

Dr. Mustafa Cerić važi za jednog od najuticajnijih muslimanskih ličnosti današnjice. Završio je Gazi Husrev-begovu medresu u Sarajevu, a diplomirao na Univerzitetu Al-Azhar u Kairu, Egipat. Doktorirao je na Čikaškom univerzitetu pred uglednim muslimanskim učenjakom Fazlur Rahmanom. Predavao je na Međunarodnom institutu islamske misli i civilizacije u Kuala Lumpuru u Maleziji pod vođstvom prof. Naquib Al-Attasa, te kao gostujući profesor na Svjetskom univerzitetu za islamske nauke i obrazovanje, Amman, Jordan. Vodio je Islamsku zajednicu u Bosni i Hercegovini kao reisu-l-ulema i vrhovni muftija(1993 – 2012) u ratu i miru; njegovo vodstvo je imalo veliki utjecaj na domaća i međunarodna pitanja koja se tiču istine, pravde, mira i pomirenja. Dr. Cerić je zagovornik međukulturalnog angažmana, kao i mirovni aktivist; dobitnik je *UNESCO-ove nagrade za mir*, nagrade *Theodor-Heuss-Stiftug*, *Sternbergove nagrade*, *nagrade zaklade Eugen Biser*, *nagrade za životno djelo asocijacije UK Muslim Social Scientist*, *nagrade Fondacije Ducci*... Napisao je *Deklaraciju evropskih muslimana;* predvodio muslimansku delegaciju inicijative *Zajednička riječ u Vatikanu*; član je *Odbora savjesti* koji se bori protiv poricanja holokausta; član je Upravnog odbora *Muslimanskog mirovnog foruma*, Abu Dabi; specijalni savjetnik šejha Abdallaha bin Bejje; počasni predsjednik *Svjetske konferencije 'Religija za mir'*; uvršten je među 50 najuticajnijih muslimana u svijetu... Redovni je član Kraljevske akademije Al al-Bajt (Jordan), a jedan je od osnivača i redovni član BANU-a (Bosna). E-Mail: **cericmustafa@gmail.com**

Dr. Mustafa Cerić is considered one of the most inȧuential Muslim figures of today. He completed the Gazi Husrevbeg Madrasa in Sarajevo and earned a scholarship to Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. He received his doctorate from the University of Chicago by the mentorship of the eminent Muslim scholar Fazlur Rahman. He lectured at the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, under the leadership of Prof. Naquib Al-Attas; was a Visiting Professor at the World University of Islamic Sciences and Education, Amman, Jordan. He led the Islamic Community as the Grand Mufti (Raisu-l-ulama) of Bosnia (1993-2012) in war and peace; his leadership had a major impact on domestic and international issues concerning truth, justice, peace and reconciliation. Dr. Cerić is an advocate of intercultural engagement as well as a peace activist; he won the ***UNESCO Peace Prize, the Theodor-Heuss-Stiftung Prize, the Sternberg Prize, the Eugen Biser Foundation Prize, the UK Muslim Social Scientist Association Life Achievement Prize, Ducci Foundation Prize***... He wrote ***Declaration of European Muslims***; led the Muslim delegation of the ***Common Word initiative*** to the Vatican; he is a member of the ***Committee of Conscience*** against Holocaust denial; he is a member of the Board of ***Trustees of Muslim Peace Forum***, Abu Dhabi; he is a special adviser to Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah; he is Honorary President of ***World Conference Religions for Peace***; he is listed among the 50 most influential Muslims in the world ... He is a ful member of the Royal Academy Al al-Bayt (Jordan), and is one of the founders and ful member of BANU (Bosnia). E-Mail: **cericmustafa@gmail.com**



datum prijema / date of receipt: 26.09.2022.
datum recenzije / review date: 27.10.2022.
datum prihvaćanja / date of acceptance: 20.11.2022.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.52510/sia.v3i2.50
UDK: UDK:28:[316.624:329](497)
Izvorni naučni rad – Original scientific paper

Mustafa CERIĆ

O FENOMENU POPULIZAMA I EKSTREMIZMA NA BALKANU

ON THE PHENOMENON OF POPULISM AND EXTREMISM IN THE BALKANS

Sažetak

Ovaj rad zasnovan je na mom osobnom iskustvu rata i mira u Bosni. Osnovna ideja je da je lakše započeti rat nego ga zaustaviti. Dakle, poslijeratni oporavak ili izgradnja mira nije jednostavan proces. Ali, zahvaljujući ljudima otvorenog uma koji su sve vrijeme bili protiv mitskog populizma koji je izazvao krvavi rat protiv Bosne i njenog autohtonog naroda, mir, iako nepravedan, ipak je postignut. Fokus je ovdje na ideji pluralizma u Bosni kao suprotnosti "populizmu" i "ekstremizmu". Jer, pozitivan narativ poput pluralizma je dobar način da se suočimo sa današnjom prijetnjom "populizma" i "ekstremizma". Pozitivan ili optimističan narativ je kreativan, dok je negativan i pesimističan narativ depresivan i obeshrabrujući.

Ključne riječi: *Balkan, populizam, ekstremizam, pluralizam, balkanizacija, Bosna, Europa, orijentalizam, millet, epohalni rat, politička laž, ljudska prava.*

Abstract

This paper is based on my personal experience of war and peace in Bosnia. The basic notion is that it is easier to start a war than to stop it. Thus, the postwar recovery or peace-building is not easy. But thanks to open-minded people who have been all along against a mythical populism that caused the bloody war against Bosnia and its autochthon people, the peace, although unjust, was reached after all. The focus here is on the idea of pluralism in Bosnia as an opposite to "populism" and "extremism". For a positive narrative like pluralism is a good way to encounter the today's threat of "populism" and "extremism". A positive or optimistic narrative is creative while a negative and pessimistic one is depressive and discouraging.

Key words: *the Balkans, populism, extremism, pluralism, balkanization, Bosnia, Europe, orientalism, millet, Epochal War, political lie, human rights.*

O FENOMENU POPULIZAMA I EKSTREMIZMA NA BALKANU

I

Da li su fenomeni populizma i ekstremizma neki novi koncepti? Ne, nisu novi, ali su danas upadljiviji i opasniji nego prije zbog fenomena Novih medija, odnosno društvenih medija. Ali problem nije u medijima kao takvima. Mediji – društveni ili drugi – koriste se kao sredstvo za isticanje cilja. Dakle, problem je u ljudskom umu koji definira politički cilj, ili na neki drugi način, koji je vjerovatno dostižan putem populizma koji vodi u ekstremizam. Zaista, danas smo suočeni s promjenom ljudskog razmišljanja ne samo u političkoj misli već i u moralnoj percepciji. Očigledno je da današnjoj politici sve više nedostaje principijelnosti.*[1]

Do sada znamo da je Prvi svjetski rat okončao feudalizam zajedno s univerzalnom (imperijalnom) državom,*[2] dok je Drugi epohalni rat u relativnom smislu porazio fašizam zajedno s rasizmom. Nakon tog novog razvoja, svijet su činile nacionalne države koje su pristale regulirati svoje odnose međunarodnim pravom i poretkom pod pokroviteljstvom Ujedinjenih nacija. U principu, kao članice Ujedinjenih nacija, sve nacionalne države su prihvatile Univerzalnu deklaraciju o ljudskim pravima.*[3] Dana 10. decembra 1948. godine Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija usvojila je Univerzalnu deklaraciju o ljudskim pravima kao "zajednički standard postignuća za sve narode i sve nacije".*[4]

Međutim, borba se nastavila između liberalne demokracije Zapada i autoritarnog socijalizma Sovjetskog Saveza. Ova borba se smirila tek nakon raspada Sovjetskog Saveza 1990. god. i očiglednog trijumfa zapadne liberalne demokracije. Smatralo se da je svijet krenuo ka eri stabilnijeg globalnog mira i sigurnosti. Ali to nije bilo tako. Vakum nakon Hladnog rata napravio je više izazova nego što je iko mogao zamisliti.*[5] Stvorio se otvoreni prostor za etnički i nacionalni

---

[1] Uporedite sedam smrtnih grijeha: 1. bogatstvo bez rada; 2. zadovoljstvo bez savjesti; 3. znanje bez karaktera; 4. trgovina (poslovanje) bez morala (etike); 5. nauka bez humanosti; 6. religija bez žrtve; 7. politika bez principa.
Vidjeti: Stephen R. Covey, ***Principle Centered Leadership***, Free Press, New York, 1991., str. 87-93.

[2] Univerzalne države u to vrijeme bile su Osmansko i Habsburško Carstvo. Obje su imale religijsku matricu za svoju političku vladavinu i sistem feudalizma za svoj ekonomski sistem. Svijet je u osnovi bio podijeljen između islama i kršćanstva.

[3] 2018. god. obilježena je 50. godišnjica Deklaracije.

[4] Deklaracija je međunarodni dokument koji je usvojila Generalna skupština Ujedinjenih nacija i koji sadrži prava i slobode svih ljudskih bića. Generalna skupština ju je prihvatila kao Rezoluciju 217 na svojoj trećoj sjednici 10. 10. 1948. u Palais de Chaillot u Parizu, Francuska. Od tadašnjih 58 članica Ujedinjenih nacija, 48 je glasalo za, nijedna protiv, osam je bilo uzdržano, a dvije nisu glasale. Vidjeti: ***Opća deklaracija o ljudskim pravima*** (1948).
Dostupno na adresi: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declarationhuman-rights/. Pristup 29. 10. 2022.

[5] Raspad Sovjetskog Saveza u decembru 1991. eliminirao je imperative Hladnog rata koji su održavali krhki američki klasni kompromis i suzili ideološki prostor za političko neslaganje. Trijumf neoliberalnog poretka nije osigurala

ON THE PHENOMENON OF POPULISM AND EXTREMISM IN THE BALKANS

I

Are the phenomena of populism and extremism new? No, they are not new, but they are nowadays more conspicuous and dangerous than before because of the phenomenon of New Media, i.e., the social media. But the problem is not in the media as such. The media - social or otherwise - is used as the means to highlight the end. Thus, the problem is in the human mind that defines a political end, or otherwise, that is presumably achievable by the way of populism that leads to extremism. Indeed, we are faced today with a shift of human mind-set not only in political thought but also in moral perception. It is obvious that today's politics is becoming more and more without principles.*[1]

We know by now that the First World War had ended feudalism together with the universal (imperial) state,*[2] while the Second Epochal War had relatively defeated fascism together with racism. In the aftermath of that new development, the world had been made up of nation states that had agreed to regulate their relationships by the international law and order under the auspice of the United Nations. In principle, as the members of the United Nations, all nation states had accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*[3] On 10 December 1948, the United General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."*[4]

However, the struggle had continued between liberal democracy of the West and the authoritarian socialism of the Soviet Union. This struggle only calmed following the Soviet collapse in 1990 and the obvious triumph of Western liberal democracy. It was thought that the world has headed toward an era of more stable global peace and security. But this was not so. The vacuum of following the Cold War created more challenges than anyone could have imagined.*[5] It created an open space for an ethnic and national populism and extremism in

---

[1] Compare seven deadly sins: 1) Wealth Without Work; 2) Pleasure Without Conscience; 3) Knowledge Without Character; 4) Commerce (Business) Without Morality (Ethics); 5) Science Without Humanity; 6) Religion Without Sacrifice; 7) Politics Without Principle.

See, Stephen R. Covey, ***Principle Centered Leadership***, Free Press, New York, 1991, pp. 87- 93.

[2] The universal states at the time were Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Both had a religious matrix for their political rule and a system of feudalism for their economic system. The world had been basically divided between Islamdom and Christendom.

[3] The 50th Anniversary of the Declaration was celebrated in 2018.

[4] The Declaration is an international document adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations that contains the rights and freedoms of all human beings. The General Assembly accepted it as Resolution 217 at its third session on 10/10/1948 at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France. Of the 58 members of the United Nations at the time, 48 voted in favor, none against, eight abstained, and two did not vote.

See, ***Opća deklaracija o ljudskim pravima***, (1948). Available at: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declarationhuman-rights/. Accessed on 29.10.2022.

[5] The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 eliminated the Cold War imperatives that had sustained America's fragile class compromise and narrowed the ideological space for political dissent. The triumph of the neoliberal order was ensured not by the Republican Party that nurtured its rise, but by the tacit acquiescence of Democratic President Bill Clinton to the political regime they established.

populizam i ekstremizam u postkomunističkim zemljama što je odvelo postjugoslovenske republike na Balkanu, posebno Bosnu, u krvavi rat koji je završio srpskim genocidom u Srebrenici nad Bošnjacima – muslimanima u Bosni.*[6]



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Eleanor Roosevelt u rukama drži *Opću deklaraciju UN-a o pravima čovjeka* iz 1948. godine.
ILLUSTRATION ~ Eleanor Roosevelt is holding the *UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights* from 1948.

Republikanska stranka koja je njegovala njegov uspon, već prešutno pristajanje demokratskog predsjednika Billa Clintona na politički režim koji su oni uspostavili. Clinton je postao Eisenhower demokrata pod utjecajem političkog stratega Dicka Morrisa i viših članova kabineta.

[6] Vidjeti: ***Srebrenica massacre: Bosnian history [1995]***, Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, dostupno na adresi: https://www.britannica.com/event/Srebrenica-massacre/Aftermath. Pristup 10.09.2022.; Vidjeti i: ***Srebrenica Timeline of a Genocide***, na: *International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals*, dostupno na adresi: https://www.irmct.org/specials/srebrenica/timeline/en/. Pristup 10.09.2022.

the post-communist countries that led post-Yugoslav republics in the Balkans, especially Bosnia, into a bloody war that ended in the Serbian Genocide in Srebrenica against the Muslims of Bosnia.*[6]



ILLUSTRATION ~ Document about the genocide committed in Srebrenica. Excavation of the remains of human bodies found in the primary grave.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dokument o izvršenom genocidu u Srebrenici. Iskopavanje pronađenih ostataka ljudskih tijela u primarnoj grobnici.

Clinton became an Eisenhower Democrat under the influence of political strategist Dick Morris and senior cabinet members.

[6] See, ***Srebrenica massacre: Bosnian history [1995]***, Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Srebrenica-massacre/Aftermath. Accessed on 10/29/2022. See also, ***"Srebrenica Timeline of a Genocide"*** in *International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals*, available at: https://www.irmct.org/specials/srebrenica/timeline/en/. Accessed on 10/29/2022.


SPQR


D. N. THEODOSIVS P. F. AVG.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Sve imperijalne sile koje su vladale Bosnom i Balkanom bile su samo imperijalne dok su i Bosnu i Balkan imale pod svojom političkom i ekonomskom kontrolom. To se dogodilo rimskoj, osmanskoj, austrougarskoj... Kada je jednom carska sila izgubila vlast nad Bosnom i Balkanom, izgubila je i carsku titulu, te i svoj prestiž na globalnoj sceni.

ILLUSTRATION ~ All the imperial powers that ruled Bosnia and the Balkans were only imperial while they had both Bosnia and the Balkans under their political and economic control. This happened to Roman, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian... Once the imperial power lost its power over Bosnia and the Balkans, it also lost its imperial title and its prestige on the global stage.

II

Evo kako iz ptičije perspektive vidim Balkan. Pomaže mi u tome Marija Todorova, bugarska historičarka. Naime, njezino dragocjeno djelo o Balkanu*[7] je svojevrsna *Apologija* Balkana pred evropskom porotom, koja je slična Platonovoj *Apologiji* Sokrata pred atinskom porotom. Ishod je također sličn. Sokrat je optužen za "moralnu", a Balkan za "mirovnu korupciju". Osuđen krivim, Sokrat je sâm sebi presudio, a krivi Balkan je osuđen da na margini europske povijesti čeka presudu za svoj ulazak ili ne-ulazak u Europsku Uniju, koja Balkan ne želi zbog svoje europske i (naše) balkanske korupcije.

Kao što je Marija Todorova ispravno primijetila, Balkan je obilježila *imagologija*[*8] kao kulturni, društveni i politički konstrukt. Kao slika, ova *imagologija* ima veoma snažan utjecaj. Kada dostigne nivo nesvjesnog, postaje moćno oruđe u svrhu definiranja nepoznatog drugog. Ono što je nepoznato uvijek je opasno. Ali, potreba da se to definira jeste da se njime kontrolira i da se njime dominira. Iako se u velikoj mjeri oslanja na Orijentalizam Edwarda Saida, koji se bavi zapadnim strukturiranjem orijenta kao Drugog,[*9] Maria Todorova odbacuje ideju balkanizma kao "puke podvrste orijentalizma."[*10]

No, Todorova ne propušta da nas podsjeti na mističnost Balkana, koja je drugačija od orijentalne, ali ipak mistična sama po sebi. Ona je u svoju priču unijela živi opis balkanskog duha od strane Amerikanca Arthura Smitha, koji je posjetio ovaj region 1907. godine i napisao ovo:

> Za one koji ga nisu posjetili, Balkan je mjesto sjena obavijenih u misteriji; onima koji ga poznaju postaje još tajanstveniji... Postajete, na neki način, dio čarolije, misterije i glamura cjeline. Stekli ste naviku da čučnete uz jutarnju kafu u kafiću, kada sretnete nekog svog poznanika, barem polovina onoga što kažete je prošaptana, glasno. Intrige, zavjere, misterija, velika hrabrost i smjela djela – stvari koje su duša prave romanse su danas duša Balkana.*[11]

Možda se Balkan u međuvremenu nije mnogo promijenio osim što više nije "nezamisliva

---

[7] Maria Todorova, ***Imagining the Balkans***, Oxford University Press, 1997.

[8] ***Ibid.***, str. 7.

[9] Edward W. Said, ***Orientalism***, New York, Pantheon, 1978.

[10] Maria Todorova, ***Imagining the Balkans***.., str. 8

[11] ***Ibid.***, str. 14.

II

Here is how I see the Balkans from a bird's eye view. Marija Todorova, a Bulgarian historian, helps me with this. Namely, her valuable work on the Balkans*[7] is a kind of *Apology* of the Balkans before the European jury, which is similar to Plato's *Apology* of Socrates before the Athenian jury. The outcome is also similar. Socrates was accused of "moral" and the Balkans of "peaceful corruption." Convicted guilty, Socrates judged himself, while the guilty Balkans are condemned to wait on the margins of European history for a verdict on their entry or non-entry into the European Union, which does not want the Balkans because of the European as well as (our) Balkan corruption.

Here is a bird's eye view of the Balkans. Marija Todorova, a Bulgarian historian, helps me with this. Her valuable work on the Balkans is a kind of *Apology* of the Balkans before the European jury, which is similar to Plato's *Apology* of Socrates before the Athenian jury. The outcome is also similar. Socrates was accused of "moral" and the Balkans of "peaceful corruption." Convicted guilty, Socrates judged himself, and the guilty Balkans is on the sidelines waiting for the European verdict for their entry or non-entry into Europe, which do not want the Balkans in its circle because of its and the Balkans' corruption.

As Maria Todorova has rightly noticed, the Balkans was marked by an *imagology*[8] as a cultural, social, and political construct. As an image, this *imagology* has a very strong impact. When it reaches the level of the unconscious, it becomes a powerful tool for the purpose of defining the unknown other. What is unknown is always dangerous. But, the need to define it is to have a control over it and to dominate it. Although relying heavily on the Edward Said's "Orientalism", which deals with the Western structuring of the orient as "other",[9] Maria Todorova rejects the idea of balkanism as being "a merely subspecies of orientalism".[10]

However, Todorova does not fail to remind us of the mystique of the Balkans, which is different from the oriental but still mystical in its own right. She brought in her narrative a lively description of the Balkan spirit by an American, Arthur Smith, who visited the area in 1907 and wrote this:

> To those who have not visited them, the Balkans are a shadow-land of mystery; to those who know them, they become even more mysterious... You become, in a sense, a part of the spell, and of the mystery and glamour of the whole. You contract the habit of crouching over your morning coffee in the café, when you meet a man of your acquaintance, at least half of what

---

[7] Todorova, Maria: ***Imagining the Balkans***, Oxford University Press, 1997.

[8] ***Ibid***., p. 7.

[9] Edward W Said. ***Orientalism***. New York, Pantheon, 1978.

[10] Todorova, Maria: ***Imagining the Balkans*** .., p. 8.

konkretnost", da se izrazim u Todorovinom stilu, i nije više ni mističan kao što je bio. Konkretni su i stvarni kao i svi drugi, ali ipak pomalo čudni i strani evropskom načinu razmišljanja kao i oduvijek. Kada Balkan insistira da bude identificiran kao evropski u političkom i ekonomskom smislu, Evropa oklijeva da ga prihvati, ali kada okrene leđa Evropi, Evropa plače da ga vrati. Dakle, rastrgan između "drugog" i "okupljanja" u svom odnosu prema Evropskoj uniji, Balkan je samo *imagologija* ili *dijagnoza*, a ne dio evropske geografije. Međutim, uprkos činjenici da je historija Balkana neodvojiva od ukupne historije Evrope, historijsko iskustvo Balkana u smislu njihove etničke, nacionalne, jezičke, vjerske i kulturne raznolikosti je veoma prepoznatljivo.*[12]

Dakle, opis Balkana kao "drugog" od Evrope je ispravan, ali ne u smislu evropske pežorativne predrasude, već više u smislu njihove istrajnosti u održavanju etničke, kulturne i vjerske raznolikosti kroz stoljeća. Uprkos svemu, Balkan je još uvijek jedno od najgušćih područja etničke, jezičke, vjerske i kulturne raznolikosti. Nemam namjeru da se zalažem za *millet* sistem koji je prakticiralo Osmansko Carstvo, koje je priznalo pravo "ličnog prava" konfesionalnih zajednica kao što su muslimanska *Sharī'a* (šereijatsko pravo), kršćansko *kanonsko pravo* i jevrejski *Halakhah* zakon, kao nezavisni pravni organi u okviru ukupnog pravnog sistema osmanske carevine.

Međutim, želim da ukažem na činjenicu da je ovaj *millet* sistem bio sredstvo za očuvanje specifičnih vjerskih, ali i kulturnih identiteta takvih zajednica.*[13] To je, možda, i glavni razlog što Balkan, za razliku od Evrope, nije imao inkviziciju kao što je, naprimjer, bila španjolska.

Također, kao sopstvenu apologiju Balkana pred evropskim žirijem, želio bih da kažem da ukoliko termin "balkanizacija", koji je skovan početkom 19. stoljeća, ima negativno značenje zbog brojnih novih država koje su nastale kao posljedica raspada Austro-Ugarskog i Osmanskog Carstva na Balkanu, po istom principu, izraz "nacionalizacija Europe" mogao bi imati istu negativnu konotaciju zbog brojnih novih država koje su nastale u Europi raspadom univerzalne države predstavljene u ideji kršćanstva, koja se pretvorila u mnoge sekularne "nacionalne države", ali i dalje s prepoznatljivom kršćanskom kulturnom prirodom. Želio bih da se pridružim Mariji Todorovoj u njenoj apologiji Balkana protiv optužbi za balkansku "drevnu mržnju" kao isključivo lošu osobinu Balkana kao takvog, dok ona citira američkog novinara Rogera Cohena, koji objašnjava da "pojam o ubijanju ljudi... zbog nečega što se

---

[12] Opsežna studija Diane Miškove koncentrira se na načine na koje su različite generacije naučnika definirale Balkan, kako bi se ispitala politička upotreba akademskih projekata. Fokusirajući se na unutarregionalne geopolitičke uloge i prekogranične interakcije, Miškova mijenja uobičajenu percepciju Balkana kao postkolonijalnog prostora. Sa svježim pristupom kompliciranom pojmu balkanizma i više nego respektabilnim korpusom kritičke literature, ovo istraživanje gradi osnovu za dalji razvoj studija područja uopće.

Pogledajte historijski udžbenik: Diana Mishkova, ***Beyond Balkanism: The Scholarly Politics of Region Making*, *Routledge***, New York, 2018.

[13] Prema Katherine Verdery, suprotno Orijentu koji služi kao polarna suprotnost Evropi, Balkan je Evropa "Drugi iznutra" u intersticijskoj poziciji da nije ni ovdje ni tamo.

Uporediti: Katherine Verdery: ***Review***: [*Bez naslova*] *Reviewed Work: Imagining the Balkans by Maria Todorova*. Slavic Review, 58 (2), Cambridge University Press, 1999., str. 472-473.

you say is whispered, portentously. Intrigue, plotting, mystery, high courage, and daring deeds - the things that are the soul of true romance are to-day the soul of the Balkans.*[11]

Perhaps, the Balkans, in the meantime, haven't change much except that they are not anymore "unimaginable concreteness", to use Todorava's phrase, and they are not anymore as mystical as they used to be. They are as concrete and as real as anyone else but still somewhat as strange and as foreign to the European mindset as ever before. When the Balkans insist to be identified as Europeans in a political and economic sense, Europe is hesitant to accept them, but when they turn their backs to Europe, Europe is crying to have them back. Thus, torn between the "othering" and "gathering" in their relation to the European Union, the Balkans are just an *imagology* or a *diagnosis* rather than a part and parcel of European geography. However, despite the fact that the history of the Balkans is inseparable from the overall history of Europe, the historical experience of the Balkans in terms of their ethnical, national, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity is very distinguishable.*[12]

Thus, the description of the Balkans as the "other" than Europe is a correct one but not in the sense of a European pejorative prejudice, but rather in the sense of their perseverance in maintaining an ethnical, cultural and religious diversity throughout centuries. Against all odds, the Balkans are still one of the densest areas of ethnical, linguistic, religious and cultural diversity. I have no intention to advocate for the *millet* system practiced by the Ottoman Empire, which recognized the right of the "personal law" of the confessional communities such as the Muslim *Sharī'ah* Law, Christian *Canon* Law and the Jewish *Halakhah* Law as independent bodies of law within the overall legal system of the Ottoman state.

However, I want to indicate to the fact that this *millet* system had been a vehicle for a preservation of specific religious as well as cultural identities of such communities.[13] This is, perhaps, the main reason that the Balkans, unlike Europe, had no inquisition such as the Spanish inquisition, for instance.

Also, as my own apology of the Balkans before the European jury, I would like to say that if the term "balkanization", which was coined in the early 19th century, has a negative meaning because of the numerous new states that arose from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in the Balkans, by the same token, the term "nationalization of Europe" might have the same negative connotation because of the numerous new states that arose in Europe from the collapse of the universal state represented in the idea of Christendom, which had

---

[11] Ibid., p. 14.

[12] Diana Mishkova's extensive study concentrates on the ways various generations of scholars defined the Balkans, in order to inspect political usage of academic projects. By focusing on intra-regional geopolitical stakes and cross-border interactions, Mishkova changes the usual perception of the Balkans as a postcolonial space. With a fresh approach to the complicated notion of balkanism and a more than respectable corpus of critical literature, this research builds a basis for the further development of Area Studies in general.

See the historical textbook, Diana Mishkova: ***Beyond Balkanism: The Scholarly Politics of Region Making***, Routledge, New York, 2018.

[13] According to Catherine Verdera, contrary to the Orient which serves as the polar opposite of Europe, the Balkans is the "Other from within" Europe in the interstitial position of being neither here nor there.

Compare: Katherine Verdery : ***Review*** : *[Untitled] Reviewed Work : Imagining the Balkans by Maria Todorova*. Slavic Review, 58 (2), Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 472–473.

možda dogodilo 1495. nezamislivo je u zapadnom svijetu. Ne na Balkanu." U odgovoru na ovu optužbu, Todorova je istakla da je "On (Rodžer Cohen) sasvim u pravu. Na Balkanu su ubijali zbog nečega što se dogodilo prije više od 500 godina; u Evropi, sa dužim rasponom civilizovanog pamćenja, ubijali su nad nečim što se dogodilo prije 2000 godina. U iskušenju je da se zapitamo da li je holokaust rezultat 'dužne' ili 'neopravdane' prevlasti barbarstva".*[14]



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Na Balkanu su ubijali zbog nečega što se dogodilo prije više od 500 godina, tvrdi Todorova. (*Sahrana ubijenih u Srebrenici*)
ILLUSTRATION ~ In the Balkans, they killed because of something that happened more than 500 years ago, claims Todorova. (*Burial of those killed in Srebrenica*)

[14] Todorova, ***Imagining***..., str. 6.

turned to become many secular "nation states" but still with a recognizable Christian cultural nature. I would like to join Maria Todorova in her apology of the Balkans against the charge of the Balkan "ancient hatred" as being an exclusively bad feature of the Balkans as such while she quotes the American journalist Roger Cohen, who explains that "the notion of killing people . . . because of something that may have happened in 1495 is unthinkable in the Western world. Not in the Balkans". In response to this charge, Todorova has pointed out that "He (Roger Cohen) is quite right. In the Balkans they were killing over something that happened over 500 years ago; in Europe, with a longer span of civilized memory, they were killing over something that happened 2,000 years ago. One is tempted to ask whether the Holocaust resulted from a "due" or "undue" predominance of barbarity".*[14]



ILLUSTRATION ~ In Europe, with a longer span of civilized memory, they killed over something that happened 2000 years ago. We are tempted to ask ourselves whether the Holocaust was the result of the 'due' or 'unjustified' dominance of barbarism, Todorova wonders. (*Auschwitz concentration camp*)

ILUSTRACIJA ~ U Evropi, sa dužim rasponom civilizovanog pamćenja, ubijali su nad nečim što se dogodilo prije 2000 godina. U iskušenju je da se zapitamo da li je holokaust rezultat 'dužne' ili 'neopravdane' prevlasti barbarstva, pita se Todorova. (*Koncentracioni logor Auschwitz*)

[14] Todorova, Maria: ***Imagining the...***, p. 6.

Ne želim da steknete utisak da je Balkan bolji od Evropljana, ali nije ni gori od njih. U kompresiji lošeg ponašanja u historiji Balkana i Evropljani su skoro jednaki, ali u poređenju velikog historijskog napretka nakon bolnog historijskog iskustva, Evropljani su daleko bolji od Balkana jer su shvatili, za razliku od Balkana, da, uostalom, *Historia est magistra vitae*. Ako ništa drugo, Balkan je, kao i Evropa, pun historije – loše i dobre. Od stanja ljudskog uma zavisi šta je od ovo dvoje čovjekov izbor – loš ili dobar historijski primjer za novu akciju u novoj historiji.

Postoji još jedna karakteristika koja Balkan čini zanimljivim. Naime, Balkan je prostor gdje se prije stvaraju dobri kraljevi nego što su sami za sebe dobri kraljevi. Zaista, sve imperijalne sile koje su vladale Balkanom bile su samo imperijalne dok su Balkan imale pod svojom političkom i ekonomskom kontrolom. To se dogodilo rimskoj, osmanskoj, austrougarskoj, kao i nedavno imperijalnoj moći Komunističke internacionale (Komin-terne) predstavljene u vlasti Sovjetskog Saveza, koja je dominirala Bugarskom, Rumunijom i Mađarskom i donekle bivšom Jugoslavijom. Kada jednom carska sila izgubi vlast nad Balkanom, izgubi i carsku titulu, te izgubi svoj prestiž na globalnoj sceni. Zbog toga je rivalstvo oko Balkana, koji neki vole da nazivaju i Istočnom Evropom, između velikih svjetskih sila uvijek bilo veliko sporno pitanje; zato se u Sarajevu 1914. godine dogodio atentat na nadvojvodu Franca Ferdinanda od Austrije koji je rasplamsao Prvi epohalni rat u historiji a ne drugdje.*[15]

Međutim, vjerujem da ovdje ne govorimo o sukobu civilizacija, već o sukobu ljudskih umova. Ako bilo gdje, to je na Balkanu da imamo više od jedne svjetske civilizacije. Ove različite svjetske civilizacije koegzistiraju na Balkanu stoljećima. Naime, pravoslavna istočnoevropska, zapadnoevropska i islamska civilizacija, "od kojih je pravoslavni Evropljanin primarni",*[16] još uvijek su žive civilizacije na Balkanu. Prije pojave islamske civilizacije na Balkanu u 12. stoljeću, rimski car Dioklecijan (284–305) podijelio je Rimsko Carstvo na dvije administrativne polovine. Nevidljiva linija te divizije prolazila je teritorijom Bosne.*[17]

Dakle, obilježena ovom nevidljivom linijom između dva administrativna područja Rimskog Carstva, Bosni je suđeno da ostane svojevrsna tampon zona između dvije suprotstavljene kršćanske dogme:

---

[15] O rivalstvu na Balkanu vidjeti: Arnold Wolfers, ***The Balkans and the Great Powers***. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, tom 177, Radio: The Fifth Estate, str. 232-236. Sage Publications, Inc., Jan., 1935. Dostupno na adresi: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1019987. Pristup 10.09.2022.

[16] Todorova, ***Imagining...***, str. 12-13.

[17] Tetrarhiju (pravilo četverice) stvorio je Dioklecijan 293. godine. U trećem stoljeću Rimsko Carstvo je postalo preveliko i nemoguće je bilo njime upravljati. Da bi riješio ovaj problem, Dioklecijan je podijelio Rimsko Carstvo na četiri različite teritorije, od kojih je svakim upravljao drugi vladar. Ovo je okončalo krizu trećeg stoljeća i stabiliziralo Rimsko Carstvo. Tetrarhija nije dugo trajala i u roku od dvadeset godina je razbijena, u korist trajne podjele između Istočnog Rimskog Carstva (predvođenog Konstantinom) i Zapadnog Rimskog Carstva (predvođenog Licinijem).
Vidjeti dalje: Gill, N.S., ***What Was the Roman Tetrarchy?*** ThoughtCo, Aug. 28, 2020. Dostupno na adresi: thoughtco.com/definition-of-tetrarchy-120830. Pristup 10.09.2022. Vidjeti i: Joe Phelan, ***Why did the Roman Empire split in two?*** Live Science Newsletter, September 25, 2022. Dostupno na adresi: https://www.livescience.com/why-roman-empire-split-in-two. Pristup 10.09.2022.

I don't want you to get the impression that the Balkans are better than the Europeans, but they are not worse than them either. In a compression of bad behavior in history the Balkans and the Europeans are almost equal, but in a comparison of a great historical advancement after a painful historical experience, the Europeans are far better than the Balkans because they have understood, unlike the Balkans, that, after all, "*Historia est magistra vitae*". If anything, the Balkans, like Europe, is full of history - bad as well as good. It depends on the state of human mind which of these two are man's choice - bad or good historical example for a new action in a new history.

There is another characteristic that makes the Balkans interesting. Namely, the Balkans are good kingmakers rather than good kings themselves for themselves. Indeed, all imperial powers that ruled the Balkans were imperial only as long as they had the Balkans under their political and economic control. This had happened to the Roman, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian as well as recently to the imperial power of the Communist International (Comintern) represented in the power of the Soviet Union, which dominated Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary and to some extent ex-Yugoslavia as well. Once, the imperial power loses its power over the Balkans, it loses its imperial title, it loses its prestige on the global stage. This is why the rivalry over the Balkans, which some like to call Eastern Europe as well, between the great world powers have been always a big contested issue; this is why the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria happened in Sarajevo in 1914 that ignited the First Epochal War in history and not elsewhere.*[15]

However, I believe that we are talking here not about the clash of civilizations but rather about the clash of human minds. If anywhere, it's in the Balkans that we have more than one world civilization. These different world civilizations have coexisted in the Balkans for centuries. Namely, the Orthodox Eastern European, the Western European, and the Islamic civilization, "of which the Orthodox European is primary",*[16] are still live civilizations in the Balkans. Before the advent of the Islamic civilization into the Balkans in the twelfth century, the Roman Emperor Diocletian (284-305) had divided the Roman Empire into two administrative halves. The invisible line of that division ran through the territory of Bosnia.*[17]

Thus, marked by this invisible line between two administrative realms of the Roman Empire, Bosnia has been destined to remain a kind of buffer zone between two competing Christian dogmas: the dogma of the Orthodox

---

[15] About the rivalry in the Balkans see, Wolfers, Arnold: ***The Balkans and the Great Powers***. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 177, Radio : The Fifth Estate, pp. 232-236. Sage Publications, Inc., Jan., 1935.
Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1019987. Accessed on 10/29/2022.

[16] Todorova, Maria: ***Imagining the***..., p.p. 12-13.

[17] The Tetrarchy ("rule of four") was created by Diocletian in 293 CE. In the third century, the Roman Empire had grown too large and impossible to administer. To solve this problem, Diocletian divided the Roman Empire into four distinct territories, each to be governed by a different ruler. This brought to an end the Crisis of the Third Century and stabilized the Roman Empire. The Tetrarchy did not last long, and within twenty years was dismantled, in favor of a permanent division between an Eastern Roman Empire (led by Constantine) and a Western Roman Empire (led by Licinius).
To see wider, Gill, N.S.: ***What Was the Roman Tetrarchy?*** ThoughtCo, Aug. 28, 2020. Available at: thoughtco.com/definition-of-tetrarchy-120830. Accessed on 10/29/2022. See also, Phelan, Joe: ***Why did the Roman Empire split in two?*** Live Science Newsletter, September 25, 2022. Available at: https://www.livescience.com/why-roman-empire-split-in-two. Accessed on 10/29/2022.

dogme Bizantijske pravoslavne crkve i dogme Katoličke crkve Rima. Ovakvo stanje je i dalje prisutno u Bosni. Međutim, Bosna nije pripadala nijednom od njih dvoje. Ove tačke ćemo razraditi kasnije u radu.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Sarajevski atentat poslužio je kao povod za izbijanje Prvog svjetskog rata.
ILLUSTRATION ~ The Sarajevo assassination served as a reason for the outbreak of the First World War. (La Domenica del Corriere 5-12 Jula 1914.)

Church of Byzantine and the dogma of the Catholic Church of Rome. This state of affairs is still present in Bosnia. However, Bosnia had belonged to neither of the two. We shall elaborate these points later in the paper.



ILLUSTRATION ~ The conflict between Tito and Stalin created the first Communist Protestant – *Resolution of Informbiro 1948.*
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Sukob između Tita i Staljina je stvorio prvog komunističkog protestanta – *Rezolucija Informbiroa 1948.*



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Iskustvo još uvijek nije naučilo ljude u dovoljnoj mjeri da se ponašaju prema učenju čistog razuma. Umjesto toga, ljudi se kao gomila ponašaju iz svoje nesvjesne moći, koja je jača od njihovog čistog individualnog razuma i njihovog ličnog morala. Da li smo danas u stanju barbarstva zbog populizma, ekstremizma i monopola na laž?




ILLUSTRATION ~ Experience has not yet taught men sufficiently to act according to the teachings of pure reason. Instead, people as a crowd act out of their unconscious power, which is stronger than their pure individual reason and their personal morality. Are we in a state of barbarism today because of populism, extremism and the monopoly on lies?

III

U uvodu svoje knjige *The Virtues of Mendacity* ("Vrline lažnosti"),*[18] u kojoj se bavi lažima u politici, Martin Džej nam je skrenuo pažnju na dio zloglasne misli Adolfa Hitlera izražen u njegovom *Mein Kampf-u*:

> *Veličina laži uvijek sadrži određeni faktor vjerodostojnosti, budući da su velike mase ljudi u samom srcu sklone da budu više pokvarene nego svjesno i namjerno zle, te da, dakle, s obzirom na primitivnu jednostavnost svojim umom lakše padaju žrtve velike laži nego male, budući da i sami lažu u malim stvarima, ali bi se postidjeli prevelikih laži. Takva laž im nikada neće pasti na pamet, i neće moći vjerovati u mogućnost takve monstruozne drskosti i zloglasnog lažnog predstavljanja kod drugih...*
>
> *Stoga će uvijek ostati i zadržati se nešto od čak i najbezobraznije laži -- činjenica koju svi veliki lažljivi virtuozi i lažljivi klubovi na ovom svijetu vrlo dobro znaju i koje se izdajnički koriste.*[*19]

Najvjerovatnije ne bih razumio ovaj Hitlerov citat da ga nisam u potpunosti doživio u životu u Bosni. Bilo je to prije i tokom rata protiv Bosne sa dugom opsadom glavnog grada Sarajeva koja je trajala skoro četiri godine – zaista, trajala je 1.425 dana, što je duže od Staljingradske bitke i više od godinu dana duže od opsade Lenjingrada – da sam okusio gorčinu velike laži koja je bez stida izrečena kroz um ozloglašenog srpskog nacionaliste, poznatijeg kao oca srpskog naroda, Dobrice Ćosića, koji je, kako se navodi, rekao:

> *Mi* (Srbi) *lažemo da bismo obmanuli sebe, da utešimo drugoga; lažemo iz samilosti, lažemo iz stida, da ohrabrimo, da sakrijemo svoju bedu, lažemo zbog poštenja. Lažemo zbog slobode. Laž je vid srpskog patriotizma i potvrda naše urođene inteligencije. Lažemo stvaralački, maštovito, inventivno.*[*20]

Ali da budemo pošteni, ideja plemenite laži nije noviji izum. To je koncept koji je proizveo Platon

---

[18] Martin Jay, ***The Vertues Mendocity – On Lying in Politics***. University of Virginia Press, 2010., str. 2.

[19] Adolf Hitler, ***Mein Kampf: Adolf Hitler*** – (Ralph Manheim Translation). A Mariner Book, Houghton Mifflin Company Boston and New York, 1999., str. 231. Dostupno na adresi: https://archive.org/details/mein-kampf-by-adolf-hitler-ralph-manheim-translation/page/iv/mode/2up. Pristup 10.09.2022.

[20] Dobrica Ćosić, ***Deobe***. Laguna, Beograd, 2017., str. 96-97. (Citat iz trilogije romana *Deobe*).

III

In the introduction to his book *The Virtues of Mendacity*,*[18] which deals with lying in politics, Martin Jay has brought to our attention a piece of Adolf Hitler's ill-famed thought expressed in his *Mein Kampf*, which reads:

> *The magnitude of a lie always contains a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of the people in the very bottom of their hearts tend to be corrupted rather than consciously and purposely evil, and that, therefore, in view of the primitive simplicity of their minds, they more easily fall victim to the big lie than to a little one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads, and they will not be able to believe in the possibility of such monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation in others...*
>
> *Therefore, something of even the most insolent lie will always remain and stick - a fact which all the great lie-virtuosi and lying-clubs in this world know only too well and also make the most treacherous use of.**[19]

Most probably, I wouldn't comprehend this Hitler's quotation if I didn't experience it fully in my life in Bosnia. It was prior and during the war against Bosnia with a long siege of the capital city of Sarajevo that has lasted for almost four years - indeed, it has lasted for 1,425 days which is longer than the Battle of Stalingrad and more than a year longer than the siege of Leningrad - that I have tasted the bitterness of a big lie that has been unashamedly expressed through the mind of a notorious Serbian nationalist, better known as the father of the Serbian nation, Dobrica Čosić, who is quoted to have said:

> *We (the Serbs) lie to deceive ourselves, to console others, we lie for mercy, we lie to fight fear, to encourage ourselves, to hide our and somebody else's misery. We lie for love and honesty. We lie because of freedom. Lying is a trait of our patriotism and the proof of our innate intelligence. We lie creatively, imaginatively and inventively.**[20]

---

[18] Martin, Jay: ***The Vertues Mendocity - On Lying in Politics***. University of Virginia Press, 2010, p. 2.

[19] Hitler, Adolf: ***Mein Kampf : Adolf Hitler*** - (Ralph Manheim Translation). A Mariner Book, Houghton Mifflin Company Boston and New York, 1999, p. 231.
Available at: https://archive.org/details/mein-kampf-by-adolf-hitler-ralph-manheim-translation/page/iv/mode/2up. Accessed on 10/29/2022.

[20] Ćosić, Dobrica: A quote from a trilogy of novels ***Divisions/Deobe***. Laguna, Beograd, 2017, pp. 96-97.

u svojoj *Republici*. U politici je to na neki način opravdano kao mit ili neistina, gotovo kao religiozne prirode koju elita namjerno propagira kako bi održala društveni mir i harmoniju, ali i radi unapređenja političkog ili nekog drugog plana. Dakle, korijen političkog populizma koji vodi ka vjerskom ili ideološkom ekstremizmu leži u poimanju velike laži kao plemenite laži. Na osnovu toga, Hannah Arendt je to primijetila:

> *Niko nikada nije sumnjao da su istina i politika u prilično lošim odnosima, a niko, koliko ja znam, nikada nije ubrajao istinitost među političke vrline. Laži su oduvijek smatrane neophodnim i opravdanim oruđem ne samo političara ili demagoga, već i državničkog zanata.*[21]

Pierre Lenan je podržao ideju Arendt riječima:

> *U središtu političke igre je laž: to je namjerna, organizirana, regulirana, proračunata, nužna obmana: rasuđivanje o politici uz isključivanje laži vodi do uvredljivo naivne vizije, do greške u procjeni. Vjerovati da može postojati politika bez laganja činilo bi se iluzornim: politički život, način na koji se praktikuje, pretpostavlja povišenu stopu, čvrstu mrežu laži različitih oblika i stupnjeva.*[22]



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Adolf Hitler i njegovo mišljenje o lažima u Mein Kampf-u.
ILLUSTRATION ~ Adolf Hitler and his opinion on lies in Mein Kampf.

Ali, da li političari imaju monopol na laganje? Ne, oni nemaju takav monopol. Imaju samo političku moć koja im omogućava da lažu "kreativno, maštovito i inventivno", kako je rekao Dobrica Ćosić. Danas svako ima "pravo" da laže i svako ima pravo da pravi svoje "lažne vesti". Zaista, danas su svi samourednici autonovina, slike o sebi, samopromocije, autocenzure, samoprepoznavanja i samospoznaje na *Facebooku, Tweeteru, Instagramu* itd. Dakle, niko nema monopol nad istinom, ali svako ima pravo na svoju istinu kao i na svoju laž. Dakle, monopol na laž, koji je bio privilegija političara, kako su istakli Hannah Arendt i Pierre Lenan, više nije isključivo pravo i garancija politike.

---

[21] Hannah Arendt, ***Truth and Politics***. In: *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, ed. Peter Baehr, New York, 2000., str. 545.

[22] Pierre Lenan, ***Le mensonge politique***. Paris, 1988. Vidjeti i: Martin Jay, ***Introduction***, bilješka 73, str. 188, u: *The Virtues of Mendacity*.

But to be fair, the idea of a noble lie has not been a recent invention. It is a concept originated by Plato in his *Republic.* It has been somehow justified in politics as a myth or untruth almost as of religious nature purposely propagated by an elite to maintain social peace and harmony, but also to advance a political or otherwise agenda. Thus, the root of a political populism that leads to a religious or ideological extremism lies in a notion of a big lie as a noble lie. Based on it, Hannah Arendt has noticed that:

> *No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, as far as I know, has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues. Lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the politician's or the demagogue's but also of the statesman's trade.**[21]

Pierre Lenan has backed up the Arendt's idea by saying:

> *At the center of the political game is the lie: that is deliberate, organized, regulated, calculated, necessary deception: reasoning about politics while excluding the lie leads to an abusive naïve vision, to an error of evaluation. To believe that there can be a politics without lying would seem illusory: political life, the way it is practiced, supposes an elevated rate, a tight web of lies of different forms and degrees.**[22]



ILLUSTRATION ~ Dobrica Ćosić, a notorious Serbian nationalist, better known as the "father of the Serbian nation".
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dobrica Ćosić, ozloglašeni srpski nacionalista, poznatiji kao "otac srpskog naroda".

But do the politicians have the monopoly on lying? No, they do not have such a monopoly. They have only the political power, which enables them to lie "creatively, imaginatively and inventively", as Dobrica Čosić said. Today, everyone has the "right" to lie and everyone has the right to make his/her own "fake news". Indeed, today, everyone is a self-editor of self-newspaper, self-image, self-promotion, self-censorship, self-recognition and self-realization on *Facebook, Tweeter, Instagram*, etc. Thus, no one has the monopoly on the truth either. But everyone has the right to his/her own truth as well as his/her own lie. So, the monopoly on the lie, which was a politicians' privilege,

---

[21] Arendt, Hannah: ***Truth and Politics.*** In: *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, ed. Peter Baehr, New York, 2000, p. 545.

[22] Lenan, Pierre: ***Le mensonge politique.*** Paris, 1988. See also, Jay, Martin: ***Introduction***, note 73, p. 188, in *The Virtues of Mendacity.*

Danas je laganje uobičajeno i na drugim poljima: u sportu, u bankama, u školama, u medicini, u zanatima, u parlamentima, kao i u crkvama, džamijama i sinagogama itd. Nekada je bilo pravilo da političari ne znaju da kažu istinu, svećenici ne znaju da kažu laž, a novinari ne znaju kako da naprave razliku između toga dvoga. Danas je ovo staro pravilo prekršeno. Uostalom, neki političari znaju reći istinu, ali im ljudi i dalje ne vjeruju, iako i dalje iznova glasaju za njih uprkos činjenici da su ih prethodno lagali. Nažalost, neki svećenici su prekršili svoju zakletvu saveza s Bogom i ugovora s ljudima da ne lažu. Oni su uhvaćeni ne samo u laži nego i u skrivanju laži. Tako su neki od njih izgubili povjerenje javnosti. Naravno, treba odati priznanje i nekim hrabrim novinarima koji znaju da naprave razliku između istine i laži. Ali, najozloglašenija laž dogodila se u bankama. Laž Bernieja Madoffa u bankarstvu bila je velika kao i Hitlerova laž. Da, upravo to želim da kažem: mi smo, kao čovječanstvo, u velikoj krizi povjerenja javnosti ne samo u politici, već i u skoro svim oblastima života. Ljudi danas imaju poteškoća da urazume jedni druge i tako bježe jedni od drugih. U takvom stanju ljudskog uma, jedino što privlači pažnju ljudi kao razumno njihovom umu je satira i cinizam. Čini se da je to Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus imao na umu 1505. godine kada je napisao svoju *Pohvalu ludosti*.*[23] Njegovom satiričnom umu bio je blizak veliki muslimanski um Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī*[24] (um. 1023), koji je spalio svoje knjige prije nego što je umro jer je mislio da su ljudi bili toliko prepušteni svojim glupostima da niko neće čitati njegove knjige nakon njegove smrti. Mislio je da su ljudi u njegovo vrijeme izgubili sposobnost da razumiju jedni druge.

Francuski polimatičar Gustav Le Bon (1841–1931) proučavao je um gomile i došao do zaključka da je "gomila jednako lako herojska kao i zločinac".*[25] Dodao bih tome da je započeti rat jednako lahko kao imati parče kolača, ali zaustaviti ga i započeti mir jednako je teško kao penjati se na Himalaje. Ako pitate zašto je to tako, rekao bih, kao što je Gustave Le Bon primijetio, da iskustvo još uvijek nije naučilo ljude u dovoljnoj mjeri da se ponašaju prema učenju čistog razuma. Umjesto toga, ljudi se kao gomila ponašaju iz svoje nesvjesne moći, koja je jača od njihovog čistog individualnog razuma i njihovog ličnog vrlinskog morala.

> *Istorija nam*, kaže Gustave Le Bon, *govori da onog trenutka kada moralne sile na kojima je počivala civilizacija izgube snagu, do njenog konačnog rastakanja dovode one nesvjesne i brutalne gomile koje su, sasvim opravdano, poznate kao barbari.*[26]

Da li smo danas u takvom stanju barbarstva zbog populizma, ekstremizma i novih medija?

---

[23] Desiderius Erasmus, ***In Praise of Folly*** (Translated by John Wilson 1668). Produced by Robert Shimmin and PG Distributed Proofreaders. HTML verzija Al Haines. Dostupno na adresi: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9371/9371-h/9371-h.htm. Pristup 12.10.2021.

[24] Vidjeti, Yaqūt Al-Ḥamawī, ***Muʾjam al-ʾudabā***'. Vol. 15, str. 21.

[25] Gustave Le Bon, ***The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind***. Dover Publications, New York, 2002., str. 1-9.

[26] ***Ibid***., str. 10. Dostupno na adresi: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/lebon/Crowds.pdf. Pristup 10.29.2022.

as Hannah Arendt and Pierre Lenan have pointed out, is not any more an exclusive right and warrant of politics. Today the lying is a common feature in other fields as well: in sports, in banks, in schools, in medicine, in trades, in parliaments as well as in churches, mosques and synagogues, etc. It used to be a rule that the politicians don't know how to tell the truth, the priests don't know how to tell the lie, and the journalists don't know how to make the difference between the two. Nowadays, this old rule has been broken. After all, some politicians do know how to tell the truth, but people still don't believe them, although they still vote for them again and again despite the fact that they have previously lied to them. Unfortunately, some priests have broken their oath of covenant with God and their contract with men not to lie. They have been caught not only lying but also hiding their lies. Thus, some of them lost the public trust. Of course, we should give a credit to some bold journalists who know how to make a difference between the truth and lie. But, the most notorious of lies happened in banks. The Bernie Madoff's lie in banking was as big as Hitler's lie. Yes, this is exactly what I want to say: we are, as humanity, in a big crisis of public trust not only in politics, but also in almost all fields of life. People nowadays have difficulty to reason with each other and thus they run away from each other. In such a state of human mind, the only thing that attracts people's attention as sensible to their mind is satire and cynicism. It seems that this was what Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus had in mind in 1505 when he wrote his " In Praise of Folly."*[23] Close to his satiric mind was the great Muslim mind of Abū Ḥayyān Al-Tawḥīdī*[24] (d. 1023) who had burnt his books before he died because he thought that people had been so much indulged in their follies that no one will read his books after his death. He thought that the people at his time had lost their ability to reason with each other.

It was the French polymath Gustave Le Bon (1841- 1931) who studied the mind of crowd and came to the conclusion that "a crowd is as easily heroic as criminal".*[25] I would add to it that to start a war is as easily as having a piece of cake, but to stop it and to start peace is as hard as climbing to the Himalayas. If you ask why is so, I would say, as Gustave Le Bon has noticed, that experience has not taught men as yet to a sufficient degree to conduct himself upon the teaching of pure reason. Instead, men as a crowd behave out of their unconscious power, which is stronger than their pure individual reason and their personal virtuous morality.

> *History, says Gustave Le Bon, tells us that the moment when the moral forces on which a civilization rested have lost their strength, its final dissolution is brought about by those unconscious and brutal crowds known, justifiably enough, as barbarians.*[26]

Are we today in such a state of barbarism because of populism, extremism and the New Media?

---

[23] Erasmus, Desiderius: ***In Praise of Folly*** (Translated by John Wilson 1668). Produced by Robert Shimmin and PG Distributed Proofreaders. HTML version by Al Haines.
Available at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/9371/9371-h/9371-h.htm. Accessed 12.10.2021.

[24] See, Yaqūt Al-Ḥamawī, ***Muʿjam al-'udabā'.*** Val. 15, p. 21.

[25] Le Bon, Gustave: ***The Crowd : A stusdy of the Popular Mind***. Dover Publications, New York, 2002, pp. 1-9.

[26] ***Ibid***., p. 10. Available at: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/lebon/Crowds.pdf. Accessed on 10/29/2022.



ILUSTRACIJA – Otvoreno prokletstvo Crkve bosanske od Sinoda Srpske pravoslavne crkve.



ILLUSTRATION ~ The open curse of the Bosnian Church by the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

IV

Vjerujem da je ideja pluralizma odgovor na "populizam" i "ekstremizam". Stoga bih se sada želio fokusirati na iskustvo bosanskog pluralizma kao sile protiv "populizma" i "ekstremizma" sa "bosanskim iskustvom vjere" u evropskom kontekstu. Ali, prvo da kažem zašto mislim da postoji "bosansko iskustvo vjere" a ne "bosanski islam" prije nego što kažem šta danas znači ideja "pluralne Bosne". Prvo, čini se da je Bosna obična zemlja s običnim starim narodom poznatim od davnina pod imenom "Dobri Bošnjani" ili "Bogumili".*[27]

Da li je ovo bilo samoimenovanje ili ne, sada nije važno. Ono što je sada važno je činjenica da su "Dobri Bošnjani" ili "Bogumili" Bosanci historijski imali moralnu i bogoljubivu oznaku: oni su označeni kao "dobri ljudi" (*Bono Homini*) i oni su bili "Bogu bliski". Ova dva atributa "dobro" i "bogoljubivo" odredila su prirodu bosanske zemlje i prirodu naroda Bosne za dobrotu. Uostalom, i zemlja i narod u Bosni nisu bili obični. Stranci, bilo oni obližnji ili oni iz daleka, počeli su gledati na zemlju i ljude u Bosni kao na neku mistiku jer su, dok su bili na raskršću između Rima i Carigrada, usvojili čudnu i tajanstvenu ideju o *Maniju*, dalekog Perzijanca rođenog 216. čiji su roditelji, prema Kelnskom Mani-Codexu, bili članovi jevrejske kršćanske gnostičke sekte poznate kao *Elcesaiti*.*[28]

Srž Manijevog učenja, poznatog kao manihejizam, bila je razrađena dualistička kosmologija koja opisuje borbu između dobrog duhovnog svijeta svjetlosti i zlog, materijalnog svijeta tame. Svakako, "dobri Bošnjani" opredijelili su se za dobar duhovni svijet svjetla naspram zlog materijalnog svijeta tame i, najvjerovatnije, to je bio razlog zašto su označeni kao dobri ljudi Bosne. Ni Rim ni Carigrad nisu mogli stajati skrštenih ruku i dozvoliti širenje manihejstva u srcu kršćanskog svijeta, u zemlji Bosni, koja se nalazi na raskršću istočnog i zapadnog od dva kršćanska krila. Tako je bilo tada, tako je i sada. Bosnu su ove dvije suprotstavljene kršćanske konfesije uhvatile za vrat, od kojih svaka tvrdi da zemlja i narod Bosne pripadaju njenoj vlastitoj doktrini ili vlastitoj crkvi. Međutim, Crkva bosanska je stala na svoje noge, sa svojom vjerskom doktrinom i svojom vjerskom institucijom na čijem vrhu je bio *Did* (djed), koji je predsjedavao vijećem od dvanaest ljudi zvanih *strojnici*. Neki od pristalica Crkve bosanske

---

[27] Nada Klaić, ***Srednjovjekovna Bosna***. Enimex, Zagreb, 1994., str. 197; Vjekoslav Klaić, ***Povijest Bosne do propasti kraljevstva***, Tiskom Dioničke tiskare, Zagreb, 1882., str. 42-43; Muhamed Filipović, ***Bosna i Hercegovina: najvažnije geografske, demografske, historijske, kulturne i političke činjenice***. Compact-E, Edicija "Science", Sarajevo, 199.7, str. 22; Sima Ćirković, ***Istorija srednjovjekovne bosanske države***. Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd, 1964., str. 350.

[28] Ludwig Koenen, ***Das Datum der Offenbarung und Geburt Manis***. Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik (ZPE), Band 8, Publisher Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH, 1971., str. 247-50.

IV

I believe that the idea of pluralism is an answer to "populism" and "extremism". Thus, I would like to focus now on the experience of Bosnian pluralism as a force against "populism" and "extremism" with a "Bosnian experience of faith" within a European context as well. But, first let me say why I think that there is “a Bosnian experience of faith” rather than “a Bosnian Islam” before I say what the idea of “plural Bosnia” means today. First, it seems that Bosnia is an ordinary land with an ordinary old nation known from ancient times by the name of “Good Bosnians” (“Dobri Bošnjani”) or “Dear-to-God” (“Bogumils”).*[27]

Whether this was self-naming or not, it does not matter now. What matters now is the fact that the “Good Bosnians” or the “Dear-to-God” Bosnians have had historically a moral and God-loving designation: they have been designated as “Good People” (*Bono Homini*) and they have been allotted as “close to God”. These two attributes of being “good” and “God-loving” have determined the nature of the land of Bosnia and the nature of the people of Bosnia for goodness. After all, both the land and the people of Bosnia appeared not to be ordinary. Outsiders, whether those of nearby or those from faraway, began to look at the land and people of Bosnia as a sort of mystique because they, while being at the crossroads between Rome and Constantinople, have adopted a strange and mysterious idea of *Mani*, a faraway Persian man born in 216 whose parents, according to the *Cologne Mani-Codex* were members of the Jewish Christian Gnostic sect known as the *Elcesaites*.*[28]

The core of Mani’s teaching, known as Manichaeism, was an elaborate dualistic cosmology describing the struggle between a good spiritual world of light, and an evil, material world of darkness. Certainly, the “Good Bosnians” have opted for a good spiritual world of light against an evil material world of darkness and, thus, most likely that was the reason why they have been designated as a good people of Bosnia. Neither Rome nor Constantinople could stand idly by and allow spreading Manichaeism in the heart of Christendom, in the land of Bosnia, which is at the crossroads of east and west of the two Christian wings. So, it was then, so it is now. Bosnia has been caught by these two competing Christian confessions over its neck, each one claiming that the land and people of Bosnia belong to its own doctrine or to its own church. However, the Bosnian Church stood on its own feet, with its own religious doctrine and with its own religious institution on the top of which was *Did*

---

[27] Klaić, Nada: ***Srednjovjekovna Bosna***. Enimex, Zagreb, 1994, p. 197.; Klaić, Vjekoslav: ***Povijest Bosne do propasti kraljevstva***, Tiskom Dioničke tiskare, Zagreb, 1882, pp. 42-43.; Filipović, Muhamed: ***Bosna i Hercegovina : najvažnije geografske, demografske, historijske, kulturne i političke činjenice***. Compact-E, Edicija "Science", Sarajevo, 1997, p. 22.; Ćirković, Sima: ***Istorija srednjovjekovne bosanske države***. Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd, 1964, p. 350.

[28] Koenen, Ludwig: ***Das Datum der Offenbarung und Geburt Manis***. Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik (ZPE), Band 8, Publisher Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH, 1971, pp. 247-50.

boravili su u malim manastirima, poznatim kao *hiža* (kuća), dok su drugi bili lutalice, poznati kao *gosti*. Zanimljivo je napomenuti da su bosanski *kristijani*, kako su ih još zvali, znali za Prvi nikejski sabor. Također, znali su da se vijeće odlučilo protiv arijanaca i da su Arije i dvojica njegovih sljedbenika prognani u Iliriju. Bosanski *kristijani*, Dobri Bošnjani i Bogumili, naginjali su se arijanstvu, a ne vjerovanju *Homo/ousionu* ("jednom u biću") Atanazija Aleksandrijskog. Generalno, ideja o trojstvu nije bila bliska srcima bosanskih *kristijana*.*[29]



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Bosna je bila obilježena sa dvije strane nevidljivom linijom između dva administrativna područja Rimskog Carstva, ostala je svojevrsna tampon zona između dvije suprotstavljene kršćanske dogme.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Bosnia was marked on both sides by an invisible line between the two administrative areas of the Roman Empire, it remained a kind of buffer zone between two opposing Christian dogmas.

---

[29] Vjekoslav Klaić navodi da je ban Kulin između 1190. i 1199. godine napustio kršćansku doktrinu i prihvatio vjeru "bosanskih kršćana". Vjekoslav Klaić, *Povijest Bosne*..., str. 59. S druge strane, postoje istorijski dokumenti o povezanosti i komunikaciji patarena i katara sa "bosanskim kršćanima". O hijerarhiji "bosanskih kršćana" vidjeti: Domagoj Kaučić, ***Bosnian Christians – religious principles and influence in medieval Bosnia***. *Essehist*, časopis studenata povijesti i drugih društvenih i humanističkih znanosti 10, Filozofski fakultet u Osijeku, 2019., str. 25-30.
Dostupno na adresi: https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=342424. Pristup 25.05.2021.

("grandfather"), who presided over a council of twelve men called *stroynici*. Some of the adherents to the Bosnian Church resided in small monasteries, known as *hiža* ("house"), while others were wanderers, known as *gosti* ("guests"). It is interesting to note that Bosnian *Kristians*, as they were also called, were aware of the First Council of Nicaea. Also, they knew that the council decided against the Arians and that Arius and two of his followers were banished to Illyria. The Bosnian *Kristians*, the Good Bosnians and the Dear-to-God Bosnians, did lean towards Arianism rather than to *Homo/ousion* ("one in being") of Athanasius of Alexandria's creed. In general, the idea of trinity was not close to the hearts of Bosnian *Kristians*.*[29]



ILLUSTRATION ~ The Bosnian Church was independent, with its own religious doctrine and its own religious institution headed by Did.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Crkva bosanska je bila samostalna, sa svojom vjerskom doktrinom i svojom vjerskom institucijom na čijem vrhu je bio Did.

---

[29] Vjekoslav Klaić states that between 1190 and 1199 Ban Kulin left the Christian doctrine and accepted the religion of the "Bosnian Christians". Klaić, Vjekoslav: ***Povijest Bosne...***, p. 59. On the other hand, there are historical documents about the connection and communication of the Patarens and Cathars with the "Bosnian Christians". On the hierarchy of "Bosnian Christians", see: Domagoj Kaučić, ***Bosnian Christians - religious principles and influence in medieval Bosnia***. Essehist, magazine of students of history and other social and humanistic sciences 10, Faculty of Philosophy in Osijek, 2019, pp. 25-30.
Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=342424. Accessed on 25.05.2021.

Stoga su ih i Rimokatolička i Istočna pravoslavna crkva smatrali sumnjivima zbog svoje heretičke sklonosti. Stoga su morali proći kroz temeljitu kontrolu zvanu "odricanje", koju je izvršio papin legat po imenu Ivan de Casamaris na Bilinom Polju (dolina Bile) u blizini Zenice 1203. godine ili su morali pretrpjeti otvoreno prokletstvo, što je uradio Sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve u manastiru Žiči 1221. godine. Riječi kletve su išle ovako:

> *Treba objaviti svima: Rastudiju Bosanskom, Radomiru, Dražilu, Tolku i Tvrdošu i svima onima koji su se nazivali kršćanima, muškim i ženskim, ali ne klečeći pred svetim ikonama i Časnim krstom da ih treba prokleti... Zli heretici, trostruko prokleti Babuni, koji se lažno nazivaju kršćanima, koji se rugaju našoj pravoj vjeri, koji propuštaju iz svetih knjiga riječi i izvrću ih da liče na zlo, koji se udaljuju od Svete Pravoslavne Crkve, koji se rugaju svetinji i krst časni, a koji se rugaju svetim ikonama i ne kleče pred njima – neka su prokleti.*[30]

Uz sve to, treba priznati da su, zbog njihove navodne jeresi, zemlja i narod Bosne bili izloženi opakim križarskim ratovima, od kojih se neki mogu usporediti po žrtvama (kao što neki izvještaji ukazuju) sa zvjerstvima Rimske vojske u Kartagi, poznatim kao Punski ratovi.*[31]

Pitamo se da li su ova maltretiranja, denuncijacije, te teške psovke loše utjecale na psihologiju dobrih i bogoljubivih Bosanaca? Jesu li se osjećali loše zbog svojih moralnih vrijednosti? Jesu li osjećali da više nisu bogoljubivi ljudi? Naravno, neki od njih su se tako osjećali, ali većina je još uvijek bila dobro raspoložena po pitanju svog moralnog imidža i statusa kod Boga. Zaista, vrijeme dolaska islama 1463. godine bilo je savršeno. Dapače, ovaj dolazak islama u Bosnu značio je otklanjanje krivice prokletstva koje je bilo teško naneseno dobrim i bogoljubivim Bosancima. Da, Mehmed Fatih Osvajač je taj koji je u Bosnu donio slobodu od ove opsjedajuće aveti krivovjerja i umjesto toga obećao dobrim i bogoljubivim ljudima vječne Božije blagoslove da se osjećaju kao uvijek bolji i bogoljubivi ljudi bogoljubive zemlje Bosne.*[32]

---

[30] "Da bi održao svoj ugled vjerskog i društvenog vođe, Sava je nastavio putovati po manastirima i zemljama. 1221. godine u manastiru Žiča održan je sinod na kojem se osuđuje bogumilstvo."

Navedeni citat se nalazi u: Nada Klaić, ***Pregled izvora i historiografije za hrvatsku povijest do XII. stoljeća***. Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 1967., str. 315-316; Aleksandar Solovjev, ***Svedočanstva pravoslavnih izvora o bogumilstvu na Balkanu***. Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, 1997., str. 54-57; Aleksandar Solovjev, ***Vjersko učenje bosanske crkve***. Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti. Zagreb, 1948., str. 31. Sinod je najpotpunije opisan u Teodosijevom Žitije Svetog Save. Konsultirao sam srpski prevod od L. Mirković, ***Život Svetog Save*** (Belgrade, 1984.), str. 145-6. Parafrazirano je u N. Velimirovich, ***Life of Saint Sava*** (orig. 1951., ponovo štampano sa novim Uvodom, New York, 1989.), str. XI, 55-6, 96-7, 99-100. Domentijan, biograf Svetoga Save, njegov posljednji učenik, završio je *Žitije Svetog Save* 1243. god. Srpski prijevod, ***Život Svetog Save i Svetog Simeona***, R. Marinković i L. Mirković (Belgrade, 1988.), str. 154.

[31] Peter Edwell, ***War Abroad: Spain, Sicily, Macedon, Africa***. In: Dexter Hoyos (ed.): *A Companion to the Punic Wars*. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley, 2011., str. 320-338.

[32] Nekoliko primjera iz različitih stoljeća osmanske vladavine ilustrirat će primjenu *millet* sistema u stvarnom životu. Čim je osvojio Bosnu, 1463. godine, sultan Mehmed je govorio ljudima da se tiho vrate svojim kućama i da nastave prakticirati svoju vjeru i svoje zanate. Osvajač je najavio da će "narodi knjige", odnosno sljedbenici bogootkrivenih

Therefore, they were considered suspicious both by the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Church for their heretical inclination. Hence, they had to go through a thorough scrutiny called "abjuration", which was done by a legate of the Pope named Ivan de Casamaris at Bilino Polje ("Bila Valley") nearby Zenica in 1203 or they had to suffer an outright cursing, which was done by the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church at the Žiča Monastery in 1221. The words of the cursing went like this:

> *It should be announced to all: Rastudije Bosnian, Radomir, Dražilo, Tolko and Tvrdoš and all those who called themselves Christians, male and female, but do not kneel in front of the holy icons and the Holy Cross that they ought to be cursed... Evil heretic, triple-cursed Babuns, who falsely call themselves Christians, who mock our true religion, who miss from the holly books words and twist them to look like evil, who distance themselves from the Holy Orthodox Church, who mock the holly and honorable cross, and who mock holly icons and do not kneel in front of them - they should be cursed.**[30]

In addition to all of that, we should acknowledge that, because of their alleged heresy, the land and people of Bosnia were exposed to vicious crusades, some of which may be compared in casualties (as some reports have indicated) to the atrocities of the Roman army in Carthage, known as the Punic Wars.*[31]

Now, one wonders whether this harassment, these denunciations, and these heavy curses had a bad impact on the psychology of the good and God-laving Bosnians? Did they feel bad about their morality? Did they feel that they are not God-loving people anymore? Sure, some of them did feel that way, but majority were still in a good mood about their moral image and their status with God. Indeed, the timing of the arrival of Islam in 1463 was perfect. Nay, this arrival of Islam in Bosnia meant the removal of the guilt of curse that was heavily inflicted upon the good and God-loving Bosnians. Yes, it was Mehmed Fatih the Conqueror who brought to Bosnia freedom from this haunting ghost of heresy and promised instead to the good and God-loving people God's everlasting blessings so that they can feel as ever better and God-loving people of the God-loving land of Bosnia.*[32]

---

[30] "To maintain his standing as the religious and social leader, Sava continued to travel among the monasteries and lands. In 1221 a synod was held in the Zica monastery, condemning Bogomilism".

The cited quote is found in: Klaić, Nada: ***Pregled izvora i historiografije za hrvatsku povijest do XII. stoljeća***. Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 1967, pp. 315-316.; Solovjev, Aleksandar: ***Svedočanstva pravoslavnih izvora o bogumilstvu na Balkanu***. Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, 1997, pp. 54-57.; Solovjev, Aleksandar: ***Vjersko učenje bosanske crkve***. Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti. Zagreb, 1948, p. 31. The Synod is most fully described in Teodosije's ***Life of Saint Sava***. I have consulted the Serbian translation by L. Mirković, ***Žitije Svetog Save***. (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 145-6. It is paraphrased in N. Velimirovich, ***Life of Saint Sava*** (orig. 1951, reprinted with new ***Introduction***, New York, 1989), pp. XI, 55-6, 96-7, 99-100. A shorter account is in the Life by Domentijan; Serb translation, ***Život Svetog Save i Svetog Simeona*** by R. Marinković and L. Mirković, (Belgrade, 1988), p. 154.

[31] Edwell, Peter: ***War Abroad : Spain, Sicily, Macedon, Africa***. In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.): A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley, 2011, pp. 320–338.

[32] A few examples from different centuries of the Ottoman rule will illustrate the application of the *millet* system in real life. As soon as he conquered Bosnia, in 1463, Sultan Mehmed spoke to the people telling them to return quietly to their homes, and that they could continue to practice their own religion and their trades. The conqueror announced that the "Peoples of the Book", that is the adherents of the

S druge strane, kako se i očekivalo, Sinodu Srpske pravoslavne crkve nikada ne bi palo na pamet da se odrekne svog prokletstva iz manastira Žiče iz 1221. godine. Naravno, Sinod bi mogao da skine ovu kletvu i danas, ali to je van pameti jer su u Sinodu Srpske pravoslavne crkve i dalje misle da im dobri i bogoljubivi ljudi bogoljubive zemlje bosanske duguju svoju lojalnost i izvinjenje za jeres, a ne obrnuto. Ovo je težak dio bosanskog iskustva vjere, ali je inspirativan jer su dobri i bogoljubivi ljudi Bosne našli svoj mir i spokoj u miroljubivoj vjeri islamu koja ih je naučila onome što nisu znali prije. Ali oni su također sačuvali neka iskustva svoje stare vjere i najbolje od toga prenijeli u svoju novu vjeru islam kao što je poslanik Muhammed, a.s., rekao svojim *ashabima*: "Khayrukum fī al-jāhiliyyah, khayrukum fī al-Islām" (Najbolji od vas u vrijeme prije islama su najbolji i u vrijeme islama). Ovo vjerovjesničko pravilo je u velikoj mjeri primjenjivo na bosansko iskustvo vjere. Prvo, postojao je običaj u Bosni prije islama penjati se na planinu na molitvu glasne dove, kao da se na visokoj planini približavaš Bogu. Ova stara navika dobrog i bogoljubivog naroda Bosne i danas se prakticira kao neupitna islamska tradicija. Drugo, suština, a ne forma u vjeri i moralu je uvijek bila poželjnija u očima dobrih i bogoljubivih Bosanaca. Islam je tu preferenciju kod Bosanaca potvrdio govoreći da prava pravednost nije u okrenutosti prema istoku ili zapadu, već je prava pravednost u tome da iskreno vjeruješ u Boga, u dan obračuna, i da se pošteno i redovno moliš Bogu i da od svog bogatstva daješ odgovarajuću količinu onima kojima je to najpotrebnije itd. Vjerovatno je ta ideja stvarne suštine, a ne praznog oblika u vjeri, iskovala bosansku poslovicu: "Dobar je čovjek, ali ne hvali mu zakona." Drugim riječima, ne sudite o čovjekovoj vjeri, sudite o njegovim djelima i sudite o njegovom moralu, koji je odraz njegove stvarne vjere.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Mehmed Fatih je u Bosnu donio slobodu od opsjedajuće aveti krivovjerja - *Fatihova Ahdnama i fra Anđel Zvizdović.*
ILLUSTRATION ~ Mehmed Fatih brought freedom from the haunting specter of heresy to Bosnia - *Fatih's Ahdnama and friar Anđel Zvizdović.*

religija, sačuvati svoj poseban status pod zaštitom države. Sultan je uspostavio prava kršćana *ahdname* (zalogom) dodijeljenim kroz carski dekret. Ovo obećanje izražava važna pitanja kao što su zaštita manjina, sloboda jezika, obrazovanje na sopstvenom jeziku, kao i vjerske, kulturne i ekonomske slobode.

Vidjeti: Franz Babinger, ***Mehmed the Conqueror and His Tim***e. Princeton University Press, 1978.

On the other hand, as expected, the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church would have never thought to renounce its curse of Žiča Monastery dating from 1221. Of course, the Synod could remove this curse even today, but this is out of mind as they in the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church still think that the good and God-loving people of the God-loving land of Bosnian owe them their loyalty and their apology for heresy, not the other way around. This is a hard part of the Bosnian experience of faith, but an inspiring one though as the good and God-loving people of Bosnia have found their peace and tranquility in the peace-loving faith of Islam that has taught them what they didn't know before. But they also did preserve some experience of their old faith and pass the best of it into their new faith of Islam as the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, told to his Companions: "*Khayrukum fī al-jāhiliyyah, khayrukum fī al-Islām*", ("The best of you in the time prior to Islam are the best of you in the time of Islam as well"). This Prophetic rule is very much applicable to the Bosnian experience of faith. First, there was a habit in Bosnia before Islam of climbing to a mountain for a prayer of a loud *duā'* as if you become closer to God on a high mountain. This old habit of the good and God-loving people of Bosnia is still practiced as an unquestionable Islamic tradition. Second, the substance rather than form in faith and in morality was always more preferable in the eyes of good and God-loving Bosnians. Islam came to confirm that preference in Bosnians by saying that a true righteousness is not in facing towards the east or the west, but a true righteousness is in that that you sincerely believe in God, in the day of reckoning, and that you pray honestly and regularly to God and that you give a due amount of your wealth to those who need it the most, etc. It is probably this idea of real substance rather than an empty form in faith that forged a Bosnian proverb which says: "Dobar je čovjek, ali ne hvali mu zakona" ("He is a good man, but don't praise his law"). In other words, don't judge man's faith, judge his deeds, and judge his morality, which is a reflection of his real faith.



ILLUSTRATION ~ The arrival of Islam in Bosnia meant removing the guilt of the curse that was inflicted on good and God-loving Bosnians.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ Dolazak islama u Bosnu značio je otklanjanje krivice prokletstva koje je bilo teško naneseno dobrim i bogoljubivim Bosancima.

---

divinely revealed religions, would preserve their special status under the protection of the state. The Sultan established the rights of the Christians by an "*ahdname*" (pledge) granted through an imperial decree. This pledge expresses important issues such as protection of the minorities, freedom of language, education in one's own language as well as religious, cultural and economic freedom.

See, Franz Babinger: ***Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time***. Princeton University Press, 1978.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Vestfalski mir označio je kraj *Tridesetogodišnjeg rata* (1618. – 1648.) u kojem su sudjelovale sve europske velesile i koji nije bio samo sukob među državama, nego i među vjerama.



ILLUSTRATION ~ TThe Peace of Westphalia marked the end of the ***Thirty Years' War*** (1618 – 1648), in which all European superpowers participated and which was not only a conflict between states, but also between religions.

V

Više od hiljadu godina postoji iskustvo vjere u Bosni sa tri prepoznatljiva i karakteristična periodična sloja: a) period od četiri ili pet stoljeća manihejstva prije islama;*[33] b) period od pet ili šest stoljeća islama;*[34] i c) period više od jednog stoljeća "izgubljenog i pronađenog islama".*[35] Iako su ovi slojevi po definiciji različiti, oni, međutim, dijele dvije neraskidive niti: 1. otpornost, tj. kvalitetu mogućnosti vraćanja u prethodno stanje nakon problema; 2. otpor ili postojanost, tj. kvalitet da se bosanska tradicija vjere može održati protiv "odricanja", "prokletstva" i "ateizacije" u vrijeme komunizma, a nedavno i "*tekfira*", tj. okrivljavanja ili porušnjavanja bosanske tradicije vjere, koja ima svoju aromu islama, posebno nakon iskustva genocida.

Na osnovu dosad rečenog, može se zaključiti da je Bosna predodređena za svoje pluralno okruženje. Za razliku od perioda prije dolaska islama, kada je Bosna bila pod teškim pritiskom "čišćenja vjere", Mehmed Fatih Osvajač pokrenuo je nešto što je dosad nepoznato ne samo u Bosni nego i u Evropi.

---

[33] Kršćanska hereza u srednjem vijeku, nazvana manihejstvom, vidjela je zlo i dobro kao jednake sile u svađi. Jedna grupa, albižani u Provansi, uništena je svetim krstaškim ratom u 13. stoljeću. U Bosni je ova jeres živjela, njene pristaše nazivali su bogumilima. Katoličke i pravoslavne crkve i države bile su podjednako u namjeri da unište bogumilstvo. Bogumili su se, razumljivo, borili da zadrže nezavisnost Bosne.

Vidjeti više: Dimitri Obolensky: ***The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism***. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

[34] Antonina Zheliazkova, ***The Penetration and Adaptation of Islam in Bosnia from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century***. *Journal of Islamic Studies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, July 1994. 5 (2: Islam in The Balkans), str. 187-208.

[35] Rehabilitirajući predratnu ideju koja je bila dominantna među srpskom i hrvatskom inteligencijom, komunisti su usvojili koncept etničkog porijekla kao atributa i za naciju. Slaveni muslimani su se smatrali samo vjerskom grupom i stoga nisu bili uključeni ni u jednu od navedenih grupa, čak ni u kategoriju "drugih nacionalnosti i etničkih grupa". Za komuniste je bio nezamisliv pojam nacionalnosti zasnovan na drugom kriterijumu/atributu osim etničke pripadnosti. Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija (JMO) i Muslimanska vjerska zajednica (IVZ) nikada nisu dale mišljenje o bilo kom političkom aspektu nacionalnog pitanja ili o nekom obliku autonomije.

Paul Shoup, ***Communism and the Yugoslav National Question***. Columbia University Press, 1968, str. 109. Atif Purivatra priznaje da je "... prvenstveno kroz islam dio stanovništva srednje Bosne prihvatio i razvio odgovarajuću vjersko-društvenu i duhovnu strukturu na osnovu koje je, pod utjecajem specifičnih faktora, uspostavljena posebna etnička individualnost kao odvojene društveno-etničke formacije..."

Atif Purivatra, ***On the National Phenomenon of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*** (*O nacionalnom fenomenu bosansko-hercegovačkih Muslimana*, prevod Milica Hrgović), in: *Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia*, Međunarodna politika, Belgrade, 1974., str. 308-311.

Popović je optužio laički muslimanski nacionalizam (pokret radikalnih laičkih muslimana – nasuprot radikalnom vjerskom islamskom – koji se pojavio među komunističkom inteligencijom) da je neraskidivo povezan, na jedan ili drugi način, s vjerskom komponentom. Ilustrirao je ideju onim visokim muslimanskim intelektualcima koji su izražavali "krivu nježnost" prema "vječnim vrijednostima islama", koji su tražili približavanje marksizmu i islamu, u skladu s idejama Kadhafijeve Zelene knjige, kao i Purivatra, jedan od glavnih muslimanskih marksističkih teoretičara.

Alexandre Popović, ***Les Musulmans Yougoslaves, 1945-1989***. Médiateurs et Métaphores, L'Âge d'Homme, Lausanne, 1990., str. 35-38.

V

For more than a thousand years, there has been an experience of faith in Bosnia with three recognizable and characteristic periodic layers: a) a period of four or five centuries of Manichaeism prior to Islam;*[33] b) a period of five or six centuries of Islam proper;*[34] and c) a period of more than one century of Islam "lost and found."*[35] While these layers are by definition different, they, however, share two unbreakable threads: (1) a resilience, i.e. a quality of being able to return to a previous condition after problems; (2) a resistance or durability, i.e. a quality of being able to sustain the Bosnian tradition of faith against "abjuration", "cursing" and "atheization" during the communist time, and recently, "*takfīr*", i.e. a guiltification or uglification of the Bosnian tradition of faith, which has its own aroma of Islam, especially after the experience of Genocide.

Based on what has been said so far, it may be concluded that Bosnia is destined for its plural setting. Unlike the period prior to the arrival of Islam, when Bosnia had been under a severe pressure of "faith cleansing", Mehmed Fatih the Conqueror initiated something unknown previously not only in Bosnia but also in Europe. He initiated to the oath of God, on the oath of all God's messengers and on the oath of his personal power and honor – indeed,

---

[33] A Christian heresy in the Middle Ages, called Manichaeism, saw evil and good as equal forces in contention. One group, the Albigensians in Provence, was destroyed by holy crusade in the 13th century. In Bosnia, this heresy lived on, its adherents called Bogomils. Catholic and Orthodox churches and polities were equally intent on destroying Bogomilism. Bogomils fought, understandably, to retain Bosnia's independence.

See more Dimitri Obolensky: ***The Bogomils : A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeism***. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

[34] Antonina Zheliazkova: ***The Penetration and Adaptation of Islam in Bosnia from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century***. *Journal of Islamic Studies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, July 1994. 5 (2: Islam in The Balkans), pp. 187–208.

[35] Rehabilitating a pre-war idea which was predominant among the Serbian and Croatian intelligentsia, the Communists adopted the concept of ethnic origin as the attribute for nation as well. Slav Muslims were considered just a religious group and thus, were not included in any of the above-mentioned groups, not even in the category of "other nationalities and ethnic-groups." It was inconceivable for the Communists the notion of nationhood based on another criterion/attribute than ethnicity. Just as the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) and the Muslim Religious Community (IVZ) never ventured an opinion on any political aspect of the national question or on some form of autonomy.

Shoup, Paul Shoup: ***Communism and the Yugoslav National Question***. Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 109. Atif Purivatra recognizes that "...it was primarily through Islam that part of the population of central Bosnia accepted and developed a corresponding religious-social and spiritual structure on the basis of which, and under the influence of specific factors, a separate ethnic individuality was established as a separate socio-ethnic formation..."

Atif Purivatra: ***On the National Phenomenon of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*** ("O Nacionalnom Fenomenu Bosansko-Hercegovačkih Muslimana", translation Hrgovic, Milica), in Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia, Međunarodna Politika, Belgrade, 1974, p. 308-311.

Popovic accused laic Muslim nationalism (movement of radical laic Muslims - in opposition to the radical religious Islamic - which emerged among Communist intelligentsia,) of being inextricably linked, in the one or the other way, to a religious component. He illustrated the idea with those high rank Muslim intellectuals who expressed a "guilty tenderness" to the "eternal values of the Islam, who looked for approaching Marxism and Islam, in line with the ideas of Kadhafi's "Green book," as did Purivatra, one of the major Muslim Marxist theorists.

Alexandre Popovic: ***Les Musulmans Yougoslaves, 1945-1989***. Médiateurs et Métaphores, L'Âge d'Homme, Lausanne, 1990, pp. 35-38.

Pokrenuo je zakletvu Božiju, zakletvom svih Božijih poslanika i zakletvom svoje lične moći i časti – zaista, potpisao je 1464. godine, prve godine svog dolaska u Bosnu, *Ahdnamu*, dokument zasnovan na kvintesenciji šerijata (*khamsah ḍarūrijjāt*). Naime, garancija svetosti pet osnovnih vrednosti ljudskog bića: *al-nafs* (život), *al-dīn* (vjera), *al-ʾaql* (sloboda), *al-māl* (imetak) and *al-ʾird* (dostojanstvo) svakom pojedincu u Bosni bez obzira na njegovu/njenu rasu, vjeru i etničku pripadnost. Ovo je bio i još uvijek je jedan od najmoćnijih presedana u unapređenju vjerskog pluralizma islamskog porijekla. Nije slučajno da je dokument Fatihove *Ahdname* nastao u Bosni. Bosni je u to vrijeme bio potreban takav dokument, kojeg je Bosna u potpunosti prihvatila.*[36] Evropa je dugo čekala da se sličan dokument razradi samo u riječi *Nostra Aetate*, Dokumenta o odnosu Crkve s nekršćanskim religijama Drugog vatikanskog koncila koji je objavljen 1965. godine.*[37]



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Ahdnamom je sultan dao prava franjevcima. Njome im je omogućeno slobodno obavljanje vjerske službe. Tradicija govori da je izdana 1463. ili 1464. fra Anđelu Zvizdoviću na polju Milodražkom polju.

ILLUSTRATION ~ The sultan gave rights to the Franciscans by Ahdnam. It enables them to freely perform religious services. Tradition says that it was issued in 1463 or 1464 to Fr. Anđel Zvizdović on the Milodražev field.

---

[36] Edikt je izdao sultan Mehmed II el-Fatih radi zaštite osnovnih prava bosanskog naroda kada je osvojio Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1463. godine. Originalni edikt se i danas čuva u Franjevačkom samostanu u blizini Fojnice. *Ahdnama* sultana Mehmeda Fatiha je najstarija poznata deklaracija o ljudskim pravima poznata u historiji, proglašena je 1463. godine. Objavljena je 326 godina prije Francuske revolucije 1789., 485 godina prije Međunarodne deklaracija o ljudskim pravima iz 1948. godine.

[37] Pope Paul VI, ***Declaration on the relation of the church to non-christian religions — Nostra aetate***. Holy. Vidjeti: 28. oktobar 1965.

Dostupno na adresi: https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html. Pristup 25.12.2021.

he signed in 1464, the first year of his arrival in Bosnia, the document of ***Ahdname*** based on the quintessence of *Sharī'ah* ("*khamsah ḍarūriyyāt*"), namely, the guarantee of the sanctity of the five fundamental values of human being: *al-nafs* (life), *al-dīn* (faith), *al-ʿaql* (freedom), *al-māl* (property) and *al-ʿird* (dignity) to every individual in Bosnia regardless of his/her race, faith and ethnicity. This had been and still is one of the most powerful precedents in advancing a religious pluralism of an Islamic origin. It is not a coincidence that the document of Fatih's *Ahdname* was worked out in Bosnia. Bosnia had been in need of such a document at the time, but also it was ready to embrace it fully as well.*[36] Europe has long waited for a similar document to be worked out only in the word of *Nostra Aetate*, the Document on the Relation of the Church with Non-Christian Religions of the Second Vatican Council which was promulgated in 1965.*[37]




ILLUSTRATION ~ Nostra Aetate - The Declaration on the relationship of the Church towards non-Christian religions of the Second Vatican Council from October 28, 1965.

ILUSTRACIJA ~ Nostra Aetate - Deklaracija o odnosu Crkve prema nekršćanskim religijama Drugog vatikanskog sabora iz 28. 10.1965.

---

[36] The edict was issued by the Sultan Mehmet II El Fatih to protect the basic rights of Bosnian people when he conquered Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1463. The original edict is still kept in Franciscan Monastery in the vicinity of Fojnica. The *Ahdnama* of Sultan Mehmet Fatih is an oldest Human Rights Declaration known in history, declared in 1463. It was announced 326 years before the French Revolution of 1789, 485 years before 1948 the International Human Rights Declaration of 1948.

[37] Pope Paul VI: ***Declaration on the relation of the church to non-christian religions — Nostra Aetate***. Holy. See 28 October 1965. Available at: https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html. Accessed 25.12.2021.

Osim imaginacije, Evropa nema nikakvo iskustvo vjere u smislu nebeskog dodira ili blagoslova kao što je imao i još uvijek ima orijentalni istok. Evropa ima samo kopiju neposredne nebeske intervencije ili otkrivenja. Tako je spor oko toga čija je kopija original doveo Evropu do niza vjerskih ratova u 16. i 17. stoljeću. Ovo je bilo zaista pogubno za kontinent. Više od 10 miliona ljudi je ubijeno.*[38] Tridesetogodišnji rat (1618–1648) u Evropi okončan je Vestfalskim mirom (1648).*[39] Zaista, Evropa je još uvijek pod pojmom vestfalskog suvereniteta, zasnovanog na dvije vrlo bitne premise: 1. pravedno dijeljenje političke i ekonomske moći; 2. uvažavanje vjerske raznolikosti i multietničnosti u jedinstvu. Ove dvije aksiomatske pretpostavke mogu se sažeti u ideju demokratije i ljudskih prava. Zaista, ovo su dva stuba na kojima je izgrađena današnja Evropa.

Međutim, postoji još jedna važnija dimenzija Evrope koja danas pokušava da održi svoju Uniju, a to je ideja "pomirenja". Ne, to je ključ za svaki osjećaj ujedinjene Evrope sa svojom raznolikošću rase, vjere, kulture, etničke pripadnosti… Donedavno se smatralo da je religija prepreka "pomirenju" ne samo u Evropi, već i u svijetu. Evropa je dugo vremena bila najglasniji glas i najjača sila u smanjivanju religioznog prisustva u prostoru. Činilo se da je religija izgubila utjecaj na umove i duše ljudi, kao što je to bilo u prošlosti. Zaista, izgledalo je kao da nema potrebe govoriti o religijskom ili vjerskom iskustvu. Ovakvo iskustvo više ne postoji. Ono što, ipak, postoji je iluzija da ljudi mogu nekako živjeti kao da Bog ne postoji, a ako Bog postoji, ljudi nemaju ništa s tim. Oni su slobodni u svojoj ljudskosti bez Boga. To je bilo stanje uma čovjeka, posebno u Evropi, Evropi u kojoj je nekada živio Friedrich Nietzsche, koji je svojevremeno proglasio da je Bog mrtav. "Gott ist tot! Gott bleibt tot! Und wir haben ihn getötet!" (Bog je mrtav. Bog ostaje mrtav! I mi smo ga ubili.). "Međutim, mnogo prije Nietzschea, frazu *'Dieu est mort!'* napisao je u pjesmi *'Le Christ aux oliviers'* iz 1854. ("Hrist u maslinovom drveću") Gerarda de Nervala" (ovaj citat nam je došao milošću gospodina Abdulaha Druryja).

Zaista, Nietzscheov komentar je bio krik jadikovke i tragedije! Ne proklamacija sreće ili trijumfa. Pa, sada znamo da je Nietzsche mrtav, dok je Svemogući Bog uvijek živ i uvijek prisutan u ljudskim umovima i u ljudskim dušama bez razmišljanja o tome šta je Nietzsche rekao.*[40] Problem danas je što Evropa ne zna da čita vjerske poruke koje ponovo stižu sa istoka ne samo od muslimana, već i od drugih vjernika koji vjeruju da vjera nije prepreka za pomirenje u cijelom svetu radi mira i sigurnosti u svijetu, već, naprotiv, istinska vjera u Boga je najjača snaga za bolji, sigurniji i mirniji svijet. Ovdje muslimani moraju pokazati da je to istina – zaista, da je riječ "islam" koncept mira i da riječ "musliman" doslovno znači "mirni čovjek", "čovjek koji voli mir". Mogu li muslimani to zaista učiniti? Vjerujem da mogu.

---

[38] Cathal Nolan, ***The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000–1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization***. Volume 2. Greenwood Publishing Group, London, 2006, pp. 708-710; Onnekink, ***War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713***. Ashgate Publishing, 2013, str. 1-8; Micheline Ishay, ***The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era***. Oakland: University of California Press, 2008, str. 99.

[39] ***The Peace of Westphalia: Münster***, 24. October 1648. [Excerpts]. University of Oregon.
Dostupno na adresi: https://pages.uoregon.edu/dluebke/301ModernEurope/Treaty%20of%20Westphalia%20%5BExcerpts%5D.pdf. Pristup 30.09.2021.

[40] ***The Gay Science***, (Walter Kaufmann trans.). New York: Vintage, 1974. (1st ed. 1882, 2nd ed. 1887), str. 108, 125, 343. Konsultirao sam ***The Gay Science*** (J. Nauckhoff trans.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.

Except for a mythical imagination, Europe has no experience of faith in terms of a heavenly touch or a blessing as the oriental east had and still has. Europe has only a copy of an immediate heavenly intervention or revelation. Thus, a dispute about whose copy is original has led Europe to a series of religious wars in 16th and 17th century. This was really devastating for the continent. Over 10 million people have been killed.*[38] Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) in Europe ended by the Peace of Westphalia (1648).*[39] Indeed, Europe is still under the notion of Westphalian sovereignty, based on two very essential premises: (1) sharing political and economic power in fairness; (2) appreciating religious diversity and multi-ethnicity in unity. These two axiomatic presuppositions might be summed up in the idea of Democracy and Human Rights. Indeed, these are two pillars on which today's Europe is bult up.

However, there is one more important dimension of Europe today as it tries to keep its Union alive, and that is the idea of "reconciliation". Nay, this is the key for any sense of a United Europe with its diversity of race, faith, culture, ethnicity... Until recently, it has been thought, that religion is an obstacle to "reconciliation" not only in Europe, but also in the world. Europe has been for a long time the loudest voice and the strongest force in downgrading a religious presence in the space. It has seemed that religion has lost its sway on people's minds and souls as it used to have had in the past. Indeed, it has looked as if there is no need to talk about religious or faith experience. This kind of experience does not exist anymore. What exists though is an illusion that humans can somehow live as if God does not exist and if God does exist, the humans have nothing to do with it. They are free in their humanness without God. That has been the state of mind of man, especially in Europe, the Europe in which once lived Friedrich Nietzsche, who once proclaimed that God is dead. "Gott ist tot! Gott bleibt tot! Und wir haben ihn getötet! ("God is dead. God remains dead! And we have killed him"). "However, long before Nietzsche, the phrase *'Dieu est mort!'* was written in the 1854 poem *'Le Christ aux oliviers'* ("Christ at the olive trees") by Gerard de Nerval" (this quotation came to us by the grace of Mr Abdullah Drury).

Indeed, Nietzsche's comment was a cry of lament and tragedy! Not a proclamation of happiness or triumph. Well, we know now that Nietzsche is dead, whereas God Almighty is ever alive and ever present on human minds and in human souls without thinking of what Nietzsche said.*[40] The problem today is that Europe doesn't know how to read religious messages that are coming once again from the east not only from the Muslims, but also from other faithful people who believe that faith is not an obstacle for a worldwide reconciliation for the sake of peace and security in the world, but, on the contrary, the genuine faith in God is the strongest force for a better, safer and peaceful world. Here the Muslims must come in to demonstrate that this is true – indeed, that the word

---

[38] Cathal Nolan: ***The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000–1650 : An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization***. Volume 2. Greenwood Publishing Group, London, 2006, pp. 708–710.; Onnekink: ***War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713***. Ashgate Publishing, 2013, pp. 1–8.; Ishay, Micheline: ***The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era***. Oakland: University of California Press, 2008, p. 99.

[39] ***The Peace of Westphalia : Münster***, 24 October 1648 [Excerpts]. University of Oregon. Available at: https://pages.uoregon.edu/dluebke/301ModernEurope/Treaty%20of%20Westphalia%20%5BExcerpts%5D.pdf. Accessed 30.09.2021.

[40] ***The Gay Science***, (Walter Kaufmann trans.). New York: Vintage, 1974. (1st ed. 1882, 2nd ed. 1887), pp. 108, 125, 343. Konsultirao sam ***The Gay Science*** (J. Nauckhoff trans.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.

Vjerujem da mi u Bosni to možemo. Mi njegujemo i bosansko iskustvo vjere, koje je jedinstveno po mnogo čemu, ali isto tako njegujemo evropsko iskustvo vjere koje se može usporediti sa iskustvom vjere Andaluzije, koja je i evropska i muslimanska *par excellence.* Iako nije potpuno pogrešno govoriti o "bosanskom islamu" ili "evropskom islamu", ali ova fraza može biti pogrešna jer ne postoji nešto kao što je "bosanski" ili neki drugi islam. Postoji samo jedan islam kako ga definiraju Kur'an i Sunnet. Međutim, postoje različita iskustva tog jednog te istog islama prema različitim sredinama u kojima muslimani žive. Vidimo da među različitim muslimanskim nacijama postoje razlike u razumijevanju i prakticiranju islama. Ovo nas uopće ne bi trebalo uznemiravati. Naprotiv, trebali bismo podsticati takvu raznolikost među muslimanskim nacijama. Ovo je veliko bogatstvo cijelog ummeta. Svjedoci smo i ovdje u Bosni tokom rata i mira da naše razumijevanje islama nije isto što i razumijevanje nekih ljudi koji su došli, bez sumnje s dobrom namjerom, da nas pouče o svom razumijevanju islama. Nije da su oni sami po sebi u krivu, već su u krivu po našem pravu jer mi imamo pravo shvatiti značenje islama u svom umu i duši i, shodno tome, imamo odgovornost za ono šta mislimo i šta mi radimo. Jer, islam nije samo vizija transcendentalne poruke, već je i imanentni fenomen kulture, koji se razlikuje od mjesta do mjesta ovisno o geografskom, klimatskom, društvenom, ekonomskom i političkom ambijentu u kojem muslimani žive kao "kulturni brokeri", da tako kažem.

Dozvolite mi da zaključim napomenom da trebamo biti svjesni činjenice da je ideja pluralizma veoma osporavana od strane populizma i ekstremista ne samo u religiji nego i u politici gdje je moć činjenja zla mnogo veća. Muslimani bi se trebali udružiti s onima koji zagovaraju politički i društveni pluralizam i cijene vjersku i kulturnu raznolikost. Snage protiv pluralizma su danas na potezu. Fenomeni diskriminacije, etničkog ili rasnog profiliranja, etničkog čišćenja, uznemiravanja, islamofobije, marginalizacije, migranata, rasizma, antisemitizma… svugdje su u porastu. Nijedna država, nijedna nacija, nijedna religija, nijedna kultura, nijedna politika nije imuna na ova zla. Svako ima pravo i dužnost da bude na oprezu i da čini svoj dio u promociji dobra i sprečavanju zla (*al-amru bi-l-maʾrūfi wa al-nahyu ʾan al-munkari*). Nakon pada komunizma u istočnoj Evropi niko nije bio spreman za nasilni raspad Jugoslavije. Odjednom su stari pojmovi poput četnika i ustaša našli novu valutu i pojavio se novi termin – "etničko čišćenje" – sa svojim bolesnim odjekom "konačnog rješenja."*[41]

---

[41] Termin *ethnic cleansing*, doslovan prijevod srpsko-hrvatske fraze "etničko čišćenje", bio je široko korišten 1990-ih (iako se taj izraz prvi put pojavio ranije) za opisivanje brutalnog postupanja prema različitim civilnim grupama u sukobima koji su izbili nakon raspada Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. Ove grupe su uključivale Bošnjake (bosanske Muslimane) u Bosni i Hercegovini, Srbe u regiji Krajine u Hrvatskoj, te etničke Albance i kasnije Srbe u srpskoj pokrajini Kosovo. Termin je također povezan s tretmanom indonezijskih militanata prema narodu Istočnog Timora, od kojih su mnogi ubijeni ili prisiljeni da napuste svoje domove nakon javnog glasanja za nezavisnost 1999. godine, kao i za nevolje Čečena koji su pobjegli iz Groznija i drugih područja Čečenije nakon ruskih vojnih operacija protiv čečenskih separatista tokom 1990-ih. Prema izvještaju koji je izdao generalni sekretar Ujedinjenih nacija (UN), česta pojava etničkog čišćenja 1990-ih mogla se pripisati prirodi savremenih oružanih sukoba, u kojima … civilne žrtve i uništavanje civilne infrastrukture nisu jednostavno nusproizvodi rata, ali su posljedica namjernog ciljanja neboraca… U mnogim sukobima, zaraćene strane ciljaju civile kako bi protjerali ili iskorijenili dijelove stanovništva, ili u svrhu ubrzanja vojne predaje. Etničko čišćenje kao koncept izazvao je značajne kontroverze. Neki kritičari vide malu razliku između toga i *genocida*. ***Etničko čišćenje*** – ***ratni zločin***. Encyclopedia Britannica.

Dostupno na adresi: https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-cleansing. Pristup 10.10.2021.

of "**Islam**" is a concept of peace and that the word of "**Muslim**" literally means a "**Peaceful Man**", a "**Peace Loving Man**". Can the Muslims really do it? I believe that they can. I believe that we in Bosnia can do it. We cherish both the Bosnian experience of faith, which is unique in many ways, but also, we cherish a European experience of faith which can be traced to the experience of the faith of Andalusia, which is both European and Muslim *par excellence*. Although it is not completely wrong to talk about a "Bosnian Islam" or a "European Islam", but this phrasing might be misleading because there is no such thing as" Bosnian" or otherwise Islam. There is only one Islam as the Qur'an and the Sunnah define it. However, there are different experiences of that one and the same Islam according to different environments the Muslim live in. We can see that there are differences among the different Muslim nations in understanding and practicing Islam. This should not disturb us at all. On the contrary, we should encourage such diversity among the Muslim nations. This is a great richness of the whole Ummah. We have witnessed it here in Bosnia during the war and peace that our understanding of Islam is not the same as the understanding of some people who came, no doubt with a good intention, to teach us about their understanding of Islam. It is not that they are wrong in their own right, but they are wrong in our own right because we have the right to grasp the meaning of Islam in our own mind and soul and, consequently, we have the responsibility for what we think and what we do. Because, Islam is not only a vision of a transcendental message, but also it is an immanent phenomenon of culture, which is different from one place to another depending on a geographical, climate, social, economic and political ambient where Muslims live as concrete "cultural brokers", so to speak.

Let me conclude with the note that we should be aware of the fact that the idea of pluralism is very much challenged by populism and extremists not only in religion but also in politics where the power to do evil is much greater. The Muslims should ally with those who advocate political and social pluralism and appreciate religious and cultural diversity. The anti-pluralism forces are on the move nowadays. The phenomena of discrimination, ethnic or racial profiling, ethnic cleansing, harassment, Islamophobia, marginalization, migrants, racism, anti-Semitism... are on rise every very. No country, no nation, no religion, no culture, no politics is immune to these evils. Everyone has the right and duty to be vigilant and to do his/her part in promoting good and preventing evil (*al-amru bi-l-maʿrūfi wa al-nahyu ʿan al-munkari*). After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, no one was prepared for the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Suddenly old terms like chetnik and ustasha found new currency, and a new term surfaced – *'ethnic cleansing'* – with its sickening echo of 'final solution'.*[41]

---

[41] The term ethnic cleansing, a literal translation of the Serbo-Croatian phrase 'etničko čisćenje', was widely employed in the 1990s (though the term first appeared earlier) to describe the brutal treatment of various civilian groups in the conflicts that erupted upon the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These groups included Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) in Bosnia - Herzegovina, Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia, and ethnic Albanians and later Serbs in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The term also has been attached to the treatment by Indonesian militants of the people of East Timor, many of whom were killed or forced to abandon their homes after the public vote in favor of independence in 1999 as well as to the plight of Chechens who fled Grozny and other areas of Chechnya following Russian military operations against Chechen separatists during the 1990s. According to a report issued by the United Nations (UN) secretary-general, the frequent occurrence of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s was attributable to the nature of contemporary armed conflicts, in which ... civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure are not simply by-products of war, but the consequence of the deliberate targeting of non-combatants.... [I]n many conflicts, belligerents target civilians in order to expel or eradicate segments of the population, or for the purpose of hastening military surrender. Ethnic cleansing as a concept has generated considerable controversy.

Porast nacionalističkog raspoloženja u istočnoj Evropi postavlja pitanje da li su ratovi u bivšoj Jugoslaviji nagovještaji stvari koje dolaze. Hoće li rasistička ideja etnički čiste države slomiti humanistički ideal multikulturalnog društva?

U monumentalnom pregledu svoje knjige *Yugoslavian Inferno* ("Jugoslovenski pakao") Paul Mojzes,*[42] međunarodno priznati autoritet za religiju u istočnoj Evropi, daje informativnu analizu zbunjujućih pitanja koja su dovela do raspada Jugoslavije. Paul Mojzes je na suptilan način objasnio fenomen srpskih četnika i hrvatskih ustaša kao primjer populizma i ekstremizma balkanskog tipa koji još uvijek postoji i može biti povod za budući sukob. Najefikasniji način borbe protiv takve tiranije ili zloupotrebe je analiza i artikulacija; pojedinac mora dekonstruirati problem i formulirati argument ili rješenje.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Poruke mnogih: "Rasizam i islamofobija nigdje nisu dobrodošli".
ILLUSTRATION ~ Messages from many: "Racism and Islamophobia are not welcome anywhere".

[42] Paul Mojzes, ***Yugoslavian Inferno***. The Continium Publishing Company, New York, 1994.

The upsurge of nationalist sentiment in Eastern Europe raises the question whether the wars in the former Yugoslavia are harbingers of things to come. Will the racist idea of the ethnically pure state crush the humanist ideal of the multicultural society?

In a monumental survey of his book *Yugoslavian Inferno*, Paul Mojzes*[42], the internationally recognized authority on religion in Eastern Europe, provides an informative analysis of the perplexed issues that brought about the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Paul Mojzes' explained in a subtle way the phenomena of Serbian *Chetnik* and Croatian *Ustaša* as an example of populism and extremism of a Balkan type that still existent and may be cause for a future conflict. The most effective way to fight such tyranny or abuse is through analysis and articulation; the individual must deconstruct the issue, the problem, and formulate an argument or a solution.



ILLUSTRATION ~ "Muhammad (s) Symbol of Freedom & Honour" - The message of Muslims.
ILUSTRACIJA ~ "Muhammad a.s. je simbol slobode i časti" - poruka muslimana.

Some critics see little difference between it and *genocide*. ***Ethnic cleansing - war crime.*** Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-cleansing. Accessed 10.10.2021.

[42] Mojzes, Paul: ***Yugoslavian Inferno***. The Continium Publishing Company, New York, 1994.

reference / references

ARENDT, HANNAH, *"Truth and Politics" in The Portable Hannah Arendt*, ed. Peter Baehr, New York, 2000.

BIDELEUX, ROBERT & IAN JEFFRIES, *The Balkans: A Post-communist History*, London; New York Routledge, 2007.

BJELIĆ, DUŠAN & OBRAD SAVIC, *Balkan as Metaphor: between Globalization and Fragmentation*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002.

CRAMPTON, R.J., *The Balkans since the Second World War, London*; New York: Longman, 2002.

FINE, JOHN V.A. & JR. ANN ARBOR, *The Early Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey From The Sixth To The Late Twelfth Century*. University of Michigan Press, 1983.

FINE, JOHN V.A. & JR. ANN ARBOR, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey From The Late Twelfth Century To The Ottoman Conquest*, University of Michigan Press, 1987.

FINE, JOHN V.A. & ANN ARBOR, *When Ethnicity Did Not Matter In The Balkans: A Study Of Identity In Pre-nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia In The Medieval And Early-modern Periods*, University of Michigan Press, 2006.

FINE, JOHN, THE BOSNIAN CHURCH, *From The Twelfth To The Fourteenth Century, Saqi Books*, London, 2017.

ERASMUS, DESIDERIUS ROTERODAMUS, *In Praise of Folly*, English translation published in 1922.

GLENNY, MISHA, *The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, London: Granta Books, 1999.

HATZOPOULOS, PAVLOS, *The Balkans beyond Nationalism and Identity: International Relations and Ideology*, London; New York: I.B.

HUPCHICK, DENNIS, *The Balkans From Constantinople to Communism*, Palgrave, 2002.

HUPCHICK, DENNIS & HAROLD E. COX, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkan*s, New York: Palgrave, 2001.

JAY, MARTIN, *The Vertues Mendocity – On Lying in Politics*, University of Virginia Press, 2010.

JELAVICH, BARBARA, *History Of The Balkans*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

LE BON, GUSTAVE, *The Crowd: A stusdy of the Popular Mind*, Dover Publications, New York, 2002.

MAC DONALD, DAVID BRUCE, *Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centered Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia*, Oxford University Press, 2002.

MAZOWER, MARK, *The Balkans: A Short History*, New York: Modern Library, 2000; Tauris; New York: Distributed in the U.S.A. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

MOJZES, PAUL, *Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethno-religious Warfare in the Balkans*, The Continium Publishing Company, New York, 1994.

NORRIS, H.T., *Islam In The Balkans: Religion and Society Between Europe and the Arab World*, London: Hurst & Company: Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1993.

TODOROVA, MARIA, *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, editor. Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 2004.

TODOROVA, MARIA, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

SAID, EDWARD, Orientalism, New York, Pantheon, 1978.

STEPHENSON, PAU, *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.



ILUSTRACIJA ~ Patriotizam u zagrljaju nacionalizma. "Ne samo da Srbija ne prihvaća odgovornost za zločine počinjene u ime srpskog naroda, nego politički tone u početak 90-ih i nacionalizam koji je tada bujao u zemlji", piše New York Times.

ILLUSTRATION ~ Patriotism in the embrace of nationalism. "Not only that Serbia does not accept responsibility for the crimes committed in the name of the Serbian people, but politically it sinks into the beginning of the 90's and the nationalism that flourished in the country at that time," writes the New York Times. (direktno, 28.11.2017.)