja. Današnja formalna ili instruktivna religijska misao nije u dijalogu sa suprotnim nereligioznim stavovima, koji bi joj pomogli da se vidi u ogledalu. Zaista, formalna religija danas nije u dijalogu ni s kim. Danas je, s moralne tačke gledišta, formalna religija u sukobu sa svima osim s onima koji je politički zloupotrebljavaju. Zašto su se kritičari religiozne misli povukli? Oni su nam danas potrebniji nego ikad da očistimo čistu vjeru od nečiste religiozne misli, koja pravi kompromise na račun moralne savjesti. Religija je danas u krizi ne zato što je nema, već zato što je ima na pogrešan način i na pogrešnom mjestu. Na isti način kao i ranije, pročišćavanje religiozne ili teološke misli nije moguće izvana, već iznutra, pod uvjetom da oni unutar formalnog vjerskog ili teološkog kruga prepoznaju opasnost izvana. Za sada, oni koji su unutra nemaju straha, a oni koji su vani nemaju ni znanja ni hrabrosti da se bave vjerskim pitanjima. Ali, čista prirodna vjera mora ponovo progovoriti, jer ljudska duša ne može dugo tolerirati Luciferovu prevaru. Prvi uvjet za pravi lijek je priznanje da bolest postoji. Stoga, priznajmo: religiozna ili teološka misao je u krizi jer je svijetom zavladala moralna kriza, koja dolazi kao rezultat korištenja čiste prirodne vjere za potrebe nečiste savjesti.

Završavajući ovaj članak, svjedočimo o povratku talibana u Kabul u Afganistanu. Svi su bili iznenađeni čak i sâmi talibani svojom brzom pobjedom nakon dvadeset godina poricanja i osude svijeta zbog 11. septembra 2001. godine. Dvadesetogodišnji rat protiv navodnog talibanskog terora okončano je povratkom talibana na vlast u afganistanskoj državi u centralnoj Aziji. Sada je svijet u velikom strahu od vladavine talibana, iako još niko ne zna šta znači njihov dolazak na vlast. Ali jedno je sigurno, njihov dolazak znači ukidanje demokratije u Afganistanu. Ovo je svakako najveći i najneizvjesniji izazov ne

with "good deed," namely, that "pure faith" (*al-īmān*) is not the same as formal religion "al-islām", which means that *al-īmān* has its independent essence in relation to *al-islām*, i.e. faith and practice are two different concepts and thus faith and morality are separate entities. Hence, the Murj'ite view that "pure faith" does not increase or decrease under the influence of "good deed," or "bad deeds", but pure faith is the primordial value with which man is born, lives and dies provided man is aware of it in his heart. He does not necessarily confirm this by his work.

Thus, the *fatwa* of the one of the last Ottoman Sheikh al-Islam Musṭafa Ṣabrī Effendi was adopted in the spirit of the Murj'ite doctrine that "pure faith" is not essential part of "good deed", or "bad deed". However, one must be aware of a bad deed to be sinful *ḥarām* (forbidden) or not. What is happening in the Muslim world today it can be seen in the context of these two conflicting moral attitudes, the Kharijite and the Murj'ite, which today's Muslim '*ulamā*'/scholars seek to transcend by offering the idea of *Al-Wasaṭiyyah*, the middle inclusive ground or an integral path. This is primarily important for Muslims who live in plural mixed communities and societies both in the West and in the East.

The current moral crisis in the world is largely the result of the triumphant return of formal religion or theology to the world stage after it was, more than a century ago, thrown to the end of its inability to meet the demands of the times. It sounds paradoxical, doesn't it? Was not the return of religion from atheistic-communist "prison" at the same time the return of religion to moral "freedom" to choose good? Unfortunately, it is not. Contemporary religious or theological thought has not only morally stunted, but has become morally unsustainable because, in a moral sense, it loses the purpose of its existence. Today's formal or instructive religious thought is not in dialogue with the opposite non-religious views, which would help it to see itself in a mirror. Indeed, formal religion today is not in dialogue with anyone. Today, from a moral point of view, formal religion is in conflict with everyone except with those who need its political and amoral support. Why did the critics of religious thought withdraw? We need them today more than ever to cleanse the pure faith of impure religious thought, which makes compromises at the expense of moral conscience. Religion is in crisis today not because it does not exist, but because it exists in the wrong way and in the wrong place. In the same way as before, the purification of religious or theological thought is not possible from the outside but from within, provided that those within the formal religious or theological circle recognize the danger from the outside. For now, those who are inside have no fear, and those who are outside have neither knowledge nor courage to deal with religious issues. But pure natural faith must speak out again, because the human soul cannot tolerate Lucifer's deception for long. The first condition for a real cure is the recognition that there is a disease. Therefore, let us admit: religious or theological thought is in crisis because the world has been ruled by a moral crisis, which comes as a result of using pure natural faith for the needs of an unclean conscience.

Concluding this article, we witness the return of the Taliban to Kabul in Afghanistan was announced. Everyone was surprised even the Taliban themselves by their swift victory after twenty years of denial and condemnation by the world because of the 11th September of 2001. The twenty years of war against the alleged Taliban terror ended by

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advocated an "amoral" attitude towards public morality, which is very close to the current state of moral and civilizational state of mind in the world.

samo za muslimane, već i za cijeli svijet – talibani ukidaju ili redefiniraju „demokratiju" kao način vladavine državom. Glavno pitanje za muslimane je: koji su temelji i prepreke demokratiji u islamskoj političkoj misli? Odgovor na ovo pitanje može se dobiti fokusiranjem na dva politički relevantna islamska koncepta: *šūra* (savjetodavno vijeće odabranih) i *bayʾah* (uvjetna zakletva vjernosti koja se daje novom vladaru ili novoj vlasti). Ova dva koncepta moći su u talibanskoj opciji. Talibani vjeruju da se ova dva koncepta mogu reinterpretirati tako da predstavljaju teorijsku osnovu izborne demokratije u islamu. Bit će zanimljivo čuti talibanske antidemokratske argumente u islamskoj političkoj misli u korist „Božanskog suvereniteta". Nije li, uostalom, i u kršćanskoj političkoj teologiji u Evropi, ne tako davno, bila dominantna teza o „Božanskom suverenitetu", prema kojoj je Bog vrhovni autoritet te da su sve stvari pod Božijom kontrolom? Bog je „suvereni Gospodar svega po neospornom pravu [stvaratelja]... vlasnik i posjednik neba i zemlje".



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Talibanski zvaničnici proglašavaju pobjedu na aerodromu u Kabulu 31. avgusta 2021. (J. Huylebroek/The New York Times).
ILLUSTRATION ~ Taliban officials declare victory at the Kabul airport on Aug. 31, 2021. (Jim Huylebroek/The New York Times).

Vjerujem da će kršćani, ne samo u Evropi nego i širom svijeta, moći ostati ravnodušni prema ovom talibanskom izazovu da čovjeku oduzmu relativni suverenitet nad ljudskim životom i predaju ga apsolutnom suverenitetu Boga kojem pripada. Naravno, bit će zanimljivo slušati raspravu na ovu vječnu moralnu i političku temu o tome ko je „vlasnik i posjednik neba i zemlje" te ko je vlasnik i posjednik ljudskog života na zemlji – Bog ili čovjek? Dolazak ili povratak talibana može biti razlog za ovu debatu, gdje niko još ne zna pravo rješenje. Sada je to više stvar srca nego uma. Ljudski um je rekao sve što je imao. Ostaju nam samo osjećaji srca, osjećaji koji su najskriveniji i najmisteriozniji.

a coming back of the Taliban to the power of the Afghan state in Central Asia. Now, the world is in great fear of the Taliban's rule although no one knows yet what their coming to power means. But one thing is certain, their arrival means the abolition of democracy in Afghanistan. This is certainly the biggest and most appealing challenge not only for Muslims, but for the whole world – the Taliban abolishing or redefining "democracy" as a manner of state crafting. The main question for Muslims now is: what are the foundations and obstacles to democracy in Islamic political thought? The answer to this question can be obtained from a focus on two politically relevant Islamic concepts: *shūra* (consultation) and *bayʿah* (a conditional oath of allegiance given to a new ruler). These two concepts of power are in the Taliban option. The Taliban believe that these two concepts can be reinterpreted to constitute the theoretical basis of electoral democracy in Islam. It will be interesting to hear the Taliban's anti-democratic arguments in Islamic political thought in favor of "divine sovereignty". Was it not, after all, also in Christian political theology in Europe, not so long ago, that the dominant thesis was of "divine sovereignty," according to which God is the supreme authority and that all things are under God's control? God is "the sovereign Lord of all by the indisputable right [of] the creator ... the owner and possessor of heaven and earth".



ILLUSTRATION ~ Although Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid promised on 17 August 2021 that the Taliban would honour women's rights within Islamic law, violence against women continues. No good future for Afghan women under the Taliban.
(Sanchita Bhattacharya, EastAsiaForum, 4 September 2021.).

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Iako je glasnogovornik talibana Zabihullah Mudžahid obećao 17. augusta 2021. da će talibani poštovati prava žena u okviru islamskog zakona, nasilje nad ženama se nastavlja. Nema dobre budućnosti za afganistanske žene pod Talibanima.
(Sanchita Bhattacharya, EastAsiaForum, 4. septembar 2021.).

I believe that Christians, not only in Europe but around the world, will be able to remain indifferent to this Taliban challenge of taking away relative sovereignty over human life from man and surrendering it to the absolute

Štaviše, mnogi Afganistanci se plaše talibanskog *šerijatskog* zakona. Međutim, još uvijek ne znamo o kakvom *šerijatu* govore talibani. Ali znamo kako su talibani prakticirali *šerijat* prije dvadeset godina kada su bili na vlasti. Takva primjena *šerijata* je neprihvatljiva prema slovu i duhu samog *šerijata*. Dakle, zloglasni talibanski *šerijat* iz prošlosti bio je protiv *šerijata*, što znači da autentični *šerijat* ima pet osnovnih neupitnih normi za sva vremena i sva mjesta. Ove norme su: 1. pravo svakog čovjeka na život (*al-nafs*); 2. pravo svakog čovjeka na vjeru (*al-dīn*); 3. pravo svakog čovjeka na slobodu (*al-ʾaql*); 4. pravo svakog čovjeka na imovinu (*al-māl*); i 5. pravo svakog čovjeka na čast (*al-ʾirḍ*). Ovo je osnovno značenje *šerijata*, koje su veliki muslimanski umovi davno definirali u slobodi svog duha i u stanju svoje političke i vojne moći, kao svoje pravo i moralnu dužnost da štite manjinske zajednice u svom većinskom muslimanskom okruženju. Onaj ko ignorira ili poriče to značenje *šerijata* radi protiv *šerijata*, uključujući i zabranu školovanja ženskoj djeci. Talibani su očigledno odustali od te zabrane, ali još nisu odustali od miješanja u živote žena na neprihvatljiv način. Slažem se, Zapad nije model kako žene trebaju biti odjevene, ali nije ni model „talibanskog" *nikaba*, gdje se prikriva ličnost žene. Nije li *hidžāb* ili *maḥrama* model, gdje žena pokriva glavu, ali otkriva svoje lice kao svoju plemenitu ličnost. Uostalom, mnogo je važnije ono što je u nečijoj glavi nego ono što je na glavi. Kur'ānsko učenje je jasno: *Odjeća moralnog karaktera u pobožnosti je najbolja.*

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sovereignty of God, to whom it belongs. Of course, it will be interesting to listen to a discussion on this eternal moral and political topic of who is "the owner and possessor of heaven and earth," and who is the owner and possessor of human life on earth – God or man. The arrival or return of the Taliban may provide a reason for this debate – no one knows the solution yet. It is now a matter of more heart than mind. The human mind said everything it had. We are left only with the feelings of the heart, the feelings which are the most hidden and mysterious.

Furthermore, many Afghans are afraid of the Taliban *Sharīʿah* law. However, we still don't know what kind of *Sharīʿah* the Taliban are referring to. But we know how the Taliban practiced *Sharīʿah* twenty years ago when they were in power. Such application of *Sharīʿah* is unacceptable according to the letter and spirit of *Sharīʿah* itself. Thus, the infamous Taliban *Sharīʿah* from the past was anti-*Sharīʿah*, which means that the authentic *Sharīʿah* has five fundamental unquestionable norms for all times and all places. These norms are: 1) the right of every man to life (*al-nafs*); 2) the right of every man to religion (*al-dīn*); 3) the right of every man to liberty (*al-ʿaql*); 4) the right of every man to property (*al-māl*); and 5) the right of every man to honor (*al-ʿirḍ*). This is the basic meaning of *Sharīʿah* that is defined by great Muslim minds in the freedom of their spirit and in a state of their political and military power, as their right and moral duty to protect minority communities in their majority Muslim environment. One who ignores or denies that meaning of *Sharīʿah*, works against *Sharīʿah*, including banning female children from schooling. Apparently, the Taliban have given up on that ban, but they have not yet given up on interfering in women's lives in an unacceptable way. I agree, the West is not a model of how women should be dressed, but neither is the model of the "Taliban" *niqāb*, where a woman's personality is covered up. Isn't the *hijāb* or *maḥram* a model, where a woman covers her head but reveals her face as her noble personality? After all, what is in someone's head is much more important than what is outside on someone's head. The Qur'ānic teaching is clear: **"Clothes of a moral character in piety are the best."**



ILLUSTRATION ~ What does their future hold? AFP
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Što nosi njihova budućnost?