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ILLUSTRATION ~ Reconstruction done on the basis of source: Unknown author, ***Detail – Coffee house scene***; folio from an Ottoman album, Istanbul c. 1620 (*Chester Beatty Library*).

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Ferid MUHIĆ

BOŠNJACI I BOSNA:
studija iz filozofije politike (1)

BOSNIAKS AND BOSNIA:
A Study in the Philosophy of Politics (1)

Sažetak

U ovom članku autor na sugestivan način ukazuje na važnost razumijevanja nacije i države u kontekstu evropske filozofske misli i prakse o naciji i državi. Iako su mu povod nacija Bošnjaka i bosanska država, autorova razmišljanja su aplikativna za sve skupine slične naciji Bošnjaka, kao i za države slične bosanskoj državi. Osnovna misao u ovom članku je da ideja univerzalne nacije, kulture i civilizacije niti osporava niti negira partikularni osjećaj i subjektivni doživljaj nacije i države. Članstvo u Evropskoj uniji ne oduzima pravo nijednoj naciji u Evropi da gaji i razvija svoju nacionalno-kulturnu i nacionalno-državnu svijest. Zapravo, u mjeri u kojoj je svaka nacija i svaka država u Evropi aktivno svjesna svoje nacionalne i kulturne specifične vrijednosti, čini Evropu, odnosno Evropsku uniju, snažnom i važnom u globalnom svijetu. Otuda i Bošnjaci, odnosno Bosanci, kao nacija i kao država (nacija) nemaju potrebe da se povlače, već imaju historijsku obavezu da istaknu svoju specifičnu bosansku kulturu i bosansku državu kao bogatstvo vrijedno pažnje ne samo u Evropi već i u svijetu.

Ključne riječi: *Bosna, Bošnjaci, bosanstvo, nacionalna država, pojedinac, nacija, društvo, država, filozofija politike, građanska država.*

Uvod

Prilozi koji slijede zamišljeno je da budu jedna cjelina od četiri ili pet tekstova. Nadovezuju se na moj tekst „Besjeda Bošnjacima“, objavljen početkom januara 2012. godine, kao i na desetine tekstova, javnih predavanja, tribina, TV nastupa koji su tematizirali otvorena pitanja nacionalnog identiteta Bošnjaka i statusa Bosne. Kao i kroz cijeli ovaj period, i u svim svojim javnim nastupima, pisanim ili usmenim, tako ću se i ovim tekstovima rukovoditi samo principom istine, kao jedinim predmetom svih mojih ispitivanja, ne zamarajući se nimalo oko pitanja hoće li se to kome dopasti ili neće. Pri tome, nastojat ću da mi i ovdje osnovni stavovi, kao premise, budu jasno formulirani, odnosno, kako logički, tako i faktografski, čvrsto zasnovani. Razumije se, razvijanje izlaganja, izvođenje zaključaka iz ovih premisa i zastupani stavovi, u skladu sa mojim mogućnostima, u potpunosti su usklađeni s nastojanjem da se, i ovom prilikom, beskompromisno slijedi istina – kao centralni princip i osnovni motiv naučnog rada i svakog javnog angažmana.

Abstract

In this article, the author suggestively points to the importance of understanding the concept of nation and the state in the context of the European philosophical thought and practice regarding the nation and the state. Although the occasion is about the Bosniak/Bosnian nation and the Bosnian state, the author's reflections are applicable to all groups similar to the Bosniak/Bosnain nation, as well as to all the states similar to the Bosnian state. The basic premise of this article is that the idea of a universal nationality, culture and civilisation does not oppose or negate the particular feeling or the subjective experience of either the nationality or the state. The membership of European Union does not detract the right for any nation in Europe of the right to cultivate and develop its national culture as well as its particular state consciousness. In fact, in the extent of which every nation and every state in Europe has an active awareness of its national and cultural specific value, gives Europe, indeed – the European Union strong and important role in the global community. Hence, the Bosniaks/Bosnians, both as a nation and a state (nation) have no need to withdraw, but rather have the historical opportunity to feature their specific Bosnian culture and Bosnian state as a richness worthy of appreciation, not only in Europe, but also in the world.

Key words: *Bosnia, Bosniaks, Bosnianity, nation state, individual, nation, society, state, philosophy of politics, civil state.*

Introduction

The contributions that follow are conceived as a whole consisting of four or five parts. They are the continuation of my text „A Word to Bosniaks", published in early January 2012, as well as of dozens of texts, public lectures, forums, and TV appearances focused on open issues of Bosniaks' national identity and the status of Bosnia. Just as throughout this period, and just as in all my public addresses, written or spoken, these texts will be guided solely by the principle of truth, as the only subject of all my investigations, without bothering about whether people will like it or not. Thus, I will endeavor to formulate my basic views as premises, clearly articulated, and firmly founded, both logically and factually. Indeed, developing the reasons, deriving conclusions from these premises, and presenting the advocated views are, in line with my capabilities, fully harmonized with the endeavor to uncompromisingly pursue the truth on this occasion as well, as the central principle and core motive of a scientific paper and any public engagement.

Bošnjaci i Bosna

Bošnjaci i Bosna. Pojedinac, narod, nacija, država! Posljednjih nekoliko godina sve češće se u javnosti govori o anahronizmu, zastarjelosti *nacije* i *nacionalne pripadnosti* kao pojmova – što je posebno zanimljivo i nimalo slučajno kada je riječ o Bošnjacima, pa čak i o *reakcionarnosti* kada se spomene pitanje njihove nacionalne države. Kao da niko od ovih kritičara *bošnjačkog nacionalizma* ne vidi da svuda u svijetu postoje nacionalne države, gdje god postoji autohtoni narod i to kao standardna forma njegove političke organizacije. Unutar Evropske unije (EU), sve države, bez izuzetka, i dalje su nacionalnog karaktera. Ipak, ideja da se Bosna i Hercegovina organizira kao građanska država u kojoj će se Bošnjaci, autohtoni narod sa apsolutnom većinom (po popisu iz 2013.), u ime te građanske države odreći svog etničkog i duhovnog naslijeđa, poziva se upravo na navodno građanski karakter EU! Zašto kažem „navodno"? Zato što bi, u slučaju da je tako, EU bila organizirana kao zajednica država u kojoj su svi narodi koji čine države članice EU iz svog državnog uređenja isključile faktor etničke, jezičke i duhovne posebnosti u ime apstraktne građanske nacije – *Evropljana* – kao njihove zajedničke pripadnosti!

Umjesto toga, vidimo da su sve članice EU i dalje organizirane upravo kao nacionalne države. Vidimo i da se u ovim nacionalnim državama, u kojima žive drugi autohtoni narodi, upravo na teritoriji EU, procesi stvaranja nacionalne države nisu ugasili, nego naprotiv, tinjaju bez prestanka i svakih nekoliko godina razgore se sa obnovljenom snagom! Katalonija se nastoji osamostaliti kao država u odnosu na Španiju, a ista težnja već decenijama održava napetost Baskijaca prema centralnoj vladi Španije; Škotska i Irska kontinuirano zahtijevaju državni status i autonomiju u odnosu na UK; Valonci i Flamanci održavaju neprekidnu tenziju nastojeći se osamostaliti i tako Belgiju podijeliti na dvije nacionalne države; čak se i Korzikanci intenzivno organiziraju u borbi za autonomiju Korzike u odnosu na Francusku; Česi i Slovaci, koji su stoljećima živjeli zajedno pod tuđom vlašću pa decenijama u zajedničkoj državi Čehoslovačkoj, razdvojili su se i organizirali u dvije nacionalne države, prvom pogodnom prilikom; konačno Jugoslavija, kao zajednica južnoslovenskih naroda, poslije promjene više političkih sistema, od monarhije do Socijalističke Federativne Republike (SFRJ), fragmentirala se upravo po nacionalnim kriterijima u pet naglašeno nacionalnih država: Srbiju, Hrvatsku, Sloveniju, Makedoniju, Crnu Goru. Uslijedilo je i odvajanje Crne Gore od Srbije, desilo se ono u šta niko nije mogao povjerovati: dragulj *srpstva* je iz srpske krune ispao, poslovična *dva oka jedne glave* su se od *glave* rastavila a zatim je uslijedilo i otcjepljenje autonomne pokrajine Kosova od Srbije, motivirano pravom Albanaca, kao većinskog autohtonog stanovništva, da stvore svoju nacionalnu državu!

Bosniaks and Bosnia

Bosniaks and Bosnia. An individual, a people, a nation, a state. Over the past few years, there have been increasingly frequent public discussions on the anachronism, obsoleteness of „nation“ and „national affiliation“ as concepts and, particularly interestingly and by no means unintentionally where Bosniaks are concerned, even on „reactionism“ when the issue of their nation state is raised. As if no critic of „Bosniak nationalism“ can see that there are nation states all over the world, wherever the indigenous nation lives, as a standard form of their political organization. Within the European Union (EU), all countries with no exceptions are still of the national character. Still, the idea that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organized as a civil state where Bosniaks, the indigenous nation with the absolute majority (the 2013 census) should renounce their ethnic and spiritual heritage in favor of the civil state specifically refers to the allegedly civil character of the EU. Why do I say: „allegedly“? Because if it indeed were the case, the EU would be organized as a union of states where all the nations that constitute member-states of the EU would exclude, from their state organization, the factor of ethnic, language and spiritual distinctiveness in favor of an abstract civil nation – „Europeans“ – as their joint affiliation.

Instead, we are witnesses to the fact that all of the EU member countries are still organized as nation states. We also witness that in these nation states, where other indigenous nations live as well, in the EU itself, the processes of the creation of a nation state have not died out; on the contrary, they smolder incessantly and flare up with renewed force every few years. Catalonia strives to gain independence from Spain, and the same tendency perpetuates the Basque tensions toward the Spanish central government; Scotland and Ireland continuously seek the status of a state and autonomy from the UK; the Walloons and the Flemish maintain incessant tension endeavoring to gain independence and thus divide Belgium into two nation states; even the Corsicans are intensively organizing themselves in their struggle for the independence of Corsica from France; the Czechs and the Slovaks, who used to live under foreign rule for centuries and in a common state – Czechoslovakia – for decades, separated and became organized into two nation states at the first opportunity; finally, Yugoslavia, as a union of South Slavic nations, underwent several changes in political systems, from a monarchy to the Socialist Federal Republic (SFRY), to become fragmented, according to national criteria, into five distinct nation states: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro. It included the separation of Montenegro from Serbia, an event that no one could believe would happen: the jewel of „Serbianity“ fell out of the Serbian crown, the proverbial „two eyes of a single head“ separated from the „head“; and this was followed by the secession of the autonomous province of Kosovo from Serbia, motivated by the rights of Albanians as the majority indigenous population, to create their nation state.

Izuzetak je bila i do danas ostala samo Bosna i Hercegovina. Zašto? Samo zato što se nije postigla saglasnost oko njenog jedinstvenog, odnosno, nosećeg i dominantnog nacionalnog identiteta – iz perspektive pripadnika srpske, odnosno hrvatske nacionalne manjine u Bosni i Hercegovini, instrumentaliziranih u kontekstu velikodržavnih pretenzija Srbije i Hrvatske da Bosnu podijele između sebe i te dijelove uključe u sopstvene nacionalne države. Pritom, jedina realna i kao što se pokazalo, nesavladiva smetnja njihovim ambicijama, bila je neporeciva činjenica da većinsko stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, po svojoj nacionalnoj – etničkoj, duhovnoj, kulturnoj i narodnoj pripadnosti nije ni srpske ni hrvatske nacionalne pripadnosti, nego da je to autohtona, autonomna i zasebna nacija – narod, etnikum sa hiljadugodišnjom kulturnom i višestoljetnom državotvornom tradicijom – Bošnjaci! Pokušaj fizičkog istrebljenja i raseljavanja Bošnjaka tokom agresije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1992-95. godine, te nasilne re-populacije njenih regiona opustošenih agresijom i genocidima, koja i danas traje, nije dao očekivane rezultate, pa je pitanje političkog statusa ove države ostalo otvoreno – 28 godina poslije agresije i 25 godina poslije njenog oružanog sloma.

Ipak, nastojanja da se Bosna i Hercegovina pretvori – u cjelini ili dijelom, u nacionalnu državu Srba, odnosno Hrvata, nisu zamrla. Naprotiv, i dalje se nalaze u najužem fokusu strateških interesa ove dvije države – podignutih na nivo njihovih vitalnih nacionalnih interesa. Da li je ovim konačno najavljen kraj borbe za istinu i, posebno, borbe za nacionalno samopotvrđivanje Bošnjaka kao nacije? Pitanje je opravdano – kako u kontekstu neprestanih pritisaka usmjerenih na onemogućavanje nacionalne afirmacije Bošnjaka od strane Srbije i Hrvatske tako i od strane predstavnika međunarodne zajednice, čiji strateški interesi u regionu, za sada konvergiraju sa interesima ove dvije države. Pod takvim pritiscima čini se da popušta i jezgro bošnjačkog nacionalnog korpusa, koje se sve glasnije i sve češće, javno oglašava kapitulantskim zahtjevima da Bošnjaci odustanu od svoje etničke i duhovne afirmacije i da se, lišeni svojih ključnih identitetskih obilježja, privole da iščeznu sa svjetske scene kao samostalna nacija – narod, etnikum, te da se, kao anonimni, anacionalni demografski faktor, izgube i pretope u bosanstvu, e da bi Bosnu i Hercegovinu učinili *modernom građanskom državom*, *po uzoru na EU i njene države članice* (?). Međutim, oni su sasvim smetnuli s uma već spomenute činjenice da je EU po svim kriterijima *moderna građanska Unija* i sve njene države članice su, isto tako *moderne građanske države*. Ni EU, ni bilo koja država članica nisu se odrekle svog naglašeno nacionalnog karaktera – nisu odbacile svoje etničke i duhovne biljege niti im ijednog trenutka pada na pamet da svoj nacionalni karakter žrtvuju u ime anonimnog i anacionalnog *evropejstva*.

Da sumiramo: Bošnjaci i Bosna su u teškoj situaciji, ugroženi i spolja i iznutra od drugih i od svojih. Dosada su odolili svim prijetnjama – vojnoj sili, ekonomskim sankcijama, političkim ucjenama i pritiscima. Kada su neprijatelji Bošnjaka i Bosne shvatili da nijednom od navedenih metoda nisu uspjeli slomiti Bošnjake i ugasiti njihovu nacionalna i kulturnu svijest niti ukinuti Bosnu kao državu, potražili su slabu tačku – tačnije rečeno, onu najjaču tačku iz koje izvire nesalomljiva snaga Bošnjaka i Bosne. Potražili su i našli su je.

The only exception, to this day, is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why? Only because agreement has not been reached about its single, i.e. structural and dominant, national identity from the perspective of members of the Serbian and Croatian national minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who became instruments in the context of the great-state claims of Serbia and Croatia to divide Bosnia between them and include these parts in their own nation states. In these attempts, the only realistic and, as it turned out, unsurmountable obstacle to their ambitions was the irrefutable fact that the majority population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by their national (ethnic, spiritual, cultural) affiliation are neither Serbian nor Croatian, but they constitute an indigenous, autonomous and separate nation (ethnicity) with a thousands years-long cultural and centuries-long state-building tradition – Bosniaks. Attempts to physically exterminate and displace Bosniaks during the 1992-1995 aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina and to forcibly repopulate its regions that were devastated due to the aggression and genocide did not produce the expected results and consequently, the issue of the political status of this state is still open, 28 years after the aggression and 25 years after the armed defeat of the aggression.

Still, endeavors to make Bosnia and Herzegovina (all or part of it) a nation state of Serbs or Croats have not vanished. On the contrary, they can still be found in the narrowest focus of these two countries' strategic interests, raised to the level of their vital national interests. Does this finally herald the need for the struggle for truth and, particularly, for the struggle for national self-confirmation of Bosniaks as a nation? The question is reasonable, in the context of both the incessant pressures focused on disallowing the national recognition of Bosniaks by Serbia and Croatia, and the pressures by representatives of the international community, whose strategic interests in the region currently converge with the interests of those two countries. It seems that the core of the Bosniak national body is also yielding under this pressure and is increasingly loudly and frequently publicly expressing capitulating claims for Bosniaks to abandon their ethnic and spiritual recognition and, deprived of the crucial features of their identity, be persuaded to vanish from the global scene as an independent nation (ethnicum) and become lost and melt into '*Bosnianity*' as an anonymous, a-national demographic factor, in order to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a „modern civil state, after the model of the EU and its member countries" (?). However, they have completely forgotten the facts listed above, i.e. that the EU is a „modern civil Union" by all criteria, and all its member countries are also „modern civil states", although neither the EU nor any of its member countries has renounced their prominently national character nor rejected their ethnic or spiritual labels, and that it never occurs to them to sacrifice their national character in favor of the anonymous and a-national „Europeanity".

Let us sum up: Bosniaks and Bosnia are in a difficult situation, threatened both from the outside and from the inside, by others and by their own. So far, they have resisted all the threats, the military power, economic sanctions, political blackmail and pressures. When the enemies of Bosniaks and Bosnia realized that none of these methods had managed to break Bosniaks down and extinguish their national and cultural awareness or annul Bosnia as a state, they searched for a weak spot – or more accurately, the strongest spot where the unbreakable strength of Bosniaks and Bosnia originates. They searched and found it.

Ono što je za biblijskog Samsona bila njegova kosa, ono što je kod džinova i zmajeva iz bajki bilo skriveno u medvjedu, pa u vuku, pa u lisici, pa u sokolu i, najzad, u golubu, tako da je redom trebalo poubijati, medvjeda, vuka, lisicu, sokola, da bi se, konačno, ubio golub i tako se zmaju oduzela snaga – to je za Bošnjake njihovo nacionalno ime, njihova etnička pripadnost, duhovna i kulturna posebnost, svijest o višestoljetnoj državotvornoj tradiciji – sjedinjenih u pojmu Bosna kao simbolu i sinonimu njihove Majke Zemlje. Oduzmi Bošnjacima sve ono prethodno, i Bosna će iščeznuti iz njihovog sjećanja. Kada jednom zaborave da su Bošnjaci i da je Bosna njihov praiskonski zavičaj i rodna gruda, bit će time ubijeni i medvjed, i vuk, i lisica, i sokol, a onaj golub, u kom je skrivena njihova snaga, sam će klonuti i pasti. U državi Bosni i Hercegovini ostat će tada samo dva konstitutivna naroda: Srbi i Hrvati! Ona većina njenih stanovnika što su se nekada nazivali Bošnjaci, bit će degradirani na amorfnu demografsku kategoriju: *Bosanci*, koji će, umjesto svoje izgubljene nacionalne pripadnosti, duhovne i kulturne posebnosti, ostati da se tješe novostečenim apstraktnim statusom državljana *moderne građanske države*. Vremenom bi i ta država promijenila svoje ime i rascijepila se na dva dijela sa svojim imenima – posebno imajući u vidu da se, već više od dvije decenije, pola Bosne zove *Republika Srpsk*a, dok je četvrtina *Županija Herceg-Bosna*, čime bi se konačno izbrisao svaki trag Bošnjaka i svako sjećanje na Bosnu.

Šta moraju i šta mogu uraditi Bošnjaci da bi opstali kao – oni koji jesu i koji su odvajkada bili – na svojoj pradjedovskoj rodnoj grudi Bosni!? Jednostavno i jasno: Moraju očuvati svoje ime Bošnjaci, njegovati svoj etnički karakter i duhovnu tradiciju. Moraju shvatiti da je njihov opstanak sada pitanje očuvanja duha i kulture, više nego pitanje političke organizacije! U ovoj fazi, a posebno u perspektivi, opstanak Bosne je imperativno pitanje samosvijesti Bošnjaka kao naroda i nacije, očuvanja znanja o sebi kroz njegovanje sopstvene duhovne i kulturne tradicije, a ne više pitanje fizičkog opstanka Bošnjaka i odbrana njihove državne teritorije.

Da bi se ovaj imperativ ostvario, Bošnjaci mogu sasvim realno i bez poteškoća, početi s organizirnim i sistematskim otporom protiv kulturne asimilacije i intelektualne dominacije koja im se intenzivno, sistematski i svim sredstvima nameće. Paralelno, treba raditi na suzbijanju, nažalost općeprisutne i raširene sopstvene submisivnosti i kolonijalnog mentaliteta inferiornosti. Umjesto pasivnog prihvatanja bilo kojih autoriteta sa strane kada je riječ o njima samima i njihovim nacionalnim interesima, neophodno je da razviju samostalnu kritičku distancu prema njima – koji god bili i odakle god inače dolazili ti autoriteti! Ovo se posebno odnosi na one bošnjačke akademske krugove iz sfere historijskih, društvenuih i političkih nauka, koji su potpuno, takoreći, u zametku zanemarili svako samostalno rasuđivanje – *kritiku*, jer je osnova pojma *kritika* upravo glagol *kritein: rasuđivanje*. Fascinirani zvučnim imenima i njihovom medijskom popularnošću, povjerovali su da bi bespogovornim prihvatanjem njihovih stavova i pukim imitiranjem njihovog tehničkog žargona mogli preuzeti dio te popularnosti i odsjaj njihovog autoriteta. Umjesto toga, postali su obični epigoni, promotori tuđih ideja, nesvjesni da su čak i te ideje sasvim drukčije interpretirane i sa rezervom primljene u zemljama njihovog nastanka.

What was the hair for Biblical Samson, what was hidden in giants and dragons as a bear, then as a wolf, a fox, a falcon and finally a pigeon, so that one had to kill first the bear, then the wolf, the fox, the falcon and finally the pigeon to deprive the dragon of its strength – this is for Bosniaks their national name, their ethnic affiliation, their spiritual and cultural distinctiveness, their awareness of their centuries-long state-building tradition, united in the notion of Bosnia as a symbol and a synonym of their Mother Country. Deprive Bosniaks of all these and Bosnia will vanish from their memory. When they have forgotten that they are Bosniaks and that Bosnia is their primordial homeland and native soil, it will kill the bear, the wolf, the fox and the falcon, and the pigeon where their strength is hidden will wither and fall by itself. Only two constituent nations will remain in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Serbs and Croats. The majority of its population who used to be called Bosniaks will be degraded to the amorphous demographic category: '*Bosnians*', who will, instead of their lost national affiliation, find comfort in the newly acquired abstract status of the citizens of a „modern civil state". Eventually, this country would change its name and split into two parts with names of their own, particularly keeping in mind that for over two decades half of Bosnia has already been called the *Republika Srpska*, and one fourth the *County of Herceg-Bosna*, which would finally erase every trace of Bosniaks and every memory of Bosnia.

What can and must Bosniaks do to survive as what they are and who they have always been on their ancestors' native soil of Bosnia? It is simple and clear: They must preserve their name, Bosniaks, nourish their ethnic character and spiritual tradition. They must realize that their survival is now an issue of preserving spirit and culture, rather than an issue of political organization. In this stage, and particularly in the future, the survival of Bosnia is an imperative of the self-awareness of Bosniaks as a nation, of preserving their knowledge about themselves by nourishing their spiritual and cultural tradition, rather than an issue of the physical survival of Bosniaks and defense of their state territory.

In order to achieve this imperative, Bosniaks can quite realistically and without any difficulties begin the organized and systematic resistance to cultural assimilation and intellectual dominance that is imposed on them intensely, systematically and by every means. In parallel, they should work on suppressing their own unfortunately omnipresent and widely spread submissiveness and colonial mindset of inferiority. Instead of the passive adoption of any authority of others in matters concerning themselves and their national interests, it is necessary for Bosniaks to develop an independent critical distance from them – whoever the authorities are and wherever they come from. This particularly pertains to Bosniak academic circles in the area of historical, social and political studies, who have completely, almost seminally, ignored any independent reasoning (*critique*, since the root of the term '*critique*' is the verb *kritein* = *to reason*). Fascinated by sonorous names and their media popularity, Bosniak academicians came to believe that by unconditional acceptance of those views and by mere imitation of their technical jargon, they themselves could take over part of that popularity and the reflection of their authority. Instead, Bosniak academicians became mere epigones, promoters of someone else's ideas, unaware that even these ideas were interpreted quite differently and accepted with reservations in the countries of their origin.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Preko hiljadu godina kontinuiteta – Bošnjak*

IILLUSTRATION ~ *Over a thousand years of continuity – Bosnia*



LVSTRATIONES



REGNUM BOSNIÆ



REGNI BOSNAE

i Bosna sa heraldičkim obilježjima državnosti i periodičnim kartografskim prikazima.
ks and Bosnia with heraldic features of statehood and periodic cartographic representations.

Konkretno, kada je riječ o odnosu filozofije politike i političke stvarnosti, mora se imati u vidu historijski nepobitna činjenica da sve nove ideje i koncepcije o pojedincu, narodu, naciji i državi, koliko god bile spektakularne tokom minula tri stoljeća, nisu bile prihvaćene s očekivanim entuzijazmom niti su promijenile praksu političkog organiziranja evropskih naroda u nacionalne države, gdje god i kad god je to bilo moguće. Uzmimo kao posebno uvjerljiv primjer širenje ideje kosmopolitizma, formulirane u periodu prosvjetiteljstva, sistematski elaborirane u racionalističkoj filozofiji kroz teoriju o univerzalnoj jednakosti *ljudske prirode*. Eruptivno politički promovirana u paroli Francuske buržoaske revolucije od 1789. godine: *Sloboda, Bratstvo, Jednakost – Liberte, Fraternite, Egalite!* koja je, doslovno, fascinirala cijelu epohu, ova kosmopolitska lozinka ostala je bez odjeka i zapravo je samo inspirirala separatistička stremljenja naroda koji su dotada ostali bez svoje države. Izvorna ideja da smo svi jednaki jer smo jedan rod – *Gens una summus!*, nije dovela do pretapanja naroda u anonimnu jednakost *Čovječanstva*, nego se protumačila kao ideja da svi naroda imaju jednaka prava a da su nekim narodima ta prava uskraćena. Kroz cijeli ovaj period, do danas, sve te ideološke intervencije, uz svu svoju očaravajuću moć, nijednog trenutka nisu dovele u pitanje nacionalističku političku praksu nijedne od država koje su se spremno odazvale tom pokliču. Uz svu svoju privlačnost i popularizaciju u društvenim naukama i književnosti, nisu izmijenile čak ni svijest građana, niti su ukinule etničke, vjerske, kulturne, pa čak ni rasne predrasude i stereotipe! Očigledno je, dakle, da se kosmopolitski naglašena filozofska definicija *jedinstvenog univerzalnog čovječanstva*, u praksi sasvim drukčije eksponirala. Isto tako se i sve teorijske debate o *postnacionalnim društvima* završavaju u okvirima akademskih narativa – bez bilo kakvog stvarnog efekta ne samo na političku praksu nego i na etničku, nacionalnu i kulturnu svijest građana, kao i većine, ako ne i svih autora ovih teorijskih intervencija. Svugdje u svijetu, danas kao i tokom dugih milenija, ljudski rod živi fragmentiran na mnogobrojne intrahomogene ljudske grupe i zajednice, historijski formirane u brojne naroda, od kojih je svaki razvio svoj jezik, tradiciju, običaje i posebno markirao teritoriju na kojoj je od pamtivijeka živio. Koliko god kasnije bila kompromitirana kroz neke ekstremno nacionalističke oblike ispoljavanja, ova, u biti romantičarska ideja, nudi daleko realističniju sliku čovječanstva. Umjesto kroz apstraktno jedinstvo, svuda vidimo da čovječanstvo svoju biološku jedinstvenost – kao *Homo sapiens*, u stvarnosti realizira kroz podjelu na bezbroj uzajamno različitih etnosa, naroda i nacija. Shvatanje univerzalnosti i sveopće rasprostranjenosti ove činjenice skida s dnevnog reda svako dalje preispitivanje navodne anahronosti ideje nacionalne države i neopravdanosti osjećanja privrženosti sopstvenom etničkom, jezičkom, narodnom ili nacionalnom identitetu. Ova činjenica legitimira u potpunosti pravo svakog čovjeka da se pozove na svoju pripadnost:

Da, ja jesam onaj koji jesam!

Pošavši od pretpostavke inherentne slobode svakog čovjeka, uz puno poštovanje prava da svako sebe kao pojedinca odredi u najširem kontekstu samo granicom pripadnosti ljudskom rodu, mora se poštovati i pravo svakog čovjeka da sebe odredi i kao pojedinca, ali i kao pripadnika specifične

Specifically, with respect to the relationship between the philosophy of politics and the political reality, one should keep in mind the historically irrefutable fact that all new ideas and concepts of the individual, the nation and the state, regardless of how spectacular they have been over the past three centuries, were not accepted with the expected enthusiasm nor did they change the practice of political organization of European nations into nation states, whenever and wherever it was possible. A particularly convincing example pertains to the spread of the idea of cosmopolitism, articulated in the period of Enlightenment, and systematically elaborated in the rationalist philosophy through the theory of the universal equality of „human nature". Eruptively politically promoted in the slogan of the 1789 French Revolution: *Freedom, Brotherhood, Equality* („Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité!"), which literally fascinated the entire epoch, this cosmopolitan password did not materialize and, actually, it only inspired the separatist tendencies of nations who had previously lost their country. The original idea, that we are all equal because we are one people (*Gens una summus!*) has not resulted in the melting down of nations into the anonymous equality of „Humanity"; rather, it was interpreted as the idea that all nations have the same rights and that some nations have been refused these rights. Throughout this period, and to this day, all these ideological interventions, with all their enchanting power, have never challenged the nationalist political practice of any country that readily responded to this cry. Despite their appeal and popularization in social studies and literature, they have not even changed citizens' views, nor have they eliminated ethnic, religious, cultural or even racial prejudices and stereotypes. Thus, it is evident that the philosophic definition of a „united universal humanity", highlighted as cosmopolitan, was manifested quite differently in practice. Moreover, all theoretical debates on „post-national societies" end within academic narratives, without any real effect either on political practice or on the ethnic, national and cultural awareness of citizens and of the majority, if not all, of the authors of these theoretical interventions. Everywhere in the world, today just as throughout other millennia, mankind lives fragmented into numerous intra-homogenous human groups and communities, historically formed into numerous nations, each of which has developed its own language, tradition, customs and, particularly, marked the territory in which it has lived since time immemorial. Regardless of how compromised it was later, through some extremely nationalistic manifest forms, this essentially romantic idea provides a far more realistic image of humanity. Instead of through abstract unity, we see that humanity everywhere materializes its biological distinctiveness (as *Homo sapiens*) through division into a myriad mutually different ethnic groups and nations. An understanding of the universality and omnipresence of this fact removes from the agenda any further questioning of the alleged anachronism of the idea of the nation state and non-justification of the feeling of attachment to one's own ethnic, language or national identity. This fact fully legitimizes every man's right to refer to their affiliation:

Yes, I am who I am!

Starting from the assumption of everyone's inherent freedom, with all due respect to the right of every person to define himself as an individual in the broadest context – just by the delineation of his affiliation to mankind – one must also respect every person's right to define himself both as an individual and as a member

nacionalne – narodne, etničke, kulturne, jezičke zajednice, konačno, kao državljanina sopstvene države. Zato, kada bez bilo kakvog snebivanja i nelagode kažete, jednako pred sobom kao i pred drugima:

Da, ja sam Bošnjak!,

učinili ste odlučujući korak za sopstveno samopoštovanje i dali ste najveći prilog nacionalnoj afirmaciji Bošnjaka i opstanku Bosne. Iako su se teorijska ispitivanja odnosa pojedinca, društva i države neravnomjerno razvijala u različitim periodima i različitim regionima, ljudi, društva i države, kao njihova povijesna podloga, prolazili su u biti kroz iste faze i suočavali se s veoma sličnim osnovnim izazovima. Stoga, kratka analiza razvoja tih shvatanja bit će jednako relevantna i za razumijevanje aktuelne dinamike i unutrašnje logike odnosa pojedinca, društva i države u savremenoj stvarnosti Bosne, kao i bilo gdje u savremenom svijetu.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Rafael Sanzio, *Atinska akademija (La Academia de Atina),* detalj; prikazuje Platona i Aristotela (u sredini), Ibn Rušda (na Zapadu poznat kao *Averroes*), dolje lijevo i druge drevne filozofe koji razmjenjuju svoje znanje.

of a distinctive national (ethnic, cultural, language) community and, ultimately, as a citizen of his own country. Therefore, when you say, for yourself or before others, without any hesitation or embarrassment:

Yes, I am a Bosniak!

you have taken a decisive step toward your own self-respect and have given the greatest contribution to the national recognition of Bosniaks and the survival of Bosnia. Although the theoretical investigations of the relationship between the individual, society and state developed unevenly in different periods and different regions, peoples, societies and countries, they have undergone essentially the same stages and have faced very similar basic challenges as their historical background. Therefore, a brief analysis of the development of these understandings will be equally relevant for understanding the current dynamics and internal logic of the relationship between the individual, the society and the state in the contemporary reality of Bosnia, just as anywhere in the contemporary world.



ILLUSTRATION ~ Rafael Sanzio, ***Academy of Athens (La Academia de Athens)*, detail;** depicts Plato and Aristotle (center), Ibn Rushd (known in the West as *Averroes*), bottom left and other ancient philosophers sharing their knowledge.

Pojedinac, društvo, država – filozofski aspekti

Pitanje odnosa pojedinca, naroda – zajednice, etnosa i države, u striktno filozofskom kontekstu se svodi na teorijsko pitanje odnosa dijelova i cjeline, dok se u filozofsko-političkoj teoriji i praksi eksponira kao pitanje njihove hijerarhije, prioriteta i subordinacije. Pitajući se: „Da li pojedinci stvaraju narod, a narod državu?“, filozofija postavlja vrijednosno neutralno pitanje, kao kada bismo se pitali: „Da li ‘šumu’ čini određeni broj pojedinačnog drveća, kao njenih dijelova, ili je svako pojedinačno drvo tek dio ‘šume’?“ Razumije se, samo ovo pitanje izgleda neopravdano, jer je sasvim jasno da bez drveća, nema ni ‘šume’, dok jedno drvo i osamljeno, bez ‘šume’, ostaje drvo! Drvo je pretpostavka za postojanje šume. Ali šuma nije pretpostavka za postojanje drveta! Prema tome, isto važi i za odnos pojedinca i naroda: Nema naroda bez pojedinaca, dok pojedinac ostaje pojedinac i bez naroda. Drukčije rečeno: narod dobija svoj realitet preko pojedinaca, dok pojedinac svoj realitet ima u sebi samome! Jednako se ovaj primjer, iako u nešto izmijenjenom značenju, može primijeniti i na odnos naroda i države. Nijedna država bez naroda; mnogi narodi bez države! Država dobija svoj realitet tek preko naroda; narod ima svoj identitet u sebi samome! Činjenica da u sastav mnogih država ulaze dva ili više naroda, ili da jedan narod može imati više država, ne mijenja ništa u osnovnom vrijednosno neutralnom principu, koji glasi da je *narod nužan iako ne dovoljan uvjet postojanja države, dok država nije ni dovoljan ni nužan uvjet postojanja naroda*.

Međutim, čim je sa analize dijelova i cjeline predmeta prešlo na analizu odnosa pojedinca, naroda i države – sa drveća i šume na ljude, filozofija je napustila područje vrijednosne neutralnosti i stupila na klizavi teren hijerarhije, supremacije i subordinacije, prioriteta i marginalnosti, uzroka i posljedice, konačno – sredstva i cilja! Na ovom ključnom zaokretu cijela se historija političke filozofije – dakle, filozofije zajednice, jer korijen riječi *politika* zapravo označava *zajednicu*, razdvojila u dva glavna toka, prema tome kako je koji odgovorio na ovo osnovno pitanje. Davanje prioriteta pojedincu, vodilo je ka afirmaciji indivdue, ličnih sloboda i prava, pri čemu je zajednica, posebno država, shvaćena kao forma društvene organizacije čiji je najviši cilj ostvarenje ideala slobodnog, suverenog pojedinca. *Samo slobodni pojedinci mogu ostvariti slobodnu državu!* – ovaj je aksiom, dakako, svaki pokušaj države da ograniči lične slobode i prava pojedinca, vidio kao napad na generičku, rodovsku suštinu čovjeka. Beskompromisna borba protiv takve države završavala je tek njenim rušenjem.

Čovjek se svuda rađa slobodan, a svugdje je u okovima! – ova rečenica Žan-Žaka Rusoa najpregnantnije je izrazila ideale tradicije filozofije koja je zajednicu, društvo, državu vidjela kao sredstvo a ideal slobodnog, suverenog pojedinca kao krajni cilj historije! Pod njegovim utjecajem pozicija je radikalizirana do krajnosti od Pjera Žozefa Prudona, za koga je: *Svaki onaj koji želi vladati nadamnom, jeste moj smrtni neprijatelj*.

The individual, society, state – philosophical aspects

The issue of the relationship between the individual, the nation (community, ethnos) and the state, in the strict philosophical context, boils down to the theoretical issue of the relationship between a whole and its parts, while in the theory of the philosophy of politics and in practice it is manifested as the issue of their hierarchy, priority and subordination. When asking the question: „Do individuals create a nation, and a nation – a state?", philosophy asks a neutral-value question, the same as if we asked: „Is the 'forest' made up of a certain number of individual trees, as its parts, or is every individual tree only a part of the 'forest'?" Naturally, this very question sounds unjustified, since it is more than clear that there is no 'forest' without trees, while a single tree, even alone and without the 'forest' is still a tree. The tree is a prerequisite for the existence of the forest. On the other hand, the forest is not a prerequisite for the existence of the tree. The same applies for the relationship between the individual and the nation: There is no nation without individuals, while the individual remains an individual even without the nation. In other words: the nation achieves its reality through individuals, while the individual has his reality within himself. This example can also be applied, though with a somewhat changed meaning, to the relationship between the nation and the country. There is no country without a nation; there are many nations without a country. The country assumes its reality only through nations: the nation has its identity in itself. The fact that many countries consist of two or more nations, or that a single nation may have more than one country, does not change anything in the value-neutral principle, which says that *the nation is a necessary, though not a sufficient prerequisite for the existence of a country, while the country is neither a sufficient nor a necessary prerequisite for the existence of a nation*.

However, as soon as philosophy moved from the analysis of the parts and the whole of an object to the analysis of the relationship between the individual, the nation and the state (from trees and the forest to people), it left the area of value neutrality and stepped on a slippery terrain of hierarchy, supremacy and subordination, priority and marginality, cause and effect, and ultimately – means and the goal. At this crucial turn, the whole history of political philosophy (thus, the philosophy of community, since the root of the word 'politics' actually signifies 'community'), split into two main streams, according to how each of them answered this fundamental question. Prioritizing the individual led to the recognition of a person, personal freedoms and rights, while the community, particularly the state, was understood as a form of social organization whose highest goal was achieving the ideal of a free, sovereign individual. Only free individuals can form a free state. Of course, this axiom saw any attempt of the state to restrict personal freedoms and individuals' rights as an attack on the generic, ancestral essence of man. Uncompromising struggle against such a state ended only in its destruction.

Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains! – this sentence by Jean-Jacques Rousseau most pregnantly expressed the ideals of the tradition of the philosophy that viewed the community, the society and the state as a means, and the ideal of a free, sovereign individual as the ultimate goal of history. Under his influence, this view was radicalized to the extreme by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, for whom: *Whoever lays*

Maks Štirner je u potpunosti podijelio sa Prudonom osjećaj neukrotive individualne slobode kao najveće vrijednosti ukazujući pritom da je upravo: *Svaka država kao institucija, smrtni neprijatelj svakog pojedinca!*

Drugi je tok svoj izvor imao u suprotnom stavu svedenom na aksiom: *Pojedinac je ništa, narod je nešto, država je sve!* Prema ovom shvatanju, izvan države čovjek kao jedinka, zapravo jedva da je još čovjek. U suštini, ovo shvatanje se zasniva na tezi da je, po svojoj prirodi, čovjek *biće zajednice*, te da se, sljedstveno, ne može ni govoriti o nekakvom čovjeku izvan zajednice. Sama ova tvrdnja potječe iz drevne filozofske baštine. Riječ je o svakako najcitiranijoj Aristotelovoj definiciji prema kojoj je čovjek određen sintagmom – *zoon politikon*. Ova odredba je do danas ostala i jedna od najneshvaćenijih definicija, jer u nivou semantike *zoon politikon* ne znači *politička životinja*, kao što se po pravilu paušalno prenosi – svakako ne iz Aristotelovog teksta, nego, reklo bi se, *s koljena na koljeno*, već sasvim jednostavno i doslovno: *društveno biće*. U skladu s pravilima definiranja, koja je formulirao sam Aristotel, *definicija nastaje određivanjem najbližeg roda i specifične razlike – Definitio fiat per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*, u ovom slučaju, kategorija čovjek se definira najbližim rodom *živo biće – zoon* i specifičnom razlikom koju Aristotel određuje činjenicom da to *živo biće*, po zakonima svoje prirode, živi u zajednici. Sasvim jednostavno i jasno, Aristotel kaže da je čovjek *društveno biće* – biće zajednice – *politik*, jer riječ *politika*, znači upravo zajednica – otuda i riječ *politeia – država, zajednica*, a ne *politika kao aktivnost* u smislu u kom se danas koristi. Već sljedeća Aristotelova rečenica ovo efektno i nedvosmisleno dopunjava ocjenom da je *onaj koji može živjeti sam, zvijer ili bog*! Treba imati u vidu da je Aristotel živio u društvu s politeističkom religijom i da ovdje izražava vjerovanje da su bogovi besmrtni – nezavisno žive li u zajednici ili sami, odnosno, da osim bogova i divlje zvijeri, iako smrtne, po svojoj prirodi žive same.

Određivanje inherentne, urođene društvenosti kao čovjekove specifične rodovske suštine, zapravo je značilo da je prioritet s pojedinca prešao na zajednicu. Sam Aristotel se u različitim periodima kolebao dajući naizmjenično primat čas pojedincu, čas opet, društvu. Međutim, već od samog početka, paralelno su se počele 'miješati vode' ova dva nepomirljiva toka. Tako, naprimjer, Platon najprije analizira fenomen ljudske zajednice i određuje njen karakter, izvodeći iz te analize zaključke o suštini njenog odnosa prema pojedincu, kao i o osnovnim obavezama koje proizilaze iz tog odnosa i koje pojedinac ima prema državi. Da su se spomenuti suprotstavljeni tokovi već tada račvali, vidi se iz Platonovog dijaloga *Gozba – Symposion*, u kom Trazimah oponira Sokratu kada ovaj određuje državu kao *zajednicu zasnovanu na pravdi*, s ciljem primjene pravde za sve njene članove, tvrdeći da je svaka država u biti instrument sile te da je, sljedstveno i ono što nazivamo 'pravdom', zapravo samo sila koju država koristi protiv pojedinca u ostvarivanju svojih interesa. Mnogo kasnije, posebno s filozofijom njemačkog klasičnog idealizma, odnos pojedinca, društva i države, definirat će se na osnovu deduktivne metafizike, koja svoj završni izraz dobija u Hegelovom stavu: *Istina je cjelina!*, prema kom se sva predmetna realnost, kao i pojedinačni stavovi u mišljenju, određuju i valoriziraju iz njihove

his hand on me to govern me is a usurper or tyrant, and I declare him my enemy. Max Stirner fully shared Proudhon's feeling of irrepressible individual freedom as the greatest value, also claiming that *Every state, as an institution, is intrinsically the enemy of the people*.

The other stream found its source in the opposite view, reduced to the axiom: *The individual is nothing, the nation is something, the state is everything.* According to this viewpoint, man as an individual is almost no man without the state. Essentially, this understanding is based on the assumption that, by his nature, man is a „being of community" and that, consequently, one cannot even speak of any man beyond community. This claim springs from ancient philosophical heritage. It is certainly the most quoted of Aristotle's definitions, according to which man is defined by the phrase *zoon politikon*. This definition is still one of the least understood definitions, since at the level of semantics, *zoon politikon* does not mean a „political animal", as it is typically arbitrarily translated (certainly not from Aristotle's text but rather, one might say, passed down for several generations), but rather, quite simply and literally: a „social being". In line with the rules of defining, which were formulated by Aristotle himself, *the definition proceeds by citing a genus to which the term belongs, and then the difference that gives its species (Definitio fit per genus proximus et differentiam specificam)*, in this case the category „Man" is defined by the closest genus „living being" (zoon), and by the distinction that Aristotle defines by means of the fact that this „living being", by the laws of his nature, lives in the community. Quite clearly and simply, Aristotle says that man is a „social being" – a being of the community (*politikon*), since the word politics signifies the community (therefore the word *politeia – state, community*), rather than „politics as an activity" in the sense in which it is used today. Aristotle's next sentence effectively and unambiguously supplements this rule, with the assessment that he *who can live alone is a beast or god*. One should keep in mind that Aristotle lived in a society with polytheistic religion, and that here he expresses his belief that gods are immortal, that they live independently in a community or alone, and that besides gods, wild beasts, although mortal, live alone by their nature.

Determining inherent, inborn sociality as the distinctive essence of men as a genus implied that the priority was transferred from the individual to the community. Aristotle himself wavered in different periods, alternately placing priority on the individual and on society. However, since the very beginning, the „waters" of these two irreconcilable streams began to mix. Thus, for example, Plato first analyzes the phenomenon of the human community and determines its character, deriving from this analysis conclusions about the essence of its relationship to the individual, and about the basic obligations that the individual has toward the state resulting from this relationship. One can see that the two streams already began to branch in Plato's dialogue „Symposium" (*Symposion*), where Thrasymachus opposes Socrates when the latter defines the state as a „community based on justice" aimed at applying justice for all its members, claiming that every state is essentially an instrument of force and that, consequently, what we call 'justice' is actually only the force that the state uses against individuals in achieving its interests. Far later, particularly in the philosophy of German classical idealism, the relationship between the individual, society and state would be defined based on deductive metaphysics, which gained its final expression in Hegel's view: *The truth is the whole!* According to this view, the whole of material reality, as well as individual views in reasoning, are

pozicije u cjelini – što znači da je i pojedinac potpuno podređen cjelini, konkretno – državi! Afirmacija države i potpuno zanemarivanje pojedinca, do njegovog totalnog obezvređivanja, postaje temelj ove filozofije. Hegelova apoteoza države u status apsolutnog autoriteta, promovirala je građansku lojalnost i bezuvjetnu pokornost državi u najvišu vrijednost i obavezu, istovremeno odričući pojedincu bilo kakvu samostalnost. Ovaj totalitarni model države i supremaciju države nad pojedincem Hegel je sistematski zastupao, ne samo u svojim filozofskim traktatima nego i kroz nekoliko poslovično kratkih i ubojitih aforizama koje su vlasti prihvatile s oduševljenjem a ogromna većina građana bezrezervno usvojila kao neporecivu istinu i svetu obavezu: *Bez države, pojedinac je – ništa. Tek država omogućava pojavu pojedinca. Najviše što može učiniti pojedinac, jeste da umre za državu, a najviše što može država učiniti za pojedinca, jeste da tu žrtvu prihvati!*

Teškoće dosljedno jednostranog zastupanja bilo koje od dvije krajnosti, kada je riječ o odnosu 'pojedinac, društvo, država', očigledne su već kod interpretacije samog Aristiotela. Neki interpretatori smatraju da je Aristotel dao nesumnjiv prioritet zajednici kao općem načelu, jer se i pojedinac, i zajednica, i država, kao forma zajednice, izvode iz prirode čovjeka, kao općeg uvjeta, zajedničkog za sve njih. Nasuprot tome, drugi smatraju da je Aristotelov stav nesumnjivo afirmirao prioritet pojedinca. U prilog ovakvom tumačenju ide i podatak da se Aristotel razišao sa Platonom, između ostalog, upravo po pitanju prihvatanja razlika u afinitetima i sklonostima svakog pojedinca, iz kojih onda proizilaze i njihovi različiti interesi, što se, prema Aristotelu, mora imati u vidu kada se razmišlja o odnosu pojedinca i države. Platon je ove razlike ignorirao, da bi sklonosti svih ljudi grupisao samo u tri kategorije: 1. želju za materijalnim dobrima; 2. častoljubivost; 3. želju za istinom. Ipak, i ovdje se može prigovoriti da je i sam Platon ovu podjelu izveo iz njegovog shvatanja prirode svakog čovjeka kao pojedinca, a ne iz principa *ljudske prirode* i pravednosti, odnosno *velikog dobra*, kojima sam on motivira i opravdava postojanje države. Naime, Platon ukazuje na to da svaki čovjek ima tri osnovne potrebe: 1. materijalne; 2. moralne; 3. intelektualne, koje kod čovjeka, fiziološki predstavljaju: 1. stomak; 2. srce; 3. glava. Jedina, iako bitna razlika, prema Platonu, proizilazi iz činjenice da ni ovi dijelovi, ni ove potrebe nisu ravnomjerno raspoređene kod ljudi: kod jednih, dominira stomak; kod drugih, srce, kod trećih glava. Pravedna država treba biti utemljena na postojanju ovih razlika i u skladu s tim, organizirana na poštovanju njihove hijerarhijske pozicije. Na ovoj podjeli koncipirao je Platon i svoju idealnu državu, koju čine tri kategorije građana: 1. radnici; 2. vojnici; 3. filozofi.

Ovaj nešto detaljniji eksurs u Platonovu filozofiju politike dovoljno uvjerljivo ilustrira kompleksnost i kontroverznost pitanja odnosa pojedinac, narod – građani, država, čak i kada je riječ o najznačajnijim predstavnicima filozofije politike. U ovom svjetlu treba shvatiti i podatak, da nasuprot onima koji smatraju da je Aristotel dao pojedincu prioritet nad državom, postoje i interpretacije prema kojima je Aristotel, zapravo, dao prioritet cjelini nad dijelom, a time i zajednici – državi nad pojedincem, pozivajući se u osnovi na isti argument, da je za Aristotela, 'ljudska priroda' ona zajednička osnova

defined and evaluated from their position in a whole, which means that the individual is fully subordinated to the whole, or specifically – to the state. Promotion of the state and complete neglect of the individual, all the way to his total disparagement, became the foundation of this philosophy. Hegel's apotheosis of the state to the status of absolute authority promoted civil loyalty and unconditional submissiveness to the state to the highest value and obligation, while denying any independence to the individual. Hegel systematically advocated this totalitarian model of the state and the supremacy of the state over the individual both in his philosophical treatises and in several proverbially brief and piercing aphorisms, which were accepted with delight by the authorities and adopted by the vast majority of citizens as an irrefutable truth and sacred obligation: *Without the state, the individual is – nothing, It is the state that allows the emergence of the individual. The most that the individual can do is die for the state, and the most the state can do is accept this sacrifice*.

Difficulties in the consistent one-sided advocacy of either of the two extremes in discussions on the relationship of 'individual, society, state' are evident as early as in the interpretations of Aristotle himself. Some interpreters believe that Aristotle irrefutably places priority on the community as a general principle, since both the individual and the community, including the state as a form of the community, are derived from human nature as a general condition, common to all. Others believe that, on the contrary, Aristotle's view indubitably promotes the priority of the individual. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Aristotle did not share Plato's views on accepting differences in each individual's affinities and preferences, which then result in their different interests. According to Aristotle, this must be kept in mind when considering the relationship between the individual and the state. Plato ignored these differences and grouped the preferences of all people into only three categories: 1. desire for material goods; 2. ambition; 3. desire for truth. Still, one might object that Plato himself derived this categorization from his understanding of everyone's nature as an individual, rather than from the principle of „human nature" and justice, i.e. a „greater good", which he believed to be the motive and justification for the existence of the state. Indeed, Plato suggested that every man has three basic needs: 1. material; 2. moral; and 3. intellectual, which, in man, are physiologically represented by: 1. stomach: 2. heart; and 3. head. According to Plato, the only, though vital, difference results from the fact that neither these parts of the body nor these needs are equally distributed in all people: in some, the stomach dominates; in others, the heart; and in still others, the head. A just state should be founded on the existence of these differences and, in line with them, organized based on respect for their hierarchical position. It is on this categorization that Plato conceived his ideal state, which is composed of three categories of citizens: 1. workers; 2. soldiers; and 3. philosophers.

The above, fairly detailed presentation of Plato's philosophy of politics convincingly illustrates the complexity and controversy of the issue of the relationship: individual, nation (citizens), state, even when it involves the most significant representatives of the philosophy of politics. It is in this light that one should understand that, contrary to those who believe that Aristotle placed priority on the individual rather than on the state, there are also some interpretations according to which Aristotle, in fact, placed priority on the whole over the part, and thus on the community (state) over the individual, essentially referring to the same argument, that for Aristotle

koja u krajnjoj liniji određuje i bit svakog pojedinca, što dozvoljava da se zaključi kako je 'pojedinac' kao kategorija, u Aristotelovoj filozofiji politike, izveden iz opće kategorije 'ljudski rod', što bi onda opravdalo i zaključak da Aristotel ipak daje prioritet državi nad građaninom, ljudskom rodu nad pojedinačnim čovjekom.

Da nijedna ni druga intepretacija Aristotela nije ponudila dovoljno uvjerljive argumente, vidi se iz činjenice da su se na njega pozivali i zastupnici koncepcije prioriteta države nad pojedincem, kao i njima suprotstavljeni branitelji teze o prioritetu pojedinca nad zajednicom i državom. U ranom helenističkom periodu slavni filozof Epikur ističe autonomiju i integritet pojedinca kao vrijednosti koje se ne smiju žrtvovati u ime bilo kvih državnih ili ličnih interesa, zato što pojedinac ima najviši stepen konkretnosti postojanja – za razliku od države koja je u visokom stepenu, apstraktna kategorija. Njegovi argumenti su bili tako uvjerljivi da se, kao reakcija, u ovom periodu pojavio fenomen masovne apstinencije od prihvatanja državnih poslova i visokih pozicija, uz paralelno intenziviranje socijalnih vrijednosti u ljudskom životu, posebno vrijednosti prijateljstva i ljubavi. Sličan stav u prilog afirmacije autonomije pojedinca i redukcije društvenih obaveza, ako ne i njegovog potpunog povlačenja iz javnog života, preporučuju i pripadnici stoičke škole. Insistiranje stoicizma na vrijednostima čovjeka kao pojedinca, posebno nagalašene u njihovom naglašavanju moralnog integriteta svakog čovjeka, koliko god bilo dosljedno i impresivno, otkriva još jednom logičke i pojmovne teškoće jednostranog odgovora na pitanje o odnosu pojedinca, naroda i države, bez obzira kako taj odgovor glasio! Naime, afirmacija prava i čak, obaveze pojedinca da slijedi sopstvena moralna načela i po cijenu povlačenja iz društvenog života, stoji u suprotnosti sa činjenicom da stoici čovjeka pojedinca izvode iz općeg pojma čovječanstva, dakle, da ga najprije smatraju pripadnikom ljudskog roda pa tek zatim individuom – upravo na ovom stavu stoičari zasnivaju i svoju poznatu teoriju kosmopolitizma i suštinske jednakosti svih ljudi. Implikacija da je moralni integritet pojedinca nespojiv sa teorijom o prioritetu čovječanstva nad pojedincem, promakla im je ali ne zato što je to bio njihov previd, nego zato što se od zahtjeva moralnog integriteta čovjeka kao pojedinca jednostavno ne može odreći nijedno filozofski relevatno promišljanje najboljeg načina života – što je bila osnovna inspiracija i centralna tema stoičke filozofije. S istim teškoćama da se doslijedno odbrani jedna ili druga teza, suočili su se i Platonovi sljedbenici – odnosno Sokratovi, jer je Sokrat bio Platonov učitelj, koji su se, tragajući za najboljim modelom života pojedinca i njegovog optimalnog odnosa prema državi, podijelili u dvije suprotne struje iako su zajedničku inspiraciju imali upravo u Platonovoj filozofiji. S jedne strane, Kirenska škola na čelu sa Aristipom, afirmirala je aktivan, intenzivan društveni i politički život usmjeren prema konkretnom ličnom zadovoljstvu i uspjehu svakog pojedinca, dok je nasuprot tome, Kinička škola zagovarala povlačenje pojedinca od svih društvenih funkcija i obaveza, a lični integritet i slobodu, po cijenu svih odricanja, proglasila za najvišu vrijednost, nalazeći smisao života u moralnoj nezavisnosti, a ne u stjecanju materijalnih dobara.

'human nature' is the common basis which ultimately determines the essence of each individual. This allows the conclusion that, in Aristotle's philosophy of politics, the individual as a category is derived from the general category of 'mankind', which then justifies the conclusion that Aristotle still places priority on the state over the citizen, on mankind over the individual man.

That neither interpretation has offered sufficiently convincing arguments can be seen from the fact that it was referred to both by the advocates of the conception of the priority of the state over the individual and by their opponents, who defended the premise of the priority of the individual over the community and the state. In the early Hellenic period, the famous philosopher Epicurus highlighted the autonomy and integrity of the individual as values that must not be sacrificed in the name of any state or personal interests, because the individual has the highest degree of the specificity of existence, as opposed to the state, which is an abstract category to a high degree. His arguments were so convincing that, as a response, that period witnessed the phenomenon of mass unwillingness to accept the jobs of public servants and highly-ranked positions, with the parallel intensification of social values in human life, particularly the values of friendship and love. A similar view that favors the recognition of the autonomy of the individual and the reduction of social obligations, even the individual's total withdrawal from public life, is also recommended by members of the Stoic school. Stoicism's insistence on the values of man as an individual, particularly prominent in its emphasis on the moral integrity of any man, regardless of its consistence and impressiveness again reveals the logical and conceptual difficulties of the one-sided answer to the question of the relationship between the individual, the nation and the state, regardless of what the answer is. Indeed, the promotion of the individual's right, his obligation even, to pursue his own moral principles, even at the expense of withdrawing from social life, contradicts the fact that Stoics derive the individual from the general notion of humanity, i.e. that they believe the individual to be primarily a member of mankind and only then an individual. It is on this view that Stoics base their well-known theory of cosmopolitism and the essential equality of all people. They missed the implication that the individual's moral integrity is incompatible with the theory of the priority of humanity over the individual, not because they overlooked it but rather because no philosophically relevant contemplation of the best way of life can renounce the request for the moral integrity of man as an individual – which was the basic inspiration and the central topic of the Stoic philosophy. The same difficulty in consistently defending either of the premises was faced by Plato's followers (i.e. those of Socrates, since Socrates was Plato's teacher) who, in their quest for the best model of the individual's life and its optimum relationship to the state, split into two opposing streams, although they both had common inspiration in Plato's philosophy. On the one hand, the Cyrenaic school headed by Aristippus promoted an active, intense social and political life focused on the actual personal satisfaction and success of every individual. On the other, the *Cynic school* advocated the individual's withdrawal from any social position and obligation, while declaring personal integrity and freedom at the expense of such abstinence to be the highest value, finding the meaning of life in moral independence rather than in the acquisition of material goods. Famous representatives of this school include Diogenes, who is well-known for, among other things, living in an old clay jar and carrying a lamp during the day, claiming to be looking for an honest *man*.


EU
Truth
Truth


Yes, I'm a Bosniak
Da, ja sam Bošnjak

Čuveni predstavnik ove škole bio je Diogen, poznat, između ostalog, po tome što je živio u starom buretu i što je, na svjetlu sunačnog dana, u centru grada prepunom prolaznika, sa fenjerom tražio *čovjeka*.

Tokom srednjeg vijeka, posebno preko neoplatonističke filozofije, počinje dominacija koncepcije o prioritetu cjeline nad dijelovima – pri čemu je čovjek pojedinac izveden iz pojma cjeline i vraćen u cjelinu. Ipak, pojedinac kao kategorija nije izgubio svoje značenje, jer je bio postuliran unutar religijski intonirane filozofije, što znači da bi njegovim nestankom religija zapravo izgubila svoj osnovni smisao – spas pojedinca! Ipak, status pojedinca bio je sekundarnog karaktera, a prihvatanje činjenice da je svaka zajednica, pa i država, zapravo agregat pojedinaca, te da je pojedinac nesumnjivo prije zajednice i države, nijednog trenutka nije našlo svoje mjesto u spisima ovog razdoblja. Tek pojavom nominalizma, koji je ukazao na teškoće u pridavanju ontološki realnog statusa općim pojmovima – *Postoji konkretni predmet, ali ne i pojam; postoji ova jabuka, ali ne jabuka uopće* – snažnije je afirmiran status pojedinca, iako je prioritet države – Crkve kao zajednice, Božije Države, ostao neprikosnoven. Debata je dalje oscilirala između dvije krajnosti, uz definitivno pridavanje većeg značaja Cjelini – društvu, državi, pri čemu se prihvata različit ali uvijek prisutan stepen neporecive autonomije pojedinca. Nemogućnost da se u teorijskim razmatranjima pojedinac potpuno ukine kao nezavisan entitet i podvede pod pojam zajednice, odnosno države, praktično je demonstrirao svojim tragičnim primjerom Đordano Bruno. Iako je svojom filozofijom prirode razvio teoriju o cjelini univerzuma, uz implikaciju gotovo totalne marginalizacije pojedinačnog kao takvog – dakle i čovjeka kao pojedinca, sam on je svojim primjerom potvrdio neporecivost ontološkog i svakog drugog statusa pojedinca, time što se suprotstavio Cjelini – društvu, crkvi, državi, i ostao dosljedan sebi kao pojedincu i u trenutku izvršenja smrtne presude spaljivanjem.

Ovaj primjer ima ogromno simboličko značenje za shvatanje stvarnih proporcija uloge, vrijednosti i snage pojedinca, odnosno njegove važnosti za postojanje i karakter svakog društva, posebno države, kao političke, pravne i moralne zajednice. U tom kontekstu postaje jasno da je pojedinac, i kao konkretna individua i kao kategorija, zapravo nužna pretpostavka i neophodan uvjet za postojanje svake zajednice, od obitelji do države, te da po svom realnom značaju daleko prelazi okvire svake teorijske i naučne rasprave, potvrđujući se kao ključni akter ljudskog društva i historije.

Izlaskom iz dominacije religijskog mišljenja, označenim u novo doba filozofijom racionalizma, pitanje odnosa pojedinca, naroda i države otvara nove horizonte, ali ipak ostaje u suštini kontroverzno. Tako je Dekart, francuski filozof, osnivač filozofije racionalizma, Rene Descartes, *Carthesius* (1596-1650), preko aspolutne afirmacije samosvijesti, formulirane u njegovom čuvenom aksiomu: *Mislim, dakle, jesam! – Cogito, ergo, sum!,* s jedne strane apsolutizirao intelektualnu autonomiju pojedinca, ipak je, s druge strane, tu činjenicu izveo iz najopćijeg pojma božanskog uma, prirodnog svjetla – *lumen naturale*. Na ovaj način je nesumnjivo, uz intelektualnu autonomiju pojedinačne individue, izraženu u apsolutnom statusu samosvijeti, istovremeno nedvosmisleno uvjetovao tu autonomiju tako što je

The Middle Ages witnessed the domination of the concept of the priority of the whole over the parts, which was particularly influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy. According to this conception, the individual man is derived from the notion of the whole and returns into the whole. Still, the individual as a category did not lose its meaning, since it was postulated within religiously oriented philosophy, which means that its disappearance would result in the loss of the fundamental meaning of religion – the salvation of the individual. Still, the individual's status was of secondary character, and the acceptance of the fact that every community, even the state, is actually an aggregate of individuals, and that the individual undoubtedly precedes the community and the state, can be seen in no writing of this period. It was only upon the emergence of nominalism, which pointed to the difficulties in attributing an ontologically realistic status to general notions (*There exists a specific object, but not a notion; there exists this apple, but not the apple in general*), that the status of the individual was more strongly recognized, although the priority of the state (Church as a community, Divine State) remained inviolable. The debate then oscillated between the two extremes, definitely attaching a greater significance to the Whole (society, state), with the acceptance of a different but always present degree of irrefutable autonomy of the individual. The impossibility of completely excluding the individual as an independent entity from theoretical discussions, and subsume it under the notion of community, i.e. state, was practically demonstrated by Giordano Bruno with his tragic example. Although in his philosophy of nature he developed the theory of the whole of the universe, which implied the almost total marginalization of individual as such (thus of man as an individual), he himself, with his own example, confirmed the irrefutability of the ontological and any other status of the individual, by opposing the Whole (society, church, state) and remaining consistent to himself as an individual even at the moment of his execution by being burnt at the stake.

This example has a huge symbolic significance for understanding the real proportions of the role, values and power of the individual, i.e. his importance for the existence and character of every society, particularly the state, as a political, legal and moral community. In this context, it becomes clear that the individual, both as a specific person and as a category, is indeed a necessary assumption and prerequisite for the existence of any community, from family to state, and that by his real significance he transcends the frameworks of any theoretical and scientific discussion, proving to be the crucial participant in human society and history.

After the end of the domination of religious reasoning, which was marked by the philosophy of rationalism, the issue of the relationship between the individual, nation and state opened new horizons, though it essentially remained controversial. Thus Descartes (French philosopher, founder of the philosophy of rationalism, René Descartes, *Carthesius*, 1596-1650), postulated the absolute recognition of self-awareness, formulated in his famous axiom: *I think, therefore I am!* (*Cogito, ergo, sum*) and thus absolutized the individual's intellectual autonomy on the one hand though, on the other, he derived this from the most general notion of the divine mind, natural light (*lumen naturale*). In this way, he unambiguously conditioned the intellectual autonomy of the individual, expressed in the absolute status of self-awareness, by placing absolute priority on the supra-individual unity of matter and thought (*res extensa, res cogitans*), ultimately – God.

apsolutni prioritet dao nadindividualnom jedinstvu materije i mišljenja – *res extensa, res cogitans*, u krajnjoj liniji – Bogu.

Ista unutrašnja protivrječnost održala se i u promišljanju odnosa pojedinca, društva i države i kod Spiznoze, drugog znamenitog predstavnika racionalizma – Baruch Spiunoza (1632-1677), holandski filozof. U svom čuvenom djelu *Etika*, Spinoza do krajnjih granica afirmira etičku svijest i moralni integritet pojedinca, nezavisno od svih društvenih pritisaka i posljedica do kojih ga takva beskompromisna pozicija može odvesti u životu – sam Spinoza je, zbog nepopustljivosti u odbrani svojih stavova, bio žrtva jednog neuspješnog atentata, kao i oficijelne ekskomunikacije. Pa ipak, njegova metafizička, ontološka pozicija pretpostavlja očigledni suprotni princip afirmacije apsolutne Cjeline u kojoj se izjednačavaju i preklapaju pojmovi Boga i Prirode – *Deus sive Natura – Bog ili Priroda*; Cjelina je Jedno – bilo da je nazivamo Bog ili Priroda, što znači da je moralna autonomija pojedinca u krajnjoj liniji sekundarna, izvedena iz pojma Cjeline, koji je time dobio i apsolutni prioritet nad pojedincem. Sam Spinoza je, po svemu sudeći, bio svjestan ove logičke neusaglašenosti, jer je autonomiju moralne volje suverenog pojedinca ponovo uzdigao na najviši pijedestal, definirajući je kao *intelektualnu ljubav prema Bogu – Amor Dei intellectualis*. Iako je time objašnjen nadnaravni izvor moralnog integriteta pojedinca, sam njegov status ovim je postao još nesamostalniji, jer se pojedinac, čak i u svom pravu da beskompromisno slijedi svoja uvjerenja, nasuprot društvu i državi, ipak morao povinovati zovu božanske intelektualne ljubavi, čime je Cjelini dat definitivni prioritet.

Problem odnosa pojedinac, društvo, država, dobio je konkretniju sadržinu u opusu trećeg velikog predstavnika filozofije racionalizma, Lajbnicu – njemački filozof, matematičar i izumitelj, Wilhelm Gottfried Leibnitz (1646-1716). Još uvijek izražena filozofskim jezikom i kroz filozofske kategorije, njegova koncepcija ovog odnosa je određena sa dvije uzajamno suprotstavljene pozicije. S jedne strane Lajbnic je afirmaciju pojedinca, kao individue, doveo do krajnje tačke koju je, čak i teorijski, nemoguće preći. Naime, njegov sistem, objašnjen u djelu *Monadologija*, počinje odredbom da je svijet sačinjen od monada – grčki, *monos – jedno*, pri čemu je dosljedno, samu monadu definirao kao „ono što nema dijelova". Ova definicija otklonila je imanentni problem sadržan u pojmu atoma, koji iako znači *nedjeljiv – a-tomos*, zapravo je djeljiv jer se svaki atom razlikuje po obliku i veličini, kako kod filozofa koji su prvi upotrijebili ovaj pojam – Leukip i Demokrit, jednako tako i u atomskoj fizici, koja mjeri veličinu atoma i određuje njegove elemente – protone, neutron, elektrone, što direktno znači da je sam pojam *atoma* od početka bio pogrešan. Svojom definicijom monade, Lajbnic je ovaj problem briljantno riješio, čime je zapravo anticipirao i rezultate najnovijih istraživanja kvantne, sub-molekularne fizike. Ali paralelno s ovakvom, uistinu do kraja dovedenom afirmacijom samog pojma monade – otuda i pojedinca kao individue jer, *individua* doslovno odgovara pojmu Lajbnicove monade time što znači i nedjeljivo, iz korijena latinske riječi *divide – podijeliti* i negativnog prefiksa *in*, dakle *in-divide*, *ono što se ne može podijeliti* – i Lajbnic je afirmirao prioritet Univerzuma kao cjeline svih monada, koje su hijerahijski pozicionirane, od najnižih – *monads nues*, do one

The same internal controversy was present in the contemplation of the relationship between the individual, society and state by Spinoza, another famous representative of rationalism (Baruch Spinoza, Dutch philosopher, 1632-1677). In his well-known work *Ethics*, Spinoza promotes the individual's ethical awareness and moral integrity to the extreme, independently of all social pressures and consequences to which such an uncompromising position can lead him in life (due to his adamancy in defending his views, Spinoza himself was a victim of an unsuccessful assassination, as well as of official excommunication). Still, his metaphysical, ontological position adopts the obviously opposite principle of the promotion of the absolute Whole, where notions of God and Nature are equated and where they overlap (*Deus sive Natura – God or Nature;* Whole is One – whether we call it God or Nature), which means that the individual's moral autonomy is ultimately secondary, derived from the notion of Whole, which thus assumes absolute priority over the individual. In all likelihood, Spinoza himself was aware of this logical discrepancy, since he raised the autonomy of the sovereign individual's moral will to the highest pedestal, defining it as the *intellectual love of God (Amor Dei intellectualis).* Although it explains the supernatural source of the individual's moral integrity, this makes his status even less independent since the individual, even in his right to uncompromisingly pursue his convictions, as opposed to the society and state, still has to obey the call of divine intellectual love, which definitely places priority on the Whole.

The issue of the relationship: individual, society, state received more specific content in the works by the third great representative of the philosophy of rationalism, Leibniz (German philosopher, mathematician and inventor, Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz, 1646-1716). Still expressed in philosophical language and through philosophic categories, his conception of this relationship is defined by two mutually opposed positions. On the one hand, Leibniz took the recognition of the individual to an extreme which is, even theoretically, impossible to cross. Indeed, his system, explained in his work *Monadologie*, begins with the claim that the world is composed of monads (Greek, *monos – one*) and he consistently defines the monad itself as „what has no parts". This definition removed the immanent problem contained in the notion of an atom which, although it means „indivisible" (a-tomos), is actually divisible since every atom has a distinctive form and size, both in the view of the philosophers who first used this notion (Leucippus and Democritus) and in atomic physics, which measures the size of the atom and determines its elements (protons, neutrons, electrons), which clearly means that the very notion of „atom" was wrong at the start. With his definition of monad, Leibniz solved this problem brilliantly, and indeed anticipated the results of the most recent research in quantum, sub-molecular physics. However, in parallel with this, indeed with the ultimate promotion of the very notion of monad (and therefore a person as an individual, since *individual* literally corresponds to the notion of Leibniz's monad, because it also means in-divisible, from the root of the Latin word *divide (divide)* and the negative prefix *in*, thus *in-divide, what cannot be divided*) – Leibniz also promoted the priority of the Universe as the whole of all monads, which are hierarchically positioned, from the lowest (*monads nues*) to the highest (*actus purus*). This top monad is by definition the pure distilled active principle, and as an activity without any material traces, it

najviše – *actus purus*. Ova vrhovna monada po definiciji predstavlja čisti destilirani djelatni princip, pa je kao aktivnost bez bilo kakvih materijalnih primjesa, jednostavno sam – Bog! U ovakvu svoju koncepciju Univerzuma, Lajbnic je uveo dinački princip *težnje, žudnje, poriva – appetitio*, koji svaku nižu monadu tjera da teži višem nivou, a sve zajedno usmjerava kroz težnju prema savršenstvu vrhovne monade – Boga.

Primijenjen na društveni kontekst, Lajbnicov sistem nudi zanimljivu i instruktivnu sliku ljudske historije. U osnovi svakog društva, pa dakle i države, kao i ljudskog društva u cjelini, stoji pojedinac, neporeciv i nužan kao monada. Svaki pojedinac je elemenat od kog su sačinjeni i društvo i država – kao što je u materijalnom svijetu sve ono što je sastavljeno, što ima dijelove, sastavljeno od monada, koje same nisu sastavljene i nemaju dijelove! Ovako trezvena, objektivna i realistična odredba pojedinca definitivno ga utemeljuje u najtemeljitije i najtrezvenije analitičare strukture svakog društva i države čineći pojedinca nužnim elementom njihovog postojanja! I težnja monada – *appetitio* da od nižih napreduju ka višim, primijenjena na ljude, nudi veoma inspirativnu parabolu jer se izražava kao inherentna čovjekova *težnja za savršenstvom*, kao antropološka konstanta i univerzalna osobina čovjeka kao bića! Ujedno, ova težnja za savršenstvom, objašnjava i krajnji cilj djelovanja svakog čovjeka i svakog društva, odnosno, cijelog čovječanstva – kao što je impresivno formulirano u Lajbnicovoj definiciji: *Čovjek* (*Čovječanstvo*) *je asimptota Boga!* – u skladu sa definicijom da je asimptota *prava koja se u svojoj funkciji beskonačno približava beskonačno dalekoj tački*. U svjetlu ove koncepcije, čovjek kao pojedinac i svi oblici njegove društvene organizacije u cjelini, dobijaju integrativni princip djelovanja, koji omogućava da se sagleda i shvati ono zajedničko u čitavoj, prividno haotičnoj evidenciji historijskog iskustva različitih naroda i država. Ako je svako društvo sačinjeno od pojedinaca, a svaki pojedinac teži ka savršenstvu, onda je zapravo neizbježan zaključak da su sva društva i cijelo čovječanstvo u suštini jedna ista zajednica koja beskonačno teži beskonačnom savršenstvo! Drugim riječima, za Lajbnica, historija je proces približavanja čovječanstva Bogu ili, još konkretnije: *beskonačno približavanje infinitnom, beskonačnom Bogu.*

Ovim veličanstvenim filozofskim sistemom, Lajbnic je, barem u teoriji, odstranio svako opravdanje za pitanje o protivrječnostima pojedinca i društva izvedenim iz pretpostavke njihovih suprotstavljenih interesa, klasnih borbi, inter i intraetničkih sukoba. Njegova koncepcija društva uzdigla je i čovjeka kao pojedinca, i ljudsko društvo u cjelini, na nivo najplemenitijih poriva i njihove izvorne usmjerenosti ka vječnosti i savršenstvu. Čovjek je za njega biće zajednice, pri čemu je izvorna jednakost osnovne konstitucije svakog čovjeka – izražena kao težnja za savršenstvom, temelj svakog društva i svake države. I u životu, jednako kao u svojoj filozofiji, Lajbnic se klonio rasprava, polemika i sukoba. Njegov sistem nastoji harmonizirati sve protivrječnosti – kako one u različitim filozofskim sistemima tako i inherentne logičke protivrječnosti svog sistema. Rezultat ovakvog pristupa predstavlja njegov monadološki sistem koji u ontološkoj ravni isključuje samu mogućnost postojanje nepomirljivih, antagnostičkih suprotnosti, pa čak i trajnije oblike divergentnih djelovanja koji bi doveli u pitanje suštinski integriranu cjelinu svijeta. Jednako tako, u antropološkoj ravni, pojedinac, društvo i država su

is simply – God himself. Leibniz also introduced, in such a conception of the Universe, the dynamic principle of *striving, yearning, urge (appetition)*, which urges every lower monad to strive for a higher level, and directs all of them together through striving for the perfection of the supreme monad – God.

When applied to the social context, Leibniz's system offers an interesting and instructive image of human history. The basis of every society, and thus of the state as well, and of human society as a whole, is the individual, as irrefutable and necessary as the monad. Every individual is an element which composes the society and state, just as in the material world everything that is composed, that has parts, is made up of monads, which are themselves not composed and have no parts. Such an austere, objective and realistic definition of the individual certainly includes him among the most thorough and most austere analysts of the structure of any society and state, where the individual is a necessary element of their existence. When applied to people, a monad's striving to progress from the lower to higher positions provides a very inspiring parable since it is expressed as man's inherent striving for perfection, as an anthropological constant and universal feature of man as a being. At the same time, this *striving for perfection* also explains the ultimate goal of the activity of every man and every society, indeed of the whole of mankind, as impressively articulated in Leibniz's definition: *Man (Mankind) is the asymptote of God* – in line with the definition that an asymptote is a *straight line that in its function infinitely approaches an infinitely distant spot*. In the light of this conception, man as an individual and all forms of his social organization as a whole assume the integrating principle of activity, which in turn allows the observation and understanding of what is common in all, apparently chaotic, records of the historical experience of different nations and states. If every society is composed of individuals, and every individual strives for perfection, then the necessary conclusion is that all societies and the whole of mankind are essentially the same community which infinitely strives for infinite perfection. In other words, for Leibniz history is the process of mankind's approach to God or, more specifically: *infinite approach to the infinite God*.

With this glorious philosophical system, Leibniz, at least in theory, eliminated any justification for the issue of contradictions of the individual and society derived from the assumption of their opposed interests, class struggles, inter and intra-ethnic conflicts. His conception of society also elevated man as an individual, and human society as a whole, to the level of the most noble urges and their primordial direction toward eternity and perfection. For him, man is a being of community, whereby the genuine equality of the basic constitution of every man, expressed as the striving for perfection, is the foundation of every society and every state. In his life, as in his philosophy, Leibniz shied away from debate, dispute and conflict. His system endeavors to harmonize all contradictions, both those in different philosophical systems and the inherent logical contradictions of his system. Such an approach results in his monadistic system which, at the ontological level, excludes the very possibility of the existence of irreconcilable, antagonistic opposites, even the more permanent forms of diverging activities that would challenge the essentially integrated whole of the world. In the same way, at the anthropological level, the individual, society and state are organically and inextricably

organski, iznutra neraskidivo povezani, ne smo funkcionalno, tako što ne bi mogli postojati nezavisno jedni od drugih, odnosno, jedni bez drugih nego i vrijednosno, aksiološki, jer se težnje pojedinca, kao monade koja sačinjava armaturu svakog društva i države za savršenstvom i vječnošću, mogu ostvariti samo unutar društva i države. Istovremeno, težnja svakog društva i države za sve boljim i savršenijim modelom organizacije i uzvišenijim društvenim ciljevima, ne bi mogla pronaći svoju unutrašnju snagu bez aksiološke energije koju im daje svaki njihov pripadnik – pojedinac!

(Nastavak u sljedećem broju)



ILUSTRACIJA ~ *Pisari Kraljevine Bosne - povelje, darovnice, listine bosanskih banova i kraljeva do 14 stoljeća.*

internally connected, both functionally, in the sense that they could not exist independently of each other, i.e. without each other, and axiologically, since the striving of the individual (as a monad which constitutes the reinforcement of every society and state) for perfection and eternity can be achieved only within the society and state. Besides, the striving of every society and every state for an ever-improved and perfect model of organization and nobler social goals could not find its inner strength without the axiological energy provided by each of its members – individuals.

(To be continued)



ILLUSTRATION ~ *Scribes of the Kingdom of Bosnia - charters, grants, deeds of Bosnian bans and kings of the 14th century.*